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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to gain an understanding of the problems that may impede 
detection and recovery of NHS laboratory screening errors. This is done by developing an 
accident analysis technique that isolates and further analyzes error handling activities, 
and applying it in four case studies; four recent incidents where laboratory errors in NHS 
screening programmes resulted in multiple misdiagnoses over months or even years. 
These errors resulted in false yet plausible test results, thus being masked and almost 
impossible to detect in isolated cases. 
 
This technique is based on a theoretical framework that draws upon cognitive science and 
systems engineering, in order to explore the impact of the plausibility of false test results 
on the entire process of error recovery. The four analyses are then integrated and 
compared, in order to produce a set of conclusions and recommendations. 
 
The main output of this work is the “Screening Error Recovery Model”; a model which 
captures and illustrates the different kinds of activities that took place during the 
organizational incident responses of these four incidents. The model can be used to 
analyze and design error recovery procedures in complex, inter-organizational settings, 
such as the NHS, and its Primary/Secondary care structure.  
 
Thesis statement  
This thesis aims to contribute to the safety and overall quality of screening programmes 
in the NHS, by enhancing our understanding of the problems that may impede detection 
and recovery of screening errors. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
Laboratory and radiology departments are playing an increasingly critical role in modern 
healthcare. In the past 25 years, advances in medical knowledge and technology have 
created the opportunity for better and faster patient diagnosis; for instance, with new 
high-speed analyzers laboratory testing can be largely automated, while with an 
information-technology based infrastructure, specialist doctors can now perform the 
interpretation of X-rays from a distance, without the patient having to go to the hospital 
[Brennan, 2005].  
 
The benefits of these innovations can be seen in the Breast Cancer Screening Programme 
of the UK’s National Health Service (NHS). Since its introduction in 1987, the 
programme resulted to a 25% drop in mortality rates attributed to breast cancer by 2000 
[NHS Advisory Committee for Breast Cancer Screening, 2006]. Similar success has been 
achieved by other NHS screening programs, altogether contributing significantly to the 
timely diagnosis of various forms of cancer, Sexually Transmitted Infections (STI), and 
other critical conditions.  
 
Despite the significant advances in laboratory medicine, hospitals and laboratories still 
remain concerned about the accuracy, validity and reliability of clinical test results 
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[Plebani and Carraro, 1997; Hickner et al., 2006; Schiff, 2006]. As several challenges and 
problems remain in the already complex setting of diagnostic networks (e.g., the 
definition of an acceptable error range, delays in following-up critical test results), the 
drastic changes that information technology has brought about have created the potential 
for new kinds of error, which—although rare—can be significantly more disastrous in 
extent.  
 
Table 1.1 summarizes three serious screening incidents which had multiple adverse 
outcomes over long periods of time. The table below is based on the subsequent inquiry 
reports that were produced [Ferres et al., 2001; Commission for health improvement, 
2002; Baker, 2006]; immediate cause refers to the cause that initiated the incident, while 
incident-prolonging causes are issues that resulted in not detecting the immediate cause 
and/or poorly handing the incident. Similar screening incidents have occurred in the UK 
[The Guardian, 2006], USA [Wears, 2003] and Canada [Bernstein, 2003].  
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Incident Investigation findings Patients affected 
1. Down’s syndrome 
screening errors, 
Sheffield Northern 
General Hospital, 
Immunology Dept. 
 
January-May 2001 
Immediate cause: A software bug was affecting 
an algorithm used to calculate the likelihood of 
pregnant women giving birth to children with 
Down’s 
Incident-prolonging factors: User interface 
deficiencies, audits not carried out as planned, 
incident log books not used as specified, poor 
communication between staff groups 
- 158 high-risk 
pregnancies missed 
 
- 2 women had late 
abortion 
- 2 women gave birth to 
children with Down’s 
2. Breast cancer 
screening errors, 
Hammersmith 
London, Breast 
Cancer screening 
service 
 
1993-October 2000 
Immediate cause: Confusing notation for denoting 
positive and negative results 
Incident-prolonging factors: No robust protocol 
for ensuring women received the correct result, 
strained relationships between staff groups, 
poor handling of complaints 
- Over 12,000 incorrect  
tests 
 
- 17 patients more 
critical  
- 1 death 
3. Breast cancer 
screening errors, 
Manchester, Breast 
Cancer screening 
service 
April 2003–January 
2006 
Immediate cause: ‘Human’ error of a single 
radiologist, who misinterpreted multiple 
mammograms  
 Incident-prolonging factors: No double-checking 
of radiology reports which is common practice, 
lack of safeguards  
- 176 mammograms 
misinterpreted 
 
- 28 cancers missed, 
out of which 17 were 
very critical 
Table 1.1: NHS screening incidents 
Although the immediate causes that led to these unfortunate events vary (i.e., hardware 
and software bugs, problematic notation for denoting positives, human error), all of these 
incidents were prolonged for several months by relatively common organizational 
problems (e.g., communication breakdowns, lack of safeguards, poor handling of 
complaints); however, the most important aspect of these failures is that when the errors 
manifested, false test results were plausibly acceptable, masking errors and allowing for 
them to be used in the diagnostic process. Detection was consequently only possible over 
time, when experienced staff became increasingly alarmed over a lack of positive results 
reported from the laboratory. 
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The study presented in this thesis is therefore an attempt to identify and analyze the 
factors that inhibit laboratory error detection and recovery. While there has been 
considerable work in the study of laboratory error, little attention has been paid to the 
impact of such errors to healthcare systems overall and how errors are detected and dealt 
with [Plebani and Carraro, 2004]. In addition, this work may be distinguished from 
previous error handling studies by incorporating the concept of problem detection in the 
overall error recovery process. Problem detection refers to the concerns over a potential 
error, as opposed to error detection, which is the identification of an error) [Klein et al., 
2005].  
 
In order to achieve these purposes, an accident analysis tool has been developed which 
focuses on the error handling activities that took place during an incident. This tool is the 
primary contribution of this thesis, which has been specifically tailored to help analyze 
these healthcare events. The development of such a tool was found necessary as existing 
accident analysis approaches do not take a structured perspective on the sequence of 
events that form an error recovery process. The accident analysis approach suggested has 
been used to analyze four incidents; resulting findings were then integrated and compared 
in order to draw high level conclusions about the factors that limit the ability of 
healthcare systems to detect, control and recover from laboratory error.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the aims and objectives of the study, and present 
an overview of the thesis. 
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1.1 Aims and objectives 
The work presented in this thesis focuses on the events that take place once there are 
initial concerns that ‘something is wrong’, but does not examine the causal factors, i.e., 
what led to the errors in the first place. The high-level goal of this study is to understand 
how errors could be better detected, contained and controlled, in order to help healthcare 
professionals limit the consequences on human life to the smallest extent. 
 
The aims of this thesis are the following:  
• Primary Aim: To gain a detailed understanding of the factors that affect 
detection and recovery of screening errors 
Investigations into the incidents discussed in Table 1.1 produced detailed 
conclusions and recommendations regarding the improvement of organizational 
response to errors. The primary aim of this thesis is to utilize these findings by 
comparing and integrating them, and further analyzing them with a scientific 
method that can be useful for policy-makers, system and medical device 
designers. The results of this analysis will be presented in Chapter 6, which will 
conclude with a detailed model that presents all the activities that may take place 
during laboratory error handling.  
 
• Secondary Aim: To generate recommendations for the improvement of 
laboratory error handling 
The basis for these recommendations will be the model that has been developed in 
order to meet the Primary Aim. Recommendations will focus on improving each 
stage of laboratory error recovery. An important aspect of these recommendations 
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is that they are based on the relationship between the different stages of error 
recovery (these will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, but they are error 
detection, error indication, further investigation, error explanation, and error 
correction), e.g. different recommendations regarding incident reporting that has 
been stimulated from different kinds of detection. 
 
In order to meet these aims, it was necessary to achieve the following research objective: 
• Research Objective: To develop and validate an accident analysis tool 
that can be used to identify and analyze error handling activities 
This accident analysis technique is an adaptation of ‘Sequentially Timed Events 
Plotting’ (STEP) [Henrick and Benner, 1983] that has been integrated with error 
recovery theory in order to take a focus on error handling. The development of 
Error Recovery-STEP (ER-STEP) will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4: 
Research Methodology. 
 
The following section presents an overview of the methodology used to meet these 
objectives, and provides an introduction to the findings of this thesis. 
1.2 Overview of research methodology and results 
Figure 1.1 summarizes the three parts of the methodology and their relationship to the 
aims and the research objective of this thesis. Step 1 is the development of ER-STEP, 
Step 3 is the application of ER-STEP for the analysis of four case studies (which were 
discussed in the introduction of this Chapter) and Step 3 is the integration of the 
individual findings in order to draw high level conclusions. 
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Figure 1.1: Overview of research methodology, aims and objectives. 
The analysis of the four incidents resulted in an informed model that describes the 
various kinds of activities within a healthcare system that make up the organizational 
response towards the control and correction of a laboratory error.  
 
The model is presented in Figure 1.2 below; it illustrates the relationship between error 
recovery activities, and can be used to design error recovery processes based on different 
kinds of detection, including incident reporting schemes and user interface design.  
 
Primary Aim:  
To gain a detailed understanding of the 
factors that affect detection and recovery of 
screening errors 
 
Secondary Aim:  
To generate meaningful 
recommendations for the 
improvement of laboratory 
error handling 
 
Research Objective:  
To develop and 
validate an accident 
analysis tool that can 
be used to identify and 
analyze error handling 
activities 
 
 
Methodology Step 1: 
Development of 
technique 
 
 
Methodology Step 
3: Further analysis 
of the 4 case 
studies findings 
 
 
Methodology 
Step 2: Analysis 
of four case 
studies 
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Figure 1.2: The Screening error recovery model. 
The model and its development will be explained fully in Chapter 6: Overview of 
findings. This is later used to guide the recommendations that are discussed in Chapter 7: 
Recommendations. 
 
The following section summarizes the contents of each chapter of this thesis. 
1.3 Thesis breakdown 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of laboratory work and laboratory error, which are the 
field and the focus of this thesis. First, the organizational structure of NHS diagnostic 
networks will be presented. This is important as there are several inter-organizational 
issues that need to be considered. This chapter will also discuss several studies that have 
attempted to identify and classify laboratory and radiology error types and frequencies. 
This chapter will conclude with a definition of the problem that this thesis aims to tackle. 
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Chapter 3 contains the literature review that this thesis draws upon. Theory on problem 
detection and error detection, error recovery strategies and models, and error management 
will be presented and discussed. This chapter will conclude with a new Error Recovery 
Framework, which has been developed for the purposes of this thesis. This framework 
builds upon the literature that has been reviewed but extends it by incorporating problem 
detection in the error recovery process. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the research methodology that has been used. This chapter discusses 
some existing approaches to accident analysis and elaborates on the need for an error-
handling focused analytical approach. This chapter will conclude with a presentation of 
the accident analysis tool that has been developed for the purposes of this thesis 
(Research Objective). 
 
Chapter 5 presents the analysis of four case studies in detail. These are the three incidents 
summarized in Table 1.1, as well as one incident that took place in the USA. Each case 
study, along with graphical illustrations of the applied analytical technique will be 
presented in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 6 presents an overview of the findings of the four analyses. This chapter will 
conclude with a model that describes the ‘Laboratory Error Handling Process’, which is 
an overview of the error recovery activities that may take place within a diagnostic 
network. This is where the Primary Aim of this thesis has been met. 
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Chapter 7 discusses some preliminary recommendations for the improvement of 
laboratory error detection and recovery (Secondary Aim). These recommendations will 
consider improvements, interventions and new ways for better dealing with laboratory 
error. 
 
Chapter 8 presents the validation of ER-STEP. The method undertaken for validation and 
the subsequent results are discussed here. 
 
Finally, Chapter 9 contains the overall conclusions that have arisen from this work, and 
discusses some possible directions for further research. This chapter is followed by a list 
of references and two appendices. 
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Chapter 2: Field and focus 
 
 
 
The previous chapter introduced the aims and objectives that this thesis hopes to achieve. 
This chapter will present the field and focus of this study. An overview of laboratory 
medicine and screening programmes in the NHS will first be presented. This discussion 
will proceed with a description of the inter-organizational networks that take part in 
diagnostic services, focusing on the dependencies that are developed upon laboratory and 
radiology departments within NHS Trusts, as an error in one laboratory can propagate in 
various organizations. This work, therefore, takes place in the field of diagnostic 
networks in the NHS, laboratory medicine, and the technological and procedural aspects 
that support such networks. 
 
The focus of this thesis is laboratory error, and in particular in screening services. There 
is much ongoing work aiming at the analysis of laboratory error [e.g. De Boer et al., 
2002; Sirota, 2005; Frable, 2006]; however, these studies tend to be confined within a 
specific laboratory, taking a rather quantitative approach towards the measurement of 
error types’ frequencies. It has also been suggested that most laboratory error studies do 
not consider the impact such errors have on patients, as laboratories do not maintain 
information about the results of their work in terms of patient outcomes [Bonini et al., 
2002].  
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This chapter will provide some background in laboratory medicine services and in the 
UK NHS in particular, focusing on screening services, before discussing laboratory error 
and recent work that identifies types and frequencies of error that can take place in a 
laboratory setting. This information will then be related to the incidents presented in 
Table 1.1 in order to place the problems that this thesis aims to tackle within the wider 
context of healthcare systems. 
2.1 Laboratory medicine 
Laboratory and radiology services are an integral part of diagnosis and monitoring of 
patients. On a daily basis, pathology, biochemistry, microbiology, immunology and other 
types of laboratories produce a wide range of test reports which are used to support 
clinicians’ decision upon patient treatment [Brennan, 2005]. Overall, there are three types 
of laboratory testing: 
 
1. Screening test: a test in search of a disease in a person who does not appear to 
have it; e.g. PSA test (Prostate Specific Antigen) for prostate cancer.   
2. Diagnostic test: a test for a specific, particular disease; e.g. lung cancer. 
3. Monitoring test: a test which helps doctors keep track of how a patient is doing 
with a known disease; e.g. monitoring a diabetic patient.   
 
The testing process is made up of three stages: Pre-analytic, analytic and post-analytic. 
The pre-analytic phase is structured around the ordering and implementation of the test. 
The analytic phase conducts the specimen analysis. Post-analytic is the communication, 
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documentation and usage of the test results [Sirota, 2005]. Figure 2.1  illustrates an ‘error 
free’ testing process. 
 
Figure 2.1: An ‘error-free’ testing process [adapted from Hickner et al., 2005].  
The following section will discuss how diagnostic services are provided by the NHS. 
2.2 NHS diagnostic services  
The NHS can be seen to be divided in two sections: Primary and Secondary care.  
Primary care is the ‘frontline’ service, which is the first point of contact for patients. 
Primary care consists mainly of General Practice (GP) clinics and surgeries, as well as 
dentists, opticians and pharmacists. When a patient walks in the GP practice, a prognosis 
or initial consultation may conclude that laboratory testing is required, which will be 
carried out in a hospital (Secondary care). Specimens are taken at the GP premises and 
are then sent to the laboratory1. As several hospitals, departments and GPs are attached to 
one laboratory, several specimens are analyzed in a routine, batch process, and the results 
are then sent back to each GP.  
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates a typical network of primary and secondary care organizations 
which are all dependent on a single laboratory for the provision of diagnostic services.  
 
                                                 
1
 More information can be found at www.nhs.uk/conditions/nhs/Pages/Definition.aspx?url=Pages/what-is-
it.aspx, last accessed 05-Oct-08  
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Figure 2.2: NHS diagnostic networks structure. 
The UK model of diagnostic services provision is somewhat different from the one in the 
USA, where there is an attempt to “bring lab-testing closer to the patient”. In the USA, 
testing facilities may also be offered at the first point of contact (for the UK in GPs or 
walk-in centres). When the patient goes to a clinic, there will first be a battery of common 
tests before the doctor even sees the patient, which will then be taken into account along 
with patient history, whereas in the UK such tests have to be requested following a 
consultation and sent back—a process which will may take days to perform [Brennan, 
2005]. In this way, the NHS model of laboratory services is significantly different from 
the USA model. 
 
Nonetheless—and as we shall see later on—the NHS diagnostic model has seen notable 
improvements, with important cost reduction, increases in productivity and offers more 
diagnostic services. Much of the success of this model is based on the utilisation of 
modern technologies. The next section will briefly discuss some of the advances that 
Hospital A 
Departments 
Wards GP practice 
GP practice 
GP practice 
Hospital B 
Laboratory or 
radiology dept 
Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
24 
have driven much of the drastic structural and workflow changes seen in the NHS in the 
past twenty years. 
2.2.1 Laboratory information systems 
While the number of tests ordered has increased substantially over the past decade, 
laboratory systems also steadily growing to offer more critical diagnostic services [Smith 
and McNeely, 1999; Schiff, 2006]. In order to cope with these increasing demands, the 
testing process is utilizing a combination of complex technologies that can automate the 
analytic stage. This combination involves hardware and software that is used for 
specimen analysis, and the subsequent calculations that need to be performed in order to 
derive the requested test results.  
 
In addition, information technology applications have also been introduced for the 
request, archiving and communication of test results and radiology reports. For instance, 
Picture Archiving and Communication Systems (PACS) are digital imaging solutions that 
can also distribute X-ray films over a computer network.  In the near future, all NHS 
Trusts will have a PACS system [Brennan, 2005]. NHS Scotland has introduced the 
Electronic Clinical Communications Implementation (ECCI), which aims at facilitating 
communications between primary and secondary care for the request and follow-up of 
laboratory tests, patient referrals, outpatient appointment etc. [Pagliari et al., 2004].  
 
These innovations have significantly reduced costs and created an infrastructure which 
allows for a more efficient and productive testing process. Laboratories can thus offer 
more services to more patients, by automating a great part of analytic testing and 
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communication with GP practices, departments and wards as well as other hospitals. 
Such advances have formed the basis for the success of screening programmes in the 
NHS, which are discussed in the next section. 
2.2.2 NHS Screening programmes 
Screening programmes aim at diagnosing critical conditions such as cancer by routinely 
evaluating patients that are likely to have that specific condition. For instance, under the 
NHS Breast Cancer Screening Programme, women aged 50-64 are invited for 
mammography screening once every three years [Advisory Committee on Breast 
Screening, 2006].  
 
Breast Cancer Screening was introduced in 1986. Since then, the NHS has grown to offer 
a variety of screening programmes2. They can be summarized as follows: 
• Cancer screening: Breast cancer, cervical cancer and bowel cancer. There is 
currently no national screening programme for prostate cancer, but a risk 
management programme is available.  
• Vascular diseases: Heart disease, diabetes and stroke. 
• Sexually transmitted infections: Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), 
Chlamydia, Hepatitis B and C and others.  
• Screening for pregnant women and/or their newborn babies: Down's 
syndrome, fetal anomalies, hearing, hepatitis B and HIV. 
 
                                                 
2
 More information can be found at www.screening.nhs.uk, last accessed 05-Oct-08   
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NHS screening programmes have achieved notable success; for instance, Breast Cancer 
screening has contributed to a 25% reduction in mortality attributed to the malignancy. In 
the same time, the number of women screened annually has been steadily increasing. By 
2005, there were approximately 1.3 million women screened, whereby 10,000 cancers are 
identified per year. Timely detection has then resulted to, not only a reduction in 
mortality but also a reduction to the number of mastectomies [Advisory Committee on 
Breast Screening, 2006]. 
 
As mentioned previously, many screening programmes are driven by the capabilities of 
new technologies, but involve careful consideration of policy and the development of 
appropriate management structures. New screening programmes are evaluated by the 
National Screening Committee (NSC) which uses research evidence and the skills of 
multi-disciplinary expert groups to develop policies for screening. The aim of the NSC is 
to ensure that “screening does more good than harm at a reasonable cost”3 by assessing 
new programmes against a set of recognized international standards. 
 
There has been much criticism about the way with which new screening programmes are 
introduced. For instance, in 1996, an internal report compiled by the NSC characterized 
NHS screening programmes a “mess”. Table 2.1 summarizes some of the problems 
identified by the NSC at the time [in Programme Director’s report, 2005]. 
                                                 
3
 National Screening Committee official website, http://www.nsc.nhs.uk/uk_nsc/uk_nsc_main.htm#remit, 
last accessed 07-Oct-08 
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- Unknowing variations in policy, including no policy.  
- Unknowing variations in practice.  
- Absence of standards.  
- Absence of performance measurement.  
- Patchy training.  
- Poor information for women.  
- Lack of clear lines of accountability. 
Table 2.1: Problems identified in NHS Breast Cancer Screening Programme [Programme Director’s 
report, 2005].  
 
Continuing in this report, the NSC suggested that is essential to develop clear systems of 
management which are able to deliver the four functions of a quality assurance 
programme, namely:  
1. Minimizing the risks of error. 
2. Dealing with errors and adverse events quickly and compassionately. 
3. Continual improvement in performance, either by investment of resources, 
new technology, or process redesign, and 
4. Regular re-setting of quality standards.  
 
This thesis relates primarily to function 2 but also to function 3. The statement of 
function 2 is an acknowledgement of the problems that the NHS has been facing with 
regards to screening error. The temporal aspect of error recovery is important because a 
misdiagnosed patient’s condition is most likely to deteriorate with time. This thesis can 
be seen to contribute to function 3 by promoting the development of more efficient 
laboratory error recovery strategies. 
 
The following section will discuss quality assurance practices in the NHS. 
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2.2.3 Diagnostic services quality management 
Laboratories and radiology departments have performance standards and systems in place 
for quality control and quality assurance. Reliability cannot be achieved in a clinical 
laboratory just through the promotion of accuracy in the analytical phase of the testing 
process; hence, monitoring all steps in laboratory testing in order to detect and correct 
defects is very important [Witte et al., 1997]. Quality assurance is therefore applied 
throughout the testing process (see Figure 2.3).  
 
Figure 2.3: Quality assurance in screening services [adapted from Programme Director’s report, 
2005]. 
 
Some of the main aspects of laboratory quality assurance are summarized here:  
• Laboratory standards: Each diagnostic specialization is governed by guidelines 
and standards that dictate how laboratories should conduct their services in order 
to achieve a desirable level of quality. Policy documents cover all aspects of 
laboratory work, from how testing should be carried out, to the acquisition of 
medical devices, and algorithms employed in the specific analysis [Johnson and 
Patnick, 2000]. 
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• Performance indicators: Performance indicators are performance standards that 
are proposed and controlled on a national level by accrediting agencies. These are 
used to evaluate the performance on all healthcare organizations. Ratings can then 
be used for benchmarking purposes. Table 2.2 presents 8 performance measures 
that may be applicable to all clinical laboratories [Howanitz, 2005].  
Measure Laboratory Discipline Phase of Testing Frequency of Data 
Collection 
Customer satisfaction All  All 3 Yearly 
Turnaround time Chemistry, Haematology All 3 Monthly 
Patient Identification All Pre-analytic Monthly 
Specimen 
acceptability 
Chemistry, Haematology Pre-analytic Monthly 
Proficiency testing All Analytic 6- 20 specimens per 
analyte yearly 
Critical Value 
reporting 
All Post-analytic Monthly 
Blood product 
wastage 
Transfusion medicine Post-analytic Monthly 
Blood Culture 
contamination 
Microbiology Pre-analytic Monthly 
Table 2.2: Critical laboratory performance measures [taken from Howanitz, 2005]. 
• Auditing: Laboratory audit is concerned with the everyday aspects of the work of 
the department. Audits are usually organized internally (Internal Quality Control). 
However, the National External Quality Assessment Service (known as NEQAS) 
and Clinical Pathology Accreditation schemes can complement the in-house 
program of audit4. The auditors check compliance, non-compliance or possible 
non-compliance against a checklist and write a report, while the quality system 
                                                 
4
 More information can be found at www.ukneqas.org.uk, last accessed 07-Oct-08 
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itself can be audited (Figure 2.4 presents a fragment of an example audit 
checklist5). Any faults identified by an audit should lead to immediate corrective 
action and appropriate changes in documentation, which should be discussed in 
management reviews. 
 
Figure 2.4: Example laboratory audit checklist. 
The primary purpose of quality assurance is to ensure that “the right result on the right 
specimen of the right patient is accurate, timely and properly interpreted” [Standards 
Unit, Evaluation and Standards Laboratory, 2008]. Quality assurance in laboratory 
systems primarily aims at the avoidance of errors throughout the three phases of the test 
lifecycle. The next section will introduce laboratory error and discuss various laboratory 
error related studies that have taken place recently. 
                                                 
5
 Full example laboratory audit checklist can be found at: 
http://www.evergladesplan.org/pm/recover/recover_docs/wqt/qasr_app_g.pdf, last accessed 07-Oct-08 
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2.3 Laboratory error  
Defining laboratory error is very challenging, as there is much debate regarding 
acceptable error ranges and to what rate unacceptable test results are tolerable 
[Blumenthal, 1997]. Not all patients’ samples with unacceptable results are equally likely 
to alter patients’ outcomes [Witte et al., 1997]. This confusion makes it very difficult to 
define laboratory error, and therefore regulate and mandate laboratory quality control 
practices in laboratory services [Bonini et al., 2002]. Nevertheless, laboratory error can 
be broadly defined as “any defect during the entire testing process, from ordering to 
reporting results” [Plebani and Carraro, 1997].  
 
From this definition it is obvious that the risks associated with laboratory services are not 
limited within the premises of the lab and errors in the analytical stage of the testing 
process. In fact, many misdiagnoses have resulted from requesting the wrong result or 
mixing up patients, errors occurring during the ordering or use of test results by other 
clinical units or even institutions [Schiff, 2006].  
2.3.1 Error types and frequencies 
Table 2.3 summarizes the findings of three studies that have attempted to classify various 
errors according to the three stages of laboratory testing. These studies were carried out 
by monitoring different laboratories over periods of several months. Data was derived 
from a review of test records and audits. 
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Pre-analytical Phase Analytical Phase Post-analytical Phase Study 
- ordering of incorrect test  
- specimen handling errors  
- provision of false 
information to the 
laboratory  
- specimen mix-up 
- mislabelling of specimens 
- lack of appropriate 
measurements 
- knowledge problems  
- problematic classification 
models 
- delivery of report to the 
wrong location 
- clinician misinterpretation  
Sirota, 
2005 
- failure to order 
- ordering delay 
- ordered but not 
completed 
- contraindicated 
- specimen not sent or not 
picked up 
- incorrect preparation 
- inadequate equipment 
- results incorrectly 
processed 
- ambiguous report 
- misread or missed critical 
report 
- report not acted on 
- report information not 
available when needed 
Hickner et 
al., 2006 
- wrong patient name 
- erroneous specification of 
hospital unit 
- physician order missed 
- order misinterpreted 
- inappropriate container 
used 
- isolated malfunctioning of 
instrument 
- lack of specificity of the 
method 
- unacceptable 
performance 
- correction of erroneous 
finding overlooked 
- keyboard entry error 
- turnaround time exceeded 
- physician not notified of 
problem 
Plebani 
and 
Carraro, 
1997 
Table 2.3: Errors in the testing process. 
As we can see, there is a variety of possible errors that can occur during the request, 
analysis and follow-up of test results. The following table  presents the findings of five 
studies that attempted to measure the frequencies of errors in the three stages of 
laboratory testing. 
Pre-analytical 
Phase 
Analytical Phase Post-analytical 
Phase 
Study 
31.6% 31.6% 30.8% Lapworth and Teal, 1994 
53% 23% 24% Goldsmchmidt and Lent, 1997 
55.6% 13.3% 30% Nutting et al.., 1996 
68.2% 13.3% 18.5% Plebani and Carraro, 1997 
75% 16% 9% Stahl et al.., 1998 
Table 2.4: Laboratory error frequencies [taken from Bonini et al., 2002]. 
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In conclusion from Table 2.4, most errors occur at the pre-analytic and post-analytic 
stages. In fact, all of these studies agreed that the majority of errors occur during the pre-
analytical phase, but with significant percentages in the other two stages of testing. 
  
Table 2.5 presents some methodological information about these studies, as well as the 
findings these studies had in terms of impact of errors found on patient outcomes. 
Study Data collection 
period 
Number of 
samples analyzed 
Impact on patient outcomes 
None    Mild    Moderate  Severe  
Lapworth and 
Teal, 1994 
1 year 997000 n/d n/d n/d n/d 
Goldschmidt and 
Lent, 1997 
6 years not determined 
(n/d) 
43% 23%  26% 8% 
Nutting et al., 
1996 
6 months n/d 13% 13% n/d n/d 
Plebani and 
Carraro, 1997 
3 months 40490 74% 19.6% 6.4% 0% 
Stahl et al., 1998 3 years 676564 n/d n/d n/d n/d 
Table 2.5: Patient outcomes in five laboratory error studies (adapted from Bonini et al., 2002). 
 
When considering the impact of laboratory errors found on patient outcome, these studies 
take account of four levels (none, mild, moderate, severe). These are classified according 
to immediate impact (i.e. delay of diagnosis) but do not examine the long terms effects of 
errors identified. This is problematic because it can be hard to determine the degree to 
which an error affected long term prognoses given that individual patient related factors 
have an impact on outcomes. 
 
In addition, the Goldschmidt and Lent study [1997] found that approximately 75% of 
laboratory errors are likely to result to tests which are still within their reference intervals. 
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This suggests that they would not necessarily have any adverse impact on patient’s 
health, although they might be misleading. However, defining these boundary values is a 
great challenge, primarily because not all patients are going to respond to the same 
treatment in the same way.  
 
These challenges limit our understanding of the impact of laboratory error on patient 
diagnosis and treatment overall. As laboratories maintain little or no information 
regarding the impact of their work on patients’ health, it is very difficult to understand of 
the severity of laboratory error; a single error may have much greater impact on a 
patient’s health, while several marginal errors may be superficial [Plebani and Carraro, 
1997].  
 
One more factor that makes laboratory error difficult to cope with—and, as this thesis 
argues the most important factor—is that it may be very difficult to detect, not only 
within the laboratory, but also when these test results are taken into consideration during 
patient diagnosis within primary care. Erroneous test results which are plausibly 
acceptable will mislead diagnosis, and therefore the decision upon a course of treatment. 
In the case of screening, such an error can become detrimental either by missing ill 
patients or by aggravating their health by e.g., excessive radiation treatment. The next 
section will therefore discuss the aspect of ‘plausibility’ of erroneous test results.  
2.3.2 Plausibility of false test results 
Errors taking place during the testing cycle may not always produce detectable abnormal 
results, nor raise questions for the physician that has requested them; they can thus be 
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taken into account during patient diagnosis and decision upon treatment [Bonini et al., 
2002]. When false test results appear to be worthy of belief, these are referred to as ‘false 
yet plausible’.  
In the case of screening, such errors can take the form of false positives/false negatives:  
• A false positive is when there is no disease (or other condition) but the results 
come back as positive; for example, a positive test for HIV or cancer, when the 
person was disease free, would be a false positive.  Sometimes, when a disease is 
very rare, and/or when a test has a high rate of error, there may be more false 
positives than actual positives.   
• A false negative is when there actually is a disease (or other condition) but the 
results come back as negative [De Boer et al., 2002].  
 
False-positives and false-negatives are a well known problem in laboratory medicine and 
to a certain level, they are inevitable in any screening programme [Johnson and Patnick, 
2000]. In the case of screening, there are two possible outcomes of the analysis: positive, 
or not positive; both of which are plausible, especially if there is no other information to 
constitute them as implausible. For instance, when patients are asymptomatic but ill, a 
false negative will seem like a plausible result. 
 
The incidents that were discussed in Table 1.1 are adverse events that involved several 
erroneous yet plausibly acceptable test results which were caused by technical faults or 
systematic errors taking place in the laboratory during highly automated routine 
analytical processes. Therefore the risks associated with plausibility increase when taking 
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into account the potential of hiding the automated production of multiple test results, and 
not just one single erroneous report.  
2.4 A pattern of failure in screening services 
The result of any screening service will be in the form of a ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. So 
despite the variety of screening services available, errors in the testing cycle are likely to 
result to false-positives or false-negatives, which, in most cases seem plausible in 
isolation for any screening test. Without interaction with the patient or a substantial 
amount patient history, any deterministic derivation of a screening test will therefore be 
very likely to manifest in a way plausible for the diagnostician. 
 
In the incidents summarized in Table 1.1, such plausibly acceptable yet erroneous 
screening tests were being produced for periods of months, or even years, affecting 
hundreds of patients. While their plausible nature is an inhibiting factor in terms of 
detection, there are some organizational and technological elements that contributed to 
the automation of multiple mistaken tests. In particular, the dependence of several points 
of care on one single laboratory increases the likelihood of propagation of a single fault to 
more patients; this becomes more critical when faults in software that participates in the 
analysis and communication result in the automated creation of multiple false test results. 
  
This chapter discussed how screening is done in the UK, within the organizational 
structure of diagnostic networks; where several GPs and even other hospitals depend on a 
single laboratory or radiology department for the screening of all of their patients (Figure 
2.2). Such a structure may be useful in terms of productivity and efficiency; however, if 
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there is a fault in the highly automated testing process (either software bugs or procedural 
problems), it is very likely that it will affect many—if not all—of the points of care that 
depend on that laboratory. 
 
The UK incidents of Table 1.1 all developed following this pattern. Moreover, they were 
prolonged by a lack of (or poor) safeguards—the quality assurance systems in place 
(primarily audits and management meetings) failed to mitigate or control these errors. As 
we shall see later on, these incidents were eventually detected and recovered because 
people involved took initiatives which were not necessarily prescribed to them.  
 
As mentioned in Section 2.2.2, the screening services quality assurance should be able to 
“…deal with errors and adverse events quickly…” [Programme Director’s report, 2005]. 
However, the fact that several such incidents have occurred since 20006 (Table 1.1) 
indicates that there are several problems that impede timely detection and efficient 
incident response. This thesis argues that there is a common pattern of failure that may 
occur in any screening service in the UK. This pattern of failure is summarized in Table 
2.6: . 
                                                 
6
 The most recent event took place in 2006 [ www.guardian.co.uk/society/2006/jun/29/cancercare.health, 
last accessed 01-Oct-08] 
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Fault in the analytic process  Software bugs, human error during analysis, procedural 
errors in the laboratory. 
Automation and propagation  Errors mentioned above are propagated across diagnostic 
networks. 
Plausibility of false test results False test results are plausibly acceptable, and are thus 
used in patient diagnosis. 
Lack of (or poor) safeguards Incident reporting scheme not used, audits not carried 
out—even if they had been requested 
Poor incident response Inability to detect. Also, during the crisis, severe 
communication breakdowns prolong the incidents.  
Table 2.6: A pattern of failure in NHS screening services. 
The purpose of this thesis is therefore to understand in detail what underlying problems in 
the NHS—and screening services in particular—can result to the development of multiple 
misdiagnoses over prolonged periods of time. The focus then is on the inability to detect 
and recover from such errors when they occur, but not on the causal factors that led to the 
errors in the first place. This is because the causal factors vary greatly in the different 
types of laboratory medicine, phase of testing and types of error that can occur 
(laboratory error types were discussed in Section 2.3.1). Despite the variety in causal 
factors, plausibility of false test results and problems in the incident response were 
somewhat similar. Therefore, the scope of this thesis is limited to the events that take 
place once false test results begin to be produced and detection is possible. 
 
The continuous effort to remove such faults in the analytic process (Table 2.6: ) does not 
necessarily ensure that errors will not occur again the future. With the potential for false 
yet plausible test results being present, it is essential that diagnostic networks are 
prepared to detect and recover from such failures as quickly as possible. This is the 
reason why this thesis focuses on error management within this setting.  
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The next section will summarize this chapter, before we proceed to the next chapter 
which will present and discuss the theory that this thesis draws upon: error detection and 
error recovery. 
2.5 Chapter summary  
This chapter presented the field and the focus of this thesis. This section will summarize 
the various concepts and practices that have been presented: 
• Field of study: The field of this study is diagnostic services (laboratory medicine 
and radiology) in the NHS, and in particular screening services. This chapter 
presented the testing cycle which is made up of three stages (pre-analytic, analytic 
and post-analytic). Then, screening programmes in the NHS, their organizational 
structure and the role of information technology were discussed. Finally, NHS 
laboratory quality assurance practices were briefly presented. 
• Focus of study: The focus of this research is laboratory error, and most 
specifically the potential for plausibly acceptable false test results. This aspect of 
laboratory error is crucial because it makes it very difficult to detect errors once 
they have occurred, so false test results may be used in the process of diagnosis, 
and consequently have adverse affects on patients’ health.  
 
This chapter concluded with a pattern of failure that this thesis has observed in several 
NHS screening incidents: Multiple, false yet plausibly acceptable, screening tests which 
were not detected for long periods of time. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical context 
 
 
 
The previous chapter presented the context of this work, and focused on a pattern of 
failure that has materialized in several screening incidents, resulting in prolonged failures 
to detect and recover from laboratory errors. This chapter will present the theoretical 
background that this thesis draws upon. The literature review will introduce concepts 
regarding error detection and recovery that come from cognitive psychology and safety 
science, which will then be related to laboratory error and its manifestation in test results. 
This review will conclude with an ‘Error Recovery Framework’ that will be used 
throughout this thesis, both for the analysis of the four case studies and the generation of 
recommendations for the improvement of laboratory error detection and recovery. 
3.1 Error recovery versus error prevention 
The study of error within cognitive science and applied psychology has made a 
significant contribution in understanding what types of error may occur, and what types 
of causes may result to different forms of error [e.g. mistakes, slips and lapses by Reason, 
1990]. Within safety research in industry, such work has been very influential. More 
recently, the study of major disasters (e.g., Chernobyl [Watt Committee, 1988], the 
Challenger [Vaughan, 1996]) has extended our understanding of error, not only as a 
human action, but also as a result of a wider, system failure. Error does not only refer to 
an act that will immediately result in a hazard (e.g., pressing the wrong button), but may 
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also build up through time through complex organizational and socio-technical 
environments (e.g., maintenance error) [Reason, 2004].   
 
Safety largely depends on producing systems without defects, while reducing the 
potential for human errors to occur; this can be seen as ‘error prevention’, and can be 
seen a pro-active approach to safety. However, error prevention is not the only strategy 
towards achieving an acceptable level of system safety [Lewis and Norman, 1986; Frese, 
1991]. As it is extremely difficult to remove all potential for errors or technical faults 
[Greenwell et al., 2004], industrial systems have complex sensor-alarm systems to detect 
potential problems before they compromise safety. In addition, they employ incident 
response and crisis management procedures, in order to control failures as they occur and 
prevent or minimize their impact and consequences. Error recovery is therefore a second 
strategy (reactive approach) which, along with error prevention, can provide adequate 
system defences for the prevention and control of accidents [Kontogiannis, 1997].  
 
The two error resistance strategies, along with the concepts of forward and backward 
error recovery which will be discussed in the following sections are summarized in 
Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1: Error resistance strategies [adapted from Jambon, 1997]. 
Error recovery (or error handling) has received less attention in research than the causes 
human error [Zapf and Reason, 1994; Kontogiannis, 1997]. In a similar manner, there is 
much more literature available in error prevention than error handling [Klein et al., 2005; 
Blavier et al., 2005]. Nonetheless, in the past 15 years, there has been some important 
work in the areas of error detection and recovery (however very limited in the area of 
patient safety). The purpose of this chapter is to therefore present some of this work, and 
place it in the context of laboratory screening error. 
3.2 Overview of error handling 
Improving the ability of a system to detect and recover from errors requires design and 
engineering effort, as well as organizational and structural considerations. Some system 
features that take part in the detection and recovery of errors and technical faults include 
the computer user interface [Rizzo et al., 1996], checking mechanisms [Clarke, 2005], 
Human Error 
Resistance 
Error 
Prevention 
Error 
Correction 
Backward Error 
Recovery 
Forward Error 
Recovery 
 
Error Recovery 
Error 
Explanation 
Error Detection 
Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
43 
incident reporting, communication [Barenfanger et al., 2004], work design [Zapf et al., 
1994] and training [Chmiel and Wall, 1994]. 
 
Research and practice in error handing can be seen to fall under two main categories. 
These aspects of error handling are the following: 
• Error detection: This area of research considers the mechanisms through which 
errors and technical faults are either identified, or merely steer suspicion, and is a 
focus of cognitive science (Section 3.3). 
• Error recovery: Recovery follows directly after detection. A variety of models 
and frameworks describe the stages of activities that make up the process from 
detection to recovery, coming from systems engineering (Section 3.4). 
3.3 Error detection 
Error detection is the first step of an error recovery process [Reason, 1994; Kontogiannis, 
1997; Klein et al., 2005]. Error detection is a human, cognitive activity, which can be 
defined as “the realisation that an error has occurred without necessarily understanding 
the nature and cause of the error” [Zapf and Reason, 1994].  
 
Sellen [1994] proposed a theoretical taxonomy of detection modes which aims broadly to 
describe the ways through which people detect errors in a wide variety of everyday tasks. 
The framework describes a range of detection mechanisms falling into three categories: 
action-based, outcome-based or through limiting functions. The three modes of detection, 
along with an example of laboratory error detection are given below:  
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• Action-based detection:  Occurs as the error takes place—this can be best 
described as “caught-in-the-act”. Action-based detection occurs when there is a 
mismatch between an action plan and the executed actions, or if there is a 
mismatch between conscious intentions and executed actions. For instance, a 
laboratory technician detects his or her own error during a specimen analysis by 
realizing the analysis is not conducted as prescribed. Action-based detection can 
also occur when a person observes someone else while performing an erroneous 
action. 
• Outcome-based detection: This is based on the evaluation of the outcome of the 
erroneous action. This kind of detection can occur if there is a mismatch between 
expected outcomes and actual outcomes, or if there is a match between expected 
error forms and outcome. In a laboratory setting, this can take place when a 
physician examines a test report and the results do not make sense. 
• Detection through external limiting functions: Limiting functions refers to 
physical constraints imposed by the environment. This kind of detection is 
somewhat different from action-based and outcome-based detection as no 
evaluation of the correctness of an action is required. In a laboratory context, an 
example of detection through limiting functions is the following: A ward nurse 
attempts to phone the pathology department in order to request a test, but he or 
she has actually phoned the haematology department. This is realized when the 
person who picks up the phone announces “you have reached the haematology 
department”.  
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In complex environments, error detection may not always occur instantly, but may in fact 
be a result of several events; even though error detection is nothing more than an 
acknowledgement of the presence of an error, without knowing what caused it, or even 
what the nature of the error is. Before being sure that something is actually wrong, people 
may first be concerned, or suspicious that something might be wrong. This has been 
referred to in literature as error suspicion [Allwood, 1984], problem recognition [Cowan, 
1986], problem discovery [Woods et al., 1987] and problem detection [Smith, 1989]. The 
term ‘problem detection’ will used hereafter, and will be discussed in the following 
section.  
3.3.1 Problem detection  
Problem detection is the process by which people first become concerned that events may 
be taking an unexpected and undesirable direction [Smith, 1989]. Problem detection can 
occur even in the absence of a fault or the occurrence of an error; however, it signifies the 
existence of a potential fault/error. This is important as in many cases, problem detection 
may lead to an early resolution of a problem before it manifests into a dangerous 
condition. Even in a steady state condition, problem detection signifies a preparedness 
and alertness in case something does go wrong. 
 
Problem detection is a sense-making activity. A person who is concerned may act in 
many different ways to determine if there is a problem, and what that is. For instance, if 
problem detection occurs, one might decide to monitor system behavior in case another 
cue of the potential problem emerges, or might decide to take action despite being sure 
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that something is wrong. In some cases, an operator may remain suspicious even when 
concerns are explained away by others [Klein et al., 2005]. 
 
The ‘discrepancy accumulation model’ [Cowan, 1986] is one the first influential models 
of problem detection, even through there had been some earlier propositions [e.g., Davies 
1973]. Cowan described problem detection as “the accumulation of discrepancies until a 
threshold was reached”. In a laboratory setting, the accumulation of discrepancies can for 
instance be seen as a growing concern over the frequency of positive or negative test 
results, without however being sure that an error has occurred. 
 
Klein et al. [2005] have suggested problem detection is affected by the following three 
factors: 
• Expertise: Expertise can be an advantage in most cases. Skilled personnel are 
most likely to generate expectancies and be decisive to take action when 
contradictions occur. A skilled operator is most likely to have an understanding of 
what conditions can result in the system generating misleading readings. On the 
other hand, expertise can result in confidently explaining away a problem. For 
instance, an experienced nurse may become concerned when he or she notices a 
discrepancy in the frequency of positives/negatives, while an experienced 
laboratory technician might not find this alarming.  
 
• Stance: Stance refers to the orientation the person has towards the situation 
[Chow et al., 2000]. Stance can be an absolute denial that anything could possibly 
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be wrong, to a hysterical over-reacting attitude towards minor signs. General 
alertness, level of suspicion and emotional status are some of the factors that 
make up a person’s stance. For example, a nurse that is hesitant to trust new 
technologies in his or her workplace will be ‘on the lookout’ for any problems a 
new system may incur. In healthcare systems, information is evaluated upon the 
basis of the “perceived credibility of the source" [Cicourel, 1990]. In other words, 
the judgment over the credibility of a test report will be made by taking into 
account the level of trust in the laboratory department that produced it. If there is 
no prior experience of problems originating from the source of information, it is 
unlikely that the plausibility of a test result will be questioned.  
 
• Attention Management: This refers to sensor/alarm systems: having system 
facilities to detect, capture and notify operators about problems. Attention 
management is however not independent of expertise and stance, as they may for 
instance result in disregarding an alarm or remaining concerned in the absence of 
an expected alarm [Wickens and McCarley, 2007].  
 
It is very likely that once a specific error has occurred, problem detection will occur 
before error detection—although this is not always necessary. In most environments, 
operators that have detected an error are expected to report this or take immediate action 
if it is within their responsibilities. However, the uncertainty that characterizes problem 
detection can prevent an operator from taking action. In the case that concerns are 
reported to someone else, it is possible they will be disregarded in the absence of 
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convincing evidence. For this reason, following problem detection, operators may decide 
to continue monitoring system behavior for further cues, or may formulate and explore 
hypotheses as to what is wrong themselves [Klein et al., 2005].  
 
In everyday life problem detection occurs frequently, and, in many cases, instinctively. It 
could be argued that when, for instance, driving a car, a driver’s decision to slow down is 
dictated by problem detection as, not slowing down will result in a car crush. In a similar 
context, if while driving a car the driver hears a “strange” noise coming from the engine, 
it is possible that he or she will not take the car to the mechanic until that sound occurs 
again.  
 
The following section will present a number of models and frameworks that describe the 
process of error recovery; the process that follows error detection (but not problem 
detection) until recovery (or giving up). 
3.4 Error recovery 
Error recovery is generally made up of three stages: Error detection, error diagnosis, and 
error correction [Bagnara and Rizzo, 1989; Zapf and Reason, 1994; Jambon, 1997]. This 
generic process can be applied to any type of error within almost any context. However, 
depending on the environment, error explanation and error correction may be broken up 
further (for instance, the involvement of multiple people in an error handling process will 
require communication (e.g. incident reporting) or planning might have to take place 
before proceeding to corrective actions).  
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3.4.1 Forward and backward error recovery 
A distinction can be made between forward and backward error recovery [Dix et al., 
1993]. This distinction—used extensively in interactive systems design—refers to the 
path that can be taken towards recovery [Jambon, 1997]: 
• Backward Recovery:  Backward recovery refers to attempt to restore the system 
state following the occurrence of an error by following events as they occurred in 
reverse. According to Yang [1992], there are three kinds of backward error 
recovery: undo, cancel and stop.  
• Forward recovery: During forward recovery the operator has to perform 
unexpected tasks to recover the fault, perhaps through improvisation. This kind of 
recovery applies mostly to failures in industrial engineered systems, where undo 
and cancel cannot easily be implemented. 
3.4.2 Error recovery frameworks and models 
In this section we will discuss the most influential theoretical frameworks that describe 
the process of error recovery. There are several frameworks proposed since the 1980s , 
(e.g. [Cowan, 1986]) — the ones discussed here are some of the more recent ones that are 
seen as a step further from the first attempts that were made three decades ago. In 
addition, the three frameworks discussed in this section take slightly different 
perspectives which are of interest to this thesis. 
 
In the following pages, some frameworks will be presented; a discussion regarding their 
benefits and limitations will then follow in a separate section, which will be based on a 
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comparison of their features and applicability on the particular matter of laboratory error 
handling. 
 
Error handling model 
One of the earliest models proposed was by Zapf and Reason [1994]. This model (Figure 
3.2) views error recovery as a two-step process: error diagnosis and error recovery. Each 
of these stages is broken down to two further steps. 
 
Figure 3.2: A generic error recovery model [adapted from Zapf and Reason, 1994]. 
Here, error detection is seen as part of error diagnosis, which is then followed by error 
explanation. Following error diagnosis, error recovery is performed in two steps: 
planning and execution. The two authors do not include the achievement of error control 
and correction in their model, as they view that as the outcome of the actual error 
recovery process (regardless of whether it has been successful or not), taking a rather 
general perspective on the entire process. 
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The INCORECT framework 
INCORECT (Investigating Cognitive and Recovery Tasks) has been proposed for the 
analysis of cognitive reliability in interaction in complex systems [Kontogiannis, 1997]. 
The framework takes into account a set of taxonomies of cognitive error modes, error 
causes, problem solving failures, recovery mechanisms and contextual factors.  
 
INCORECT has been proposed in order to identify cognitive errors at the stages of 
interpretation, decision making and planning during the resolution of an encountered 
problem. The framework can thus be used in a risk assessment context, attempting to 
identify potential pitfalls such as an unsafe intervention that may result from a wrong 
situation diagnosis.  
 
Apart from the investigation of cognitive errors, INCORECT also examines the  activities 
that focus on the control of the error’s consequences. As we will see later on, this second 
aspect of this framework relates greatly to this thesis. Figure 3.3 illustrates two 
dimensions of the error recovery management: Error handling (during a crisis), and the 
consideration of adequate interventions to increase preparedness for more efficient error 
handling in the future. 
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Figure 3.3: The INCORECT framework [adapted from Kontogiannis, 1997] 
 
The human redundancy framework 
This framework [Clarke, 2005] is concerned with the role of human redundancy in 
engineered systems in high-hazard industries. More specifically, the human redundancy 
framework considers “redundant arrangements” such as operator/supervisor within a 
socio-technical system where the following features are important: 
• Someone checks someone else’s work 
• A check is carried out at the time a function is fulfilled or soon after it is 
fulfilled 
• The checker is directed, either verbally or through a written procedure, to check 
a particular human interaction 
• The check takes place during normal operation. 
 
According to the author, human redundancy is activated when error recovery commences 
(Figure 3.4). From an error recovery perspective, human redundancy exists “where there 
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is support for concurrent human recovery by another of an error associated with a 
required operator function”. 
 
Figure 3.4: The ‘human redundancy’ framework [adapted from Clarke, 2005]. 
Each of the stages of error recovery within this framework are affected by cognitive 
diversity and the local and organizational factors that shape the context within which 
these activities take place:  
• Cognitive diversity is the availability of different cognitive behaviors to fulfill a 
required function, where differences originate either within operators or within 
their environment. Cognitive diversity may exist with respect to two or more 
individuals within the same group, between a group and another individual and 
between two people that perform checking tasks. 
• Local and organizational factors refer to any element of an organization that 
may affect error recovery; For example, issues such as stress, over-trust, and 
deficiencies in resource. 
3.4.3 Comparison and criticism 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each of these 
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frameworks, whilst taking into account some of the initial observations regarding 
laboratory related incidents that have been discussed in the first two chapters. 
 
The error handling model [Zapf and Reason, 1994] can be seen as the most generic one of 
the three. Although it can be argued that it covers all aspects of the recovery process, its 
relatively high-level view does not allow for a detailed consideration of all of the 
activities that may take place during error handling. In contrast, the other two frameworks 
take more in-depth perspectives: 
 
The INCORECT framework [Kontogiannis, 1997] takes account of various error 
detection types (similar to the ones proposed by Sellen, 1994), but also includes a more 
elaborate breakdown of error explanation and error recovery—in addition, this model 
extends to include error/disaster management activities following the incident (which will 
be the focus of the next section). One limitation of INCORECT is that it does not take 
account of communication activities; communication breakdowns are an important aspect 
of error handling failure and are part of the thesis focus.  
 
However, communication events are part of the human redundancy framework. Error 
indication—a sort of incident reporting—is essential in such a model, especially if the 
context is a complex organizational setting, where the involvement of several 
departments, or even organizations may be possible. Communication during error 
handling can be crucial, especially in the case of a communication breakdown which 
could have serious consequences on a recovery process. 
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The human redundancy framework [Clarke, 2005] considers error recovery as a human 
activity, whereby detection by others and reporting of errors to persons who can take 
action are the underlying concepts. This framework also considers cognitive diversity and 
organizational factors as determinants of the outcome of an error recovery process. 
However, this model is somewhat limited in the variety of possible types of error 
detection, and error explanation, which are explained in more detail in INCORECT. 
 
A common issue in these models is that they do not consider problem detection as part of 
the error recovery process. Arguably, a recovery process may commence once the 
presence of an error has been acknowledged; however, in many cases an error might not 
be obvious enough for people to confirm its presence; and although the importance of 
problem detection has been recognized, current recovery models do not incorporate 
problem detection. Finally, these models do not include the investigation activities that 
may take place at any time (either to find out if there is an error or not, or to identify the 
causes of the error).  
 
With this in mind, it was found necessary to proceed with a new model that considers 
problem detection and further investigation as parts of the error recovery process 
formally. The following section will present this new model which builds upon 
INCORECT and the human redundancy framework, also taking into account problem 
detection. 
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3.5 The error recovery framework 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the stages that make up the error recovery framework. This 
framework indicates the sequence of events from problem detection to error correction; it 
includes a larger set of steps to be followed, providing more coverage in terms of types of 
error handling activities that are possible.    
 
Figure 3.5: The error recovery framework 
These stages can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Problem detection: The initial concerns that events may be taking an 
unexpected and undesirable direction that potentially requires action. 
2. Problem indication: The reporting of concerns to someone who can act upon 
this potential problem. 
3.  Error detection: The realization that something is actually wrong, without 
necessarily knowing the nature of the error or what has caused it (Action-
based, outcome-based, through limiting functions). 
4. Error indication: The reporting of error detection to someone who can act 
upon the error. 
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5. Error explanation: The localization of an error and the identification of its 
causes. 
6. Error control: The controlling of the incident by stopping the error from 
causing more harm. At this point, the error has not necessarily been removed 
from the system. 
7. Error correction: The causes of the error are being removed and system can 
operate normally again. 
8. Further investigation: This can take several forms (e.g. observation of 
system behaviour, enquiry to colleagues, examination of system features, 
technical analysis, etc.). 
 
Problem detection, problem indication and error indication may not always occur; 
however these activities would take place in situations where there are multiple people 
involved (in terms of indication) and where system feedback is limited, making error 
detection more difficult. The error recovery framework also takes into account Sellen’s 
[1994] taxonomy of error detection mechanisms. Although cognitive diversity is 
obviously very likely to determine the outcome of each of these stages, it is not 
considered in this framework. This is because it is very difficult to map the cognitive 
model that each involved person would have during error recovery without the 
appropriate amount of data. 
 
The error recovery framework will be used throughout this thesis in order to describe 
error handling activities in the context of laboratory error handling. The way with which 
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it will be used will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter (Chapter 4: Research 
methodology). However, before proceeding to the next chapter, the next section will 
discuss how national and corporate regulation and policy determine how organizational 
failures are managed, and how organizational learning towards better error handling may 
be guided by formal public inquiries in the UK. 
 
3.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented and discussed existing work in the areas of problem detection, 
error detection and error recovery, which form the theoretical basis that this thesis draws 
upon. Following the presentation of various models and frameworks, this chapter 
proceeded with their criticism which concluded with a new error recovery framework—
an adaptation of existing frameworks which also takes into account problem detection as 
part of error recovery. 
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Chapter 4: Research methodology 
 
 
 
The previous chapter presented an overview of existing literature in error detection and 
error handling, and concluded with a proposed error recovery framework which will be 
used to analyze and explain the activities that make up the processes and activities of 
laboratory error handling. This framework will be the basis of the research methodology 
that this thesis undertakes. The methodology is summarized in Section 4.1. 
 
Section 4.2 presents an overview of available techniques that were considered for this 
analysis, while Section 4.3 contains a discussion based on criticism of these techniques. 
In order to achieve the objectives of this thesis, a new technique has been developed, by 
adapting STEP [Henrick and Benner, 1983] and integrating it with the  error recovery 
framework that was proposed in the previous chapter. 
 
Finally, Section 4.4 will discuss how this suggested analytical approach will be applied to 
multiple case studies, and Section 4.5 will discuss the sources of data that these analyses 
have been based on.  
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4.1 Overview of research methodology  
The research methodology that this thesis follows is presented in Figure 4.1, which also 
illustrates the relationship between methodology, research objectives and overall thesis 
aims. 
 
Figure 4.1: Overview of research methodology, aims and objectives. 
The research methodology is therefore summarized as follows: 
• Step 1: Development of technique. A technique is developed and discussed in this 
chapter. This technique is a result of the integration of the error recovery 
framework that was discussed in the previous chapter (see Section 3.5) with an 
existing accident analysis technique.  
• Step 2: Analysis of case studies. The UK incidents summarized in Table 1.1, 
along with one USA incident will be analyzed with the technique that has been 
proposed. This incident was included as a first attempt to demonstrate the generic 
nature of the approach and was conducted as a result of cooperation with a major 
North American hospital department. 
• Step 3: Further analysis of the four case studies findings. The findings of the four 
case studies will be further analyzed in order to identify key problem areas 
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(common problems in these case studies) and draw high-level conclusions about 
laboratory screening error handling. This will result in an enriched model of the 
error recovery framework which will describe the different types of error handling 
activities that may take place within a laboratory screening context. 
4.2 Accident analysis 
The aim of accident analysis is to identify the underlying causal factors that shaped the 
events of the misfortunate outcome. Such analyses can in turn be used by technology 
designers, system engineers, management and regulatory authorities to consider how to 
eliminate these underlying factors so that similar occurrences are avoided in the future. 
With this perspective, investigations into laboratory failures can be used by the laboratory 
and hospital management, and by device manufacturers for the continuous improvement 
of their respective products [Jenny and Jackson-Tarentino, 2000]. 
 
An abundance of techniques and notations have been developed by authorities and 
researchers, considering various levels and aspects of different kinds of incidents and 
accidents in safety-critical industries7. Causal analysis can be used to explain why the 
failure took place, and reconstruction techniques can explain what happened during the 
failure. Other approaches, such as Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) 
[Johnson, 1973] and Systems Theory Accident Modelling and Process (STAMP) 
[Leveson et al., 2003] examine the involvement of organizational, human and 
technological elements in the occurrence of an incident or accident.  
                                                 
7This chapter does not present a review of all accident techniques, as such is already available. The 
“Handbook of incident and accident reporting” [Johnson, 2002] has been used to guide the discussion that 
takes place here. However, event-based techniques will be considered in more detail. 
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However, despite the fact that accident analysis techniques would identify and analyze 
causes and events that resulted in poor error handling, there is no systematic approach 
taking a focus on the organizational response following error detection. It is argued here 
that having a focus on error handling in accident analysis would help us to understand 
how the error could have been detected faster and recovered, in addition to the why and 
what happened that established accident analysis notations can help identify.  
 
Error recovery is a process evolving through different stages over time [Zapf and Reason, 
1994; Jambon, 1997]. For this reason, it was more appropriate to consider event 
reconstruction approaches for the development of a recovery-focused analytical tool. The 
following section will present and discuss some event-based techniques which have been 
considered for this analysis. 
4.2.1 Event-based techniques 
.  
Event-based techniques are used to model multiple events which are linked over time. 
Most event-based techniques are supported by a graphical notation which depicts the 
evolution of events in a left-to-right, linear manner. The first event in a chain is often 
referred to as the “initiating event”—there is however no principle that dictates the 
selection of the initiating event [Leveson, 2001]; this decision is largely subjective—the 
investigator may go back several years before the occurrence of the more immediate 
events that led to an accident/incident. 
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Event-based techniques are useful in understanding the mechanism through which an 
accident/incident was created; however a common criticism of such techniques is the 
limited insight they provide in analyzing the underlying causes and their conditions 
[Johnson, 2003]. For the reason, event-based models are used to guide further analyses of 
the particular events that were identified as determinants in the sequence of the adverse 
events. 
 
This section will present and discuss the following: 
• Events and Causal Factors Analysis (ECFA), [Buys and Clark, 1995] 
• Multi-linear Events Sequencing (MES), [Rimson and Benner, 1975] 
• Sequentially Timed and Events Plotting (STEP), [Henrick and Benner, 1983] 
 
There are several event-based techniques available. The particular techniques have been 
selected because they are well established, longstanding and well documented.  
 
Events and Causal Factors Analysis 
Events and Causal Factors Analysis (ECFA) is used to identify errors, changes, 
oversights, and omissions, as well as also the relevant conditions affecting each event in 
the accident sequence. The approach breaks down the sequence into a logical flow of 
events from the beginning of accident development. The end point may be defined either 
as the loss event itself or as the end of the amelioration and rehabilitation phase. In 
addition, this flow of events may not necessarily lie in a single event chain but can 
involve several confluent and branching chains. 
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Figure 4.2 illustrates the conventions that are used when applying ECFA. 
 
Figure 4.2:  ECFA notation [adapted from Buys and Clark, 1995]. 
ECFA is designed as a stand alone technique but is usually applied with other techniques 
found in the Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) programme [Buys and 
Clark, 1995]. ECFA serves three main purposes in investigations:  
• assists the verification of causal chains and event sequences  
• provides a structure for integrating investigation findings 
• assists communication both during and on completion of the investigation. 
 
Multi-linear Events Sequencing  
Multi-linear Events Sequencing (MES) is a method that is made up of concepts, 
principles, rules and procedures which can be used for any kind of investigation. The 
technique was developed by Rimson and Benner—at the time investigators with the 
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National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) [1975]. One of the motivations behind the 
development of MES as an event-based technique was the wish to avoid the use of 
checklists, as this may allow for factors which are not included in a checklist to be missed 
[Ferry, 1998]. 
 
MES uses a matrix-based structure which consists of data documentation, organization 
and analysis tools and rules in order to drive the investigation tasks. Matrix entries follow 
pre-defined grammar and syntax rules of construction for event blocks on matrices 
including person, number, tense, voice and deictic position—the MES data language—
and reasoning rules to develop tested descriptions and explanations of what happened. 
These descriptions are then analyzed systematically with orderly sequential problem 
defining. MES provides some generalized behavioral models, guiding principles and 
assessment or ranking tools to convey knowledge from prior experiences to help 
investigators [Benner, 2003].  
 
Figure 4.3 illustrates an example MES chart.  
 
Figure 4.3: An example MES diagram [adapted from Ferry, 1998]. 
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Every event is a single action by a single actor. The actor is something that brings about 
events, while actions are acts performed by the actor. A time line is displayed at the 
bottom of the chart to show the timing sequence of the events while conditions that 
influence the events are inserted in the time flow in logical order to show the flow 
relationship. 
Sequentially timed and events plotting  
Sequentially timed and events plotting (STEP) [Henrick and Benner, 1983] can be seen 
as synthesis of ECFA and MES [Johnson, 2003]. The starting point of STEP is the 
compilation of STEP cards—cards that provide an initial means of recording information 
about key events that occur during the course of an incident (for example, see Figure 4.4 
below).  
Event card id: 
Actor:  
Action:  
Event location:  
Time/date event 
began: 
 
Event duration:  
Data source:  
Description:  
Figure 4.4: Example STEP event card identifier [adapted from Henrick and Benner, 1983]. 
One of the criticisms of ECFA and MES is that it can lead to very complex charts, which 
are difficult to maintain without tool support. The use of STEP cards aims at minimizing 
the notational excesses of the other analytical techniques. The multi-linear time-based 
event representation is conducted in a similar manner as MES, although somewhat more 
simplified (with condition events now omitted). Figure 4.5 illustrates an example STEP 
diagram. 
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Figure 4.5: Example STEP diagram. 
4.2.2 Focusing accident analysis on error recovery 
Event-based techniques can be used to understand the mechanisms that, through time, 
resulted in an accident or incident [Henrick and Benner, 1983]. The time-based, graphical 
illustration of events can help the analyst reconstruct what happened, and further examine 
why these events occurred. The techniques discussed in this section (ECFA, MES and 
STEP) are long-recognized, established, event-based analytical techniques. However, 
these techniques do not distinguish between the events that led to an error, and the events 
that followed aiming at preventing or controlling the impact of the error once it has 
occurred.   
 
Error recovery is itself a process that evolves through time [Zapf and Reason, 1994; 
Kontogiannis, 1997]. Therefore, an event-based technique could be adapted to focus on 
error handling, and the development of an entirely new technique was not found to be 
necessary. In order to focus on error handling activities, one has to filter out these events 
and isolate them from other events. This can be done by the use of the error recovery 
Actor A 
Actor B 
Actor C 
Event 1 
Event 2 
Event 3 
Event 4 
Event 5 
time 
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framework (or any other error recovery framework) which was proposed in Chapter 3. 
Essentially, the error recovery framework may be used in combination with any event-
based technique. However, for the purposes of this analysis, STEP was found to be more 
practical, due to its simplified notation, and the use of STEP cards.  
 
The following section will present the result of the integration of STEP with the error 
recovery framework; a method which has been developed for the purposes of this thesis, 
and will be used throughout the analysis of the four case studies. 
4.3 Error recovery focused STEP  
As discussed previously, one of the primary criticisms of ECFA and MES is that their 
notational complexity limits the ability to effectively manage extended diagrams without 
the support of software tools. The decision to use the error recovery framework within an 
event-based technique therefore required a simpler technique that could then be enriched 
with various recovery event-type definitions. The ability to separately document events 
and information about them with STEP cards allows for an event-centric elaboration 
without overloading the graphical event chain.  
 
The integration of STEP with the error recovery framework (Section 3.5) resulted in 
Error recovery focused STEP8 (ER-STEP). Analysis of error recovery activities with this 
technique is performed in the following stages: 
1) STEP event cards are produced as in the STEP method. 
                                                 
8
 The technique and its application resulted in the following paper: Chozos, N (2008). Focusing accident 
analysis on error handling activities: Three case studies in the NHS. Reliability and Engineering, Special 
issue [accepted for publication] 
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2) Error recovery events are identified according to the definitions provided in 
Section 3.5: the error recovery framework. In the action cell of the STEP cards, 
the recovery stage name may be entered. For error detection events, the action-
based, outcome-based, through limiting functions definitions can also be used for 
more detail. Events that are not recovery related may be labelled as “no 
classification”. 
3) ER-STEP diagrams are drawn up in a similar way as STEP diagrams. The error 
recovery stage name should also be entered in the event boxes. It is suggested that 
different colours are used for each of the stage, as this can help to visually observe 
the process and easily draw conclusions (e.g. the frequent occurrence of a specific 
type of event) but these could be omitted. Figure 4.6 illustrates a suggested 
coloration of the error recovery framework stages, which will be used in the rest 
of this document.  
 
Figure 4.6: The ER-STEP notation (colors used to denote recovery stages). 
The “initiating event” is the first instance of detection (problem detection or error 
detection). The investigator may chose to have separate ER-STEP diagrams for 
each sequence of events that is initiated by a detection event, but that is not 
Problem 
detection 
Error 
detection 
Error 
control 
Error 
explanation 
Error 
indication 
Problem 
indication 
Further investigation 
Error 
correction 
 
May not 
necessarily 
occur 
 
 
Any recovery 
stage that fails (i.e. 
error recovery 
stops) 
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necessary as several detection events may take place within the same error 
recovery process. This decision may therefore be made arbitrarily.  
4) ER-STEP diagrams are rearranged with a single, linear, error recovery view. 
During a recovery, it is very likely that there are repetitions of a specific kind of 
recovery action, or that the process enters a loop for a certain time period. In a 
time-based sequence, all events are depicted with a left-to-right view regardless of 
any iterations that may occur; if these events are rearranged with an error-
recovery perspective, the investigator can see these iterations as a way of ‘going a 
step back’, which indicates that the specific recovery stages may be problematic. 
 
The following section will present a simple example of an imaginary scenario which has 
been analyzed with ER-STEP.  
4.3.1 An example of ER-STEP analysis 
Let’s consider the following scenario (for brevity, recovery event identification will be 
done in the scenario text): 
Car breakdown incident 
“On the morning of December 12th, John was driving his car to work as usual. At 
approximately 8.34am, he heard a strange noise from the car engine [Event 1: 
Problem detection]. He then heard this noise again when parking his car outside his 
work place (8.45am) [Event 2: Problem detection]. At that point, John was a bit 
worried, although the car did not appear to have any particular problems as he was 
driving it. He opened the bonnet to check the engine [Event 3: Further investigation] 
but didn’t see any problems [Failure of further investigation]. After finishing work, 
John got in his car and started driving back home (5.00pm) [Event 4: No 
classification 2]. That noise did not occur again that day, or the following day. 
However, on December 14th (5.30pm) on his way back home from work [Event 5: No 
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classification], he heard that noise again [Event 6: Problem detection], and before 
managing to pull over to the next hard shoulder [Event 7: No classification], there 
was smoke coming out his engine [Event 8: Error detection]. The noise had stopped, 
but he was unable to start the engine afterwards [Event 9: Error detection]. He called 
the breakdown assistance [Event 10: Error indication], which arrived shortly after 
(5.45pm) [Event 11: No classification]. The mechanic checked the engine [Event 12: 
Further investigation] to find out that the head gasket was damaged [Event 13: Error 
explanation], allowing for a cooling failure; however, the temperature indicator had not 
shown an increase in temperature [Event 14: error explanation]; the temperature 
indicator was damaged as well. John then had the car towed to the garage (6.00pm) 
[Event 15: no classification] which was fixed the next day [Event 16: error 
correction]. John realized he should have had the car checked out at the first instance 
he heard that noise”. 
ER-STEP analysis 
STEP cards 
(For this scenario, the second step—identification of recovery activities—has already 
been conducted so the error recovery stage tag has already been entered in the action 
box). Figure 4.7 illustrates two STEP cards as an example.  
 
Figure 4.7: Example STEP cards. 
ER-STEP diagrams 
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Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 illustrate two ER-STEP diagrams that describe some of the 
events that took place during the car breakdown incident. 
 
Figure 4.8: Example ER-STEP diagram (1). 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Example ER-STEP diagram (2). 
 
Recovery-focused view 
Having drawn up the ER-STEP diagrams, the analyst can now isolate error recovery 
activities even further, and observe the recovery sequence by accumulating and 
rearranging the recovery events according to the error recovery framework sequence of 
events (Figure 4.10). 
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Figure 4.10: Error recovery-focused view. 
 
This view becomes particularly useful when multiple recovery processes have taken place 
during an incident and when ER-STEP diagrams start becoming large and complex. With 
this view, discussion per error recovery stage is possible, while some conclusions can be 
drawn visually; for instance, in the car breakdown example, we can see that problem 
detection occurred three times but they all were done in the same way when the 
‘operator’ heard a noise coming from the engine. However, this view can be most useful 
for the comparison of multiple case studies, as they can be viewed in parallel. 
4.3.2 Validation of technique 
One of the key challenges in successfully applying this technique is getting the recovery 
event identification right. For this, the definitions of each recovery stage need to be clear 
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and precise so that the analyst does not confuse events when labelling each one of them 
with the appropriate recovery stage name.  
 
The definitions that were provided in Section 3.5 were refined during the application of 
the technique with case studies. However, it was important that other analysts used the 
technique, and that the results of their application were taken into consideration towards 
the finalization of the ER-STEP method. To this purpose, an exercise was put together, 
which was then distributed to four participants. This happened in two stages: First, two 
accident investigators used the technique and identified some key issues that needed to be 
addressed. Having considered their comments and updated the technique and the 
instructions for its application, a second version of the exercise was developed and given 
to two healthcare professionals. 
 
It should be acknowledged that the number of participants is limited, and therefore the 
evaluation of the technique may not be sufficient. However, this exercise has been—at 
least—useful for making some improvement to the technique. In addition, it could be 
argued that its extensive application with four complex case studies and the quality of the 
subsequent conclusions and recommendations may stand as validation activities and 
results. The limited validation is also justified by the difficulty of finding individuals who 
are experienced in accident investigation and in healthcare – the technique cannot simply 
be tested on large numbers of undergraduates expecting the same results; although these 
tests might be conducted in the future – the initial evaluations were used in a formative 
way to inform the subsequent application of the approach in the rest of the thesis. 
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The final exercise can be found in Appendix B. A discussion regarding the evaluation of 
the technique takes place in Chapter 8:.  
4.4 Analysis of multiple case studies 
As mentioned previously, the four incidents that are summarized in Table 1.1 have all 
been analyzed with ER-STEP. Using the same technique for the analysis of multiple case 
studies offers a constructive way to compare and integrate the findings of the individual 
case studies. In turn, this can help identify key issues that are common to these incidents, 
and draw high-level conclusions about error handling in screening services in general. 
These key findings will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
4.5 Data collection 
The analysis of the three NHS case studies was based upon reports that were produced by 
the subsequent inquiry committees. All reports have sections which discuss the events 
that took place with dates and where available the time of the event. Press reports about 
these incidents were examined, but they did not form part of the analysis.  
 
Apart from the three UK incidents, there is one more case study which describes an 
incident that took place in Florida, USA. Information about this incident9 was collected 
with interviews conducted during a 2-month stay in the University of Florida10. 
                                                 
9
 Some information regarding this incident can also be found at: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/23.64.html 
10
 The 2-month stay was possible through the ‘Ken Browning Scholarship in Computing and Medicine, 
2005’. 
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4.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the research methodology that has been applied in this thesis. An 
accident analysis tool has been developed, which is used to explore the organizational 
response to different kinds of error detection. From the abundance of available accident 
analysis techniques, it was found that none isolate error handling activities and 
investigating their relationship. Such a focus is necessary in order to analyze error 
recovery processes and have a consistent way for drawing conclusions about the factors 
that limited their effectiveness. 
 
Such a technique has been developed in this thesis, and is the central point of the research 
methodology that is undertaken here. This chapter therefore presented this technique, 
which is an adaptation of STEP; with a focus on error recovery, the adapted method is 
called ER-STEP. An example was then used to illustrate how the technique may be 
applied. Some discussion took place regarding the approach to the technique’s validation 
and evaluation, which will be concluded in the final chapter of this thesis. Finally, the 
way with which data collection was carried out was also discussed at the last section of 
this chapter. 
 
The next chapter will present the analysis of four adverse incidents that involved 
screening errors with ER-STEP.  
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Chapter 5: Case studies 
 
 
 
This chapter will present the detailed analysis of each of the four case studies with the 
ER-STEP method which was presented in detail in the previous chapter. Each of the four 
sections of this chapter corresponds to one of the four incidents, and will consist of an 
incident summary, the detailed ER-STEP analysis and a summary of each analysis. Note 
that the discussion regarding the factors that affected error recovery in these four 
incidents is limited here as more discussion will take place in the next chapter. The 
purpose of this chapter is only to present the detailed analysis of each of these incidents. 
 
The STEP event cards can be found in Appendix A. Although any necessary information 
should be visible in the ER-STEP graphs throughout this chapter with elaborate 
explanations of each event in the narrative, STEP cards may at any time be used as 
reference, especially when considering the ‘error recovery-focused view’, which does not 
illustrate the actor, time and location of the event. 
5.1 Case study 1: Down’s screening errors, Sheffield 
This incident was the first one identified and has motivated and guided much of this 
study. The inquiry report [Ferres et al., 2001] is very detailed and contains a well 
documented timeline of activities and conversations that took place throughout the five 
months that the incident lasted. Also, this incident has the greatest involvement of 
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software and has unveiled some important issues in comparison to the other three 
incidents.  
5.1.1 Incident summary  
The first case study describes an incident that took place in Sheffield during the first five 
months of 2000. The Immunology Department of Northern General Hospital was using a 
software application (developed in-house 12 years prior to the failure), which, on January 
1st, 2000 was affected by the millennium bug. The error was not recovered until May 
23rd. Until that time, 158 women had been screened incorrectly for the likelihood of 
giving birth to children with Down’s syndrome. Out of the 158 women, two eventually 
gave birth to children with Down’s, and two proceeded to a late abortion (Table 5.1 
presents an overview of the incident).  
 
Incident  Errors in Down’s screening for pregnant women   
Incident timeframe January 1 – May 23, 2000 
Primary cause Millennium bug affected software algorithm used in Down’s 
screening 
Data source Formal inquiry report [Ferres et al., 2001] 
Table 5.1: Overview of incident 1. 
The incident was severely prolonged by a poor organizational response which is also the 
focus of the analysis. The inquiry committee that was subsequently formed to investigate 
the errors placed much of the focus of the investigation on “…determining at what stage 
following 1st January there were indications that there was a serious problem with the 
Downs Screening program and how such concerns were addressed”. 
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5.1.2 Background 
Down’s screening in Sheffield 
The normal process of Downs Screening is a complex multidisciplinary process involving 
obstetricians, radiologists and the diagnostic laboratory. The initial steps are taken at the 
time of a woman’s first visit to the antenatal clinic when, following counseling, consent 
for several screening procedures is obtained. Usually this is at 12-13 weeks of gestation. 
Around this time the woman also undergoes ultrasound scanning which has the dual 
purpose of identifying foetal anomalies and providing a estimate of foetal age based on 
measurements of foetal size. 
 
Several blood tests are taken at 15-17 weeks which are sent to the laboratory for analysis.  
 
Complex calculations are then used to estimate the risk of the foetus being affected by 
Downs syndrome. These start with the age-related risk (the a priori risk) which is derived 
from known incidence of pregnancies affected by Downs syndrome based on maternal 
age. This risk is modified using a likelihood ratio of the presence of an affected foetus 
derived from the concentrations of the markers to provide the final risk value. The 
calculation relies critically on accurate estimation of the projected maternal age at 
delivery which, in turn, is based on the ultrasound measurements of foetal age and the 
date of birth of the mother. It is these calculations that the software system in question 
was used to perform. 
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The final risk value is reported to the obstetrician who will offer to women deemed at 
high-risk a definitive diagnostic procedure based on cyto-genetic analysis of amniotic 
fluid obtained at amniocentesis. The risk cut-offs used in most centers for the latter 
decision lies within the range from 1 in 200 to 1 in 300. This value is selected due to the 
need to balance the risks of miscarriage due to amniocentesis (approximately 1 in 200 
procedures) with the benefits of identifying affected pregnancies.  
 
It is important to stress that the majority of women identified as high-risk are in fact 
carrying a normal child, and not all Downs syndrome pregnancies are identified as high-
risk. The evaluation of high-risk implies the woman has a higher likelihood than others to 
giving birth to a child with Down’s and should be subject to further evaluation. 
 
Management of Quality of Performance in Downs Screening 
Like other NHS screening services, a Downs Screening Service has to maintain a quality 
system which works across the complete process. Checks are needed at every stage and 
this requires a positive multidisciplinary approach: 
 
1. The initial discussion with the pregnant woman 
2. The taking of the blood sample 
3. Collection of robust demographic data 
4. Assessment of foetal age 
5. Maintenance of reliable transport arrangements for the sample 
6. Provision of accurate laboratory analytical procedures 
7. Use of reliable calculation algorithms and software 
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8. The delivery and clear presentation of the results by the relevant healthcare 
professional (midwife, nurse or doctor) 
 
These checks are supported by several internal and external QA processes [Ferres et al., 
2001]. 
5.1.3 Overview of error handling activities 
During a period of five months, there were three different error recovery processes 
initiated by nurses in different locations; two from other hospitals, and one from another 
department within Sheffield Northern General. The first two attempts involved nurses 
that became increasingly concerned over a lack of high-risk reports coming back from the 
laboratory—they were however not certain that there was an error; this is considered as 
problem detection due to the uncertainty that comes with the concerns being raised. The 
first nurse noticed this discrepancy just two weeks after the bug came in effect, while the 
second made her first report two months later. From January to May, the two nurses made 
several reports to the Immunology Department, but they did not manage to convince 
laboratory staff that there was a problem with Down’s screening. Reporting was primarily 
done over the phone, with different people picking up the phone on almost every 
occasion.   
 
In May, five months after the bug manifested, the problem was realized almost 
accidentally by an investigation into—what seemed at the time—another error. More 
specifically, nurses from Antenatal care thought the dates of birth of two mothers had 
been wrongly entered in the system and requested that they be changed. When a 
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laboratory technician attempted to change the dates of birth, the risk calculation did not 
change; this raised some suspicion. Even when laboratory staff realized there was an 
error in Down’s screening, they were not aware of the magnitude of the failure. In 
addition, communication breakdowns and absences of key personnel at that stage 
prolonged the incident even further (3-4 days). Eventually, when people decided to look 
into the software system, the bug was detected and fixed within 37 minutes. 
 
Despite the resolution of the technical problem, a further investigation was necessary in 
order to identify and contact each affected pregnant woman. Until that investigation was 
finished, recovery could not be considered complete. Eventually, it was determined that 
158 high-risk pregnancies had been labeled as low-risk before May 23rd. The women 
were contacted for reexamination, where two proceeded with a late abortion, and two 
other gave birth to a child with Down’s syndrome. 
5.1.4 ER-STEP analysis 
This section will describe three different recovery processes, initiated by the 
1. Maternity and Gynecology liaison sister, hospital B 
2. Midwife coordinator, hospital C 
3. Antenatal staff, Sheffield Northern General hospital 
In addition, the activities that followed recovery and correction of the software errors 
regarding the evaluation of the impact of the failure will also be discussed. 
Maternity and Gynecology liaison sister, hospital B 
The first attempt to report concerns was made only two weeks after the bug began to 
manifest itself after the millennium. A Maternity and Gynecology liaison sister in another 
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hospital (Hospital B) was concerned there were not enough positive results, and made at 
least three attempts to indicate the error to the immunology department in January.  
 
As the Downs Screening service had been offered for approximately 12 years, the nurse 
quickly became concerned by noticing a discrepancy in the frequency of high risk 
pregnancies diagnosed [Event 1.4: problem detection] . She reported her concerns to the 
lab over the phone in mid January [Event 1.5: problem indication], but her reports were 
not seen as significant at the time (Figure 5.1 below illustrates the ER-STEP diagram that 
describes all the activities concerning the Maternity and Gynaecology liaison sister’s 
efforts). 
 
Figure 5.1: Error Recovery Efforts 1, Sheffield. 
Shortly after she had reported her concerns regarding a lack of high-risk pregnancies, the 
same nurse was confronted with an incident that increased her concerns. An older woman 
was found to be in the low risk area, even though she should be in the high-risk area by 
default, because of her age11 (all women over 35 are considered to be in high-risk) [Event 
                                                 
11
 This event is labeled as error detection rather than problem detection because an incident involving one 
specific diagnosis is a clearer indication of the error rather than general concerns of a lack of high risk 
pregnancies. 
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1.6: error detection]. The nurse reported the incident directly to the lab [Event 1.8: 
error indication], and this time her concerns had as a result a brief inquiry [Event 1.9: 
further investigation]. 
 
Ms S, the acting Medical Laboratory Scientific Officer (MLSO) at the time, informed a 
colleague of the incident and the nurse’s concerns. ‘Ms S’ colleague’ had performed the 
Y2K tests for the application [Event 1.3: No classification] that supported the Down’s 
screening algorithm in the previous couple of weeks. During their phone conversation, 
Ms S’s colleague reassured Ms S that everything was fine and that Y2K testing had been 
carried out correctly, and this ended the investigation [Event 1.10: Failure of Further 
investigation]. As a consequence, Ms S did not consider the incident as serious, and 
decided not to log it in the ‘high book’, a book that is placed next to the phone for 
recording any reported abnormal results [Event 1.11: Failure of Further investigation] 
(It was suggested in the report that there was an overall high confidence in the Y2K 
compliance activities carried out in the lab). 
 
Towards the end of January, the nurse was becoming frustrated as her reports were 
ineffective, and she decided to monitor results personally thereafter [Event 1.12: further 
investigation]. She made her last attempt to notify the lab in the end of January [Event 
1.13: problem indication], however she didn’t make any progress. All reports were 
made over the phone. No more reference was made to the Maternity and Gynecology 
Sister since then in the inquiry report.   
 
 
Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
85 
Midwife Coordinator, Hospital C 
Approximately a month after the incident involving the Maternity and Gynaecology 
Liaison sister, the Midwife Coordinator of another hospital (Hospital C) also had growing 
concerns over a lack of high risk pregnancies [Event 1.23: problem detection]. From 
late April through to early May she reported her concerns to the lab twice over the phone 
[Event 1.24: problem indication], [Event 1.26: problem indication]. Her efforts had 
similar results with the Maternity and Gynecology Sister’s, as there were no immediate 
actions to confirm or cancel out her concerns [Event 1.24: failure of error recovery]. In 
fact, at her second attempt, she spoke to Ms S [Event 1.26: problem indication] who 
had also been personally in contact with the Maternity and Gynaecology Liaison sister in 
January (Events 1.7 and 1.8); no association of the two separate reports was made by Ms 
S according to the inquiry report. In this occasion, Ms S suggested she would notify Mr 
M regarding this matter [Event 1.27], but there is no evidence in the report that she 
actually did [Event 1.28], as she never responded to the Midwife’s phone-call [Event 
1.29].  
 
Figure 5.2: Error recovery efforts 2, Sheffield.  
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The Midwife Coordinator made another attempt to communicate her concerns to the lab 
over the phone [Event 1.30: problem indication], and this time spoke to the Head of 
Department, Dr B. He told her he would get back to her soon [Event 1.31: No 
classification]. In the meantime, the Midwife Coordinator consulted with the Head of 
Midwifery of Hospital C [Event 1.32: further investigation], and decided to put her 
concerns in writing [Event 1.34: problem indication]. This decision was important and, 
as we shall see later on, it commenced a series of actions that led to the identification of 
the error; however, it followed a number of failed attempts to report the problem 
informally.  
 
Later on during the same day (May 17th), Dr B discussed the matter with Ms P [Event 
1.35: further investigation] another MLSO (apart from Ms S), who informed Dr B 
[Event 1.36: further investigation] that an audit which had been requested in April 
(Figure 5.3 illustrates the events that took place in April regarding the audit) and by the 
lab IT technician had not been carried out [Event 1.37: No classification].  Dr B 
instructed Mr M to have the audit report on his desk the following day [Event 1.38: 
further investigation].  
 
Figure 5.3: Error recovery efforts 3, Sheffield. 
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On May 18th Dr B saw the note on his desk [Event 1.50: No classification] but didn’t 
realize the piece of paper was actually the result of the audit [Event 1.51: Failure of 
Further investigation]. It was suggested that at the time Dr B was very busy, while his 
wife was about to go into labor. The next day, Friday May 19th, the Midwife Coordinator 
made a phone call to the lab again reporting her concerns, and also to inform Mr K that 
she would be sending a letter to the lab about her concerns over the lack of high risk 
pregnancies [Event 1.56: further investigation]. On that day Dr B’s wife went into labor 
[Event 1.53: No classification]. During his absence, no further activities regarding 
Downs Screening took place until after the weekend.  
 
Figure 5.4: Error recovery efforts 4, Sheffield. 
 
The Midwife Coordinator’s reports did not have a direct impact in the detection of an 
error within the lab. However, during the third week of May, there was another report to 
the Immunology department which was seen at the time as a separate event. This report, 
Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
88 
in conjunction with the efforts of the Midwife coordinator resulted in the realization of 
the problem with Down’s screening.  
 
Antenatal Staff, Sheffield Northern General 
On May 17th, the same day that the Midwife Coordinator spoke to Dr B over the phone 
[Event 1.42: error indication], staff from Antenatal care made a phone call requesting 
amendments to two reports. The dates of birth in the reports were wrong; one by a couple 
of months and one by a couple of years [Event 1.41: error detection]. Note that error 
detection here refers to the detection of another error [error 2].  
 
Ms S became concerned there was a problem with Downs Screening as when she 
changed the dates of birth accordingly, the risk calculation remained the same [Event 
1.44: error detection]. Ms S reported this matter to Mr L, who was responsible for 
maintaining PathLan [Event 1.45: error indication]. Mr L then attempted to inform Mr 
W in Hartlepool [Event 1.46: error indication] who, along with Dr A, had created the 
Downs Screening software application back in 1988. Mr W was not available and so Mr 
L left a voice- message [Event 1.48: error indication].  
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Figure 5.5: Error Recovery Efforts 5, Sheffield. 
The following day, Friday 19th, Mr L was away, and no further actions were taken until 
Monday 22nd. On that Friday Mr K received the letter from the Midwife Coordinator 
[Event 1.57: further investigation]. On the 22nd, Dr B’s wife went into labour, so he 
was absent on paternity leave.  
 
On May 23rd, Mr K asked Mr M to provide him with the audit results [Event 1.60: 
further investigation]. After examining the audit results [Event 1.61: further 
investigation], Mr K found that high risk calculations were overall much lower than 
anticipated, and not just with regards to Hospital B’s pregnant women, but to all 
recipients of their test reports [Event 1.62: error detection]. Mr K immediately asked his 
assistant Mr L to contact Mr W [Event 1.64: error indication] while he had already 
started checking analytical values himself [Event 1.63: further investigation].  
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Figure 5.6: Error Recovery Efforts 6, Sheffield. 
Contact with Mr W was established the next day [Event 1.65: error indication]. Mr W 
then logged on to PathLan in the morning and checked the date values [Event 1.66: 
further investigation]. Within 37 minutes, the bug had been identified [Event 1.67: 
error explanation] and corrected [Event 1.68: error correction]. Mr K did not find out 
about the Maternity and Gynecology Sister’s reports until after the error had been 
corrected. 
 
At that stage it was important to find out how many errors had been made. On the 
morning of May 24th, Mr K informed Dr B that he would find all high-risk cases that had 
been wrongly reported. He trawled through the system to identify the potential size of the 
problem over the next 12 hours or so [Event 1.70: further investigation]. He found 
approximately 150 high-risk pregnancies which had been reported as low-risk [Event 
1.71: error explanation]—Mr K subsequently emailed these findings to Dr B [Event 
1.72: further investigation] who then informed the Chief Executive. 
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5.1.5 Further analysis 
As mentioned in Section 4.3, the final stage of the ER-STEP analysis is to rearrange the 
sequence of events based on the progression that is suggested by the error recovery 
framework.  With this view, the analyst can focus even further on the process of error 
recovery.  
 
In this section, the ER-STEP diagrams will therefore be rearranged to the error recovery 
view, while detection events will be classified according to the different detection types 
proposed by Sellen [1994] (action-based, outcome-based, through limiting functions). 
These findings will be aggregated and further analyzed in the next chapter. 
 
Maternity and Gynecology Liaison Sister, hospital B 
Figure 5.7 illustrates the same events as in Figure 5.1 with the error recovery view.   
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Figure 5.7: Error recovery focused view, Sheffield 1. 
As we can see, detection events occurred where test results are used and not inside the 
lab. Reporting of either concerns or of an incident with a patient had to be reported to the 
lab over the phone several times. In the first instance, problem indication did not 
convince laboratory staff that there was actually a problem. Following several reports by 
the same person, there were some investigation activities—although these came close to 
the identification of the software bug, the person who had carried out Y2K testing 
dismissed these reports, so the incident was not investigated further and was not logged. 
 
Table 5.2 summarizes the different kinds of activities under each stage that have taken 
place during the efforts initiated by the Maternity and Gynaecology sister during January 
2000. 
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Event Analysis 
Problem detection Outcome-based, outside the lab 
Growing concern due to a discrepancy between the expected number of 
positives and the actually received (event 1.4).  
Error detection Outcome-based, outside the lab 
Outcome (screening result) different than what she expected (event 1.6). 
Problem indication Over the phone (events 1.3, 1.5 and 1.7) 
Error indication Over the phone (event 1.8) 
Further 
investigation 
Outside the lab 
Monitoring of results to find out if there is an error (event 1.12) 
Inside the lab 
Enquiry to colleague to find out if there is an error (event 1.9) 
Investigation to determine the extent of the failure (event 1.70) 
Failure of error 
recovery 
Incident not logged (Event 1.11) 
Reassurances that ‘everything is OK’ (events 1.10, 1.14) 
Table 5.2: Analysis of recovery events, Sheffield 1. 
 
Midwife Coordinator, Hospital C 
Figure 5.8 illustrates the error recovery focused view of the activities following the 
Midwife coordinator’s efforts presented in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.8: Error recovery focused view, Sheffield 2, 4 and 6.  
It is obvious from the above figure that the reports made by the Midwife coordinator 
resulted in a significant amount of investigation activities. There were at least five 
distinct events where staff was investigating the system in order to determine if there is 
an error, after people in the laboratory started becoming suspicious. However, this was 
largely motivated by the Midwife coordinator’s decision to write a formal letter, while 
her phone-call to the laboratory to announce she had in fact sent that letter perhaps 
accelerated investigation activities in the laboratory. 
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However, these events were not enough to lead laboratory staff to identify the actual 
cause of the errors (although it makes sense to assume that investigation activities that 
were undertaken at the time would have resulted in error explanation anyway). This was 
done when staff from antenatal found errors which seemed at the time as unrelated—this 
will be discussed in the following section.  
 
Table 5.3 summarizes the different kinds of activities under each stage that have taken 
place during the efforts initiated by the Midwife coordinator in Hospital C during March-
May 2000. 
Event Analysis 
Problem detection Outcome based, outside the lab 
Growing concern due to a lack of positives reported (event 1.23) 
Error detection Through further investigation, inside the lab 
Investigation following problem detection has resulted in the identification 
of an error (event 1.62) 
Problem indication Over the phone (events 1.24, 1.26 and 1.30) 
Written (event 1.34) 
Error indication None 
Further 
investigation 
Outside the lab 
Enquiry to colleague regarding what action to take (events 1.32)  
Inside the lab 
Enquiry to colleague regarding what action to take (events 1.35) 
Enquiry to colleague regarding actions that have been performed in the 
past (events 1.36,1.54 and 1.57)  
Investigation to find out if there is an error (events 1.38, 1.39, 1.55, 1.61 
and 1.63) 
Failure of error 
recovery 
Failure to consider previous event as important (events 1.25, 1.28 and 
1.51) 
Table 5.3: Analysis of recovery events, Sheffield 2, 4 and 6. 
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Note that error detection through investigation is a detection mechanism which is not 
considered in Sellen’s taxonomy. This kind of detection occurred following problem 
detection, problem indication and consequently, further investigation. 
Antenatal Staff, Northern General 
Figure 5.9 presents the error recovery focused view of events that are described in Figure 
5.5 and Figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.9: Error recovery focused view, Sheffield 5 and 6. 
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During a rather turbulent time for the Department (recent change of Head of Department, 
low staffing levels), with the reports from the Midwife coordinator under investigation, 
the two nurses in antenatal care found two reports with the DOBs of two women being 
wrong. When they phoned the laboratory to have the dates changed, it was realized that 
the risk calculation remained the same, which made it obvious that there was something 
wrong with the Down’s screening software. It is important to stress that the person who 
tried to change the date was Ms S, who had been involved in all previous reports; she was 
aware of the reports by the Gynaecology and Maternity Liaison sister and the Midwife 
coordinator. 
 
Mr W, the person responsible for the maintenance of the software was finally contacted 
that time—according to the report, it took him 37 minutes to identify and correct the bug. 
 
Table 5.4 summarizes the different kinds of activities under each recovery stage that have 
taken place during the efforts initiated by Antenatal care staff towards the end of the 
incident in May 2000. 
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Event Analysis 
Problem detection None 
Error detection Outcome based, outside the lab 
Antenatal staff found two reports where the dates of birth (DoBs) were 
wrong. This was an error during data entry, and could have happened 
regardless of the software bug. For this reason it has been labeled as 
error 2. (Event 1.41). 
Outcome based, inside the lab 
In an attempt to correct error 2, Ms S found the risk calculation remained 
the same. This led to the realization that there was something wrong with 
the risk calculation software (event 1.44) 
Problem indication None 
Error indication Over the phone (events 1.45, 1.46, 1.48) and voice-mail (event 1.65) 
Further 
investigation 
Investigation of system to find out what the errors is (event 1.66) 
Error explanation Identification of software bug (event 1.67) 
Error correction Removal of bug (event 1.68) 
Table 5.4: Analysis of error recovery activities, Sheffield 5.5 and 5.6. 
5.1.6 Overview of findings 
Table 5.5 summarizes and categorizes all types of error recovery activities that took place 
during this incident. 
Event Analysis 
Problem detection Outcome based, outside the lab 
Growing concern due to a lack of positives (events 1.4, 1.23) 
Error detection Outcome based, outside the lab 
Older woman should be in high-risk by default (Event 1.6). 
Outcome based, inside the lab 
When trying to change a DOB, risk calculation remains the same (event 
1.41) 
Through investigation, inside the lab 
Previous reports investigated result into identification of error (event 1.62) 
Problem indication Over the phone (events 1.3, 1.5, 1.7, 1.24, 1.26, 134) 
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Event Analysis 
Written (event 1.34) 
Error indication Over the phone (events 1.45, 1.46, 1.48) and voice-mail (event 1.65) 
Further 
investigation 
Outside the lab 
Monitoring of results to find out if there is an error (event 1.12) 
Enquiry to colleague regarding what action to take (events 1.32)  
 
Inside the lab 
Enquiry to colleague to find out if there is an error (event 1.9) 
Enquiry to colleague regarding what action to take (events 1.35) 
Enquiry to colleague regarding actions that have been performed in the 
past (events 1.36,1.54 and 1.57)  
 
Audit to find out if there is an error (events 1.38, 1.39, 1.55, 1.61 and 
1.63) 
Investigation of system to find out what the errors is (event 1.66) 
Investigation to determine the extent of the failure (event 1.70) 
Error explanation Identification of software bug 
Error correction Removal of bug 
Failure of error 
recovery 
Incident not logged (Event 1.11) 
Reassurances that ‘everything is OK’ (events 1.10, 1.14) 
Failure to consider previous event as important (events 1.25, 1.28 and 
1.51) 
Table 5.5: Summary of error recovery activities in the Sheffield incident. 
5.2 Case study 2: Breast cancer screening errors, London 
This second incident is particularly different from the first one. The error was not 
originating in software or in the analysis altogether, but in the notation laboratory 
technicians used to denote positives. The notation was “confusing”, leading to multiple 
positives missed. In addition, there was no protocol in place to ensure that women were 
receiving the correct results. In comparison to the first incident, there are more 
organizational deficiencies directly involved with the manifestation of diagnostic errors. 
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In addition, this incident was severely prolonged by the subsequent investigations that 
were carried our. 
 
However, the impact of the temporal dimension on the clinical outcome is not as 
immediate as in the first case study which considered diagnoses on pregnancies. The 
impact in terms of numbers of patients was therefore smaller, although fatal in some 
cases. 
5.2.1 Incident summary  
In mid October 2000, it was discovered almost accidentally that a woman had been sent 
the wrong results (she was informed she was fine, although she should have been called 
for further testing) by her previous breast screening service following her mammogram in 
January 1999. Following this incident, two inquiries were carried out. During this 
investigation, over 174,000 screening episodes were reviewed, concluding that 123 
women had not received the right result. The error was eventually associated with a delay 
in diagnosis of breast cancer in 11 women, while the longest delay was 21 months. One 
woman’s condition deteriorated and she died. 
Incident  Errors in Breast Cancer Screening service   
Incident timeframe 1993 – December 2001 
Primary cause Absence of protocol to ensure women receive the correct results 
Data source Formal inquiry report [CHI, 2002] 
Table 5.6: Overview of incident 2. 
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One of the conclusions drawn by the inquiry committee was that: “…there had been 
warning signs of the potential for service failure which had not been reported and, 
therefore, not acted on by West of London Breast Screening Service…” 
5.2.2 Background 
The inquiry report for this incident presents only the events that followed the detection of 
the error, and mostly the activities surrounding the decisions and conduct of three 
inquiries that followed (one internal, one independent, and a formal NHS inquiry—the 
latter being the source of this analysis). Errors were made over a period of eight years; 
they were not attributed to software or hardware faults, but to a lack of protocol to ensure 
that the right results were given to the right patient.  
 
There were two Breast Cancer Screening services involved: the West of London Breast 
Screening Service (WLBSS), where the errors occurred, and Breast Screening Service X 
(BSS X), where one of the errors was detected. Abbreviations here are the same as in the 
formal inquiry report. 
5.2.3 ER-STEP analysis 
In January 1999, a woman was sent the wrong mammogram tests by the WLBSS [Event 
2.1: No classification], where she was cleared from any risks associated with Breast 
Cancer. She should have been called back for further testing. In October 2000, she moved 
to another area [Event 2.2: No classification] and had her files sent over to her new 
Breast Cancer Screening Service, BSS X [Event 2.3: No classification]. A review of her 
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case found the error [Event 2.4: error detection], and the BSS X contacted the WLBSS 
over the phone regarding the matter [Event 2.5: error indication].  
 
On October 31st, the BSS X sent written confirmation to the WLBSS [Event 2.6: error 
indication], that there was an error with the specific patient’s diagnosis, and copied the 
letter to their own Quality Assurance Centre (Quality Assurance Centre X). The matter 
was discussed among senior management within WLBSS [Event 2.7: further 
investigation], however it was not regarded as significant [Event 2.8: Failure of error 
recovery], as there had been no complications for the woman’s health. 
 
On the following day, BSS X informed the London Quality Assurance Reference Centre 
[Event 2.9: error indication] over the phone, while they also forwarded the letter sent to 
the WLBSS the previous day [Event 2.10: error indication]. The letter was received 10 
days later (November 10) by the London Quality Assurance Reference Centre [Event 
2.11: further investigation]. Until then, no further actions to investigate the error and 
other possible complications were carried out. 
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Figure 5.10: Error recovery efforts 1, London. 
On the week starting November 13th, the London Quality Assurance Centre made several 
attempts to discuss the matter with senior management of the WLBSS [Event 2.12: error 
indication]. They insisted the error be reported to the General Manager of the 
Hammersmith Hospitals Trust. On November 17th, the incident was finally reported as a 
‘critical incident’ to the Trust’s General Manager [Event 2.13: error indication], who 
immediately contacted the Trust’s Chief Operating Officer [Event 2.14: error 
indication]. 5 days later, the matter was brought to the attention of the NHS England 
Coordinator of Breast Screening [Event 2.15: error indication]. 
 
The following day (Nov 23), the London Quality Assurance Reference Center informed 
the officer with lead responsibility for Cancer Services at the NHS London Regional 
Office [Event 2.16: error indication]. On November 24, the London Quality Assurance 
Reference Centre wrote a letter to the NHS Region Director of Public Health regarding 
the incident [Event 2.17: error indication], and decided to call a meeting [Event 2.18: 
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further investigation], with participants being representatives from the WLBSS, the 
wider trust, the health authority commissioning consortium, and the Quality Assurance 
Reference Center, while the trust’s Chief Operating Officer was chairing the meeting 
which was scheduled for December 4th.  
 
Figure 5.11: Error recovery efforts 2, London. 
 
At the meeting, the trust established an internal inquiry panel [Event 2.19: further 
investigation]. The panel, made up by the general manager of the directorate and a 
consultant radiologist who did not work at the WLBSS, reviewed a number of documents 
and conducted interviews [Event 2.20: further investigation]. It was understood that the 
WLBSS needed to develop a robust right results protocol to ensure women received the 
correct result [Event 2.21: error explanation], while they suggested an external audit 
company should review the mammogram files of all women who had attended for 
screening since 1993, nearly 104,000 women (over 174,000 episodes) [Event 2.22: 
further investigation]. 
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Figure 5.12: Error recovery efforts 3, London. 
 
The findings of the inquiry panel were reported to the Trust Chief Executive on 
December 22nd [Event 2.24: further investigation]. The Trust Board also discussed the 
matter in a closed session, on February 12th 2001 [Event 2.23: further investigation]. It 
was decided an external audit should be carried out, as suggested by the inquiry panel. 
The company—PricewaterhouseCoopers—was instructed to go over all the files since 
1993, in order to identify any difference between the information contained in WLBSS 
files and the corresponding computer records. The principal objective was to identify 
cases in which women screened by WLBSS may have received the wrong result and 
incorrectly refereed for a routine recall in 3 years time instead of being recalled for 
immediate clinical or technical assessment.  
 
This audit lasted approximately 3 months [Event 2.25: further investigation]; the 
findings were forwarded to the inquiry panel, which compiled a report in July [Event 
2.26: Error explanation]. During the audit by PricewaterhouseCoopers, the Trust Chief 
Executive requested the assistance of the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) 
[Event 2.27: error indication], who agreed to conduct their own investigation on April 
10th [Event 2.28: further investigation].  
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Figure 5.13: Error recovery activities 4, London.  
On June 11th, WoLBSS suspended its breast cancer screening service [Event 2.29: error 
control], and CHI began their investigation [Event 2.30: further investigation] which 
was completed in April 2002. It was not until December 10th that WoLSBSS began a 
phased reintroduction of services [Event 2.31: error correction].  
5.2.4 Further analysis 
Figure 5.14 presents the error recovery focused view of the error handling activities that 
took place during the Breast Cancer screening errors, London. 
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Figure 5.14: Error recovery focused view, London. 
 
Error recovery efforts for this incident were triggered by a single instance of error 
detection. This was however done by a Breast Screening Service and not by a nurse in 
points of care. The reason for the extended recovery timeframe is the fact that errors were 
taking place for over eight years. A total of three inquiries had to be carried out in order 
to determine the number of erroneous reports. These inquiries are considered as part of 
the entire recovery process as the errors were continuing to affect patients as time was 
passing. 
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There also many error indication events, where the Breast Screening service that detected 
the error had to notify several agencies and authorities in order to establish a formal 
inquiry. 
 
Table 5.7 summarizes and categorizes all error recovery events that took place during this 
incident. 
Event Analysis 
Problem detection None 
Error detection Outcome based, outside the lab 
Revaluation of a patient’s screening result by new breast screening 
service (Event 2.4) 
Problem indication None 
Error indication Over the phone (events 2.5, 2.9 and 2.12) 
Formal letters (2.6 and 2.10) 
Incident reporting to NHS authorities (events 2.14, 2.15 and 2.16) 
Further 
investigation 
Outside the lab 
None 
Inside the lab 
Meeting to decide what action to take (event 2.18) 
Investigation to determine what the error is (events 2.19, 2.20, 2.28 and 
2.30) 
Audit to determine the extent of the error (event 2.22 and 2.25) 
Error explanation Identification of cause (event 2.21) 
Error control Suspend breast screening (event 2.29) 
Error correction Implement recommendations (event 2.31), phased introduction of 
services (event 2.32) 
Failure of error 
recovery 
Previous event not considered as important (event 2.8) 
Table 5.7: Summary of error recovery activities in the London incident. 
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5.2.5 A case of whistle-blowing? 
Only a few days after the CHI report was published in April 2002, two former employees 
of the Hammersmith Hospitals NHS Trust gave an interview to BBC news, stating that 
there were further failures in the Radiology Department of the Trust12. In the interview, 
the one former employee argued that she—as well as other colleagues—had made several 
attempts to report problems in the radiology unit, which had to do with technology and 
management failures, but were not affective.  
 
One of them suggested that “Many scans were rendered unusable because reports were 
generated with missing characters and lines and even patients' names transposed”. The 
same person went on to argue that: “Many compromised reports were simply abandoned 
because it was impossible to identify who the patient was, while even reports which were 
identifiable were abandoned because staff were under time pressure”.  
 
These events took place during 1993-1995, when the nurse having written a letter to the 
management reporting these issues was suspended from her duties (allegedly within two 
hours). In 1995, A Picture Archiving and Communication System (PACS)13 was 
introduced, which significantly changed the way with which things were done at the 
Radiology unit. However, other mishaps had taken place since 1999 according to the 
                                                 
12
 More information can be found at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/archive/1938095.stm 
 
13
 PACS systems were discussed in section 2.2.1 
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second whistle-blower. In fact, that person suggested that staff involved believed the 
inquiry carried out was incomplete, and even acted as a ‘cover-up’ of the problems that 
existed in the radiology unit and the breast cancer screening service.  
 
The press article that discusses these matters is neither an official document, nor does it 
contain enough information for an analysis. However, it is worth mentioning as such 
occurrences illustrate the potential friction that may arise when staff in lower levels of the 
organization have concerns about the practices of their department or unit; the following 
quote from the involved nurse may highlight the challenge of whistle-blowing:  “I could 
never say to another person who might be in the NHS now, possibly watching this, 
thinking perhaps I should blow the whistle, I couldn't tell them go ahead and do it”.  
5.3 Case study 3: Breast cancer screening errors, Manchester 
This incident was attributed to ‘human error’ of a single radiologist. In comparison to the 
two previous case studies, the direct cause was therefore also different. However, like the 
previous cases, error recovery was poor and contributed to having a prolonged incident 
timeframe. 
5.3.1 Incident summary  
Over a two-year period, a consultant radiologist misinterpreted a total of 176 
mammograms. 28 of these had previously been cleared by the radiologist, but were 
eventually identified as having breast cancer, out of which 17 were given reduced 
chances of survival. Although the radiologist involved was initially considered solely 
responsible, the investigations that followed concluded that severe organizational and 
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structural problems allowed for the errors to occur. The radiologist was, at the time 
working at two NHS Trusts: The Trafford Hospitals Trust and The Bury Primary Care 
Trust.   
Incident  Errors in Breast Cancer Screening service   
Incident timeframe April 2003 – January 2006 
Primary cause ‘Human error’ 
Data source Two Formal inquiry reports [Baker, 2006] and [Expert Advisory 
Panel, 2006] 
Table 5.8: Overview of incident 3. 
Two inquiries were carried out ([Expert Advisory Panel, 2006] and [Baker, 2006]). The 
two inquiries discussed here had different purposes: The Baker report considered the 
practices of the radiologist held responsible (Dr H), while the Expert Advisory Panel’s 
report focused on the communications, meetings and reviews that were carried out upon 
the discovery of the errors. 
The inquiry reports suggested that the errors would have been identified sooner had audit 
arrangements been in place as recommended in previous reviews, while the problems 
“…may well have been masked in previous settings by the strength of their imaging 
department and of the breast multi-disciplinary team”. In addition, it was concluded that 
“…warning signs were missed or ignored and inadequate attention was paid to the 
nature of references”. 
5.3.2 ER-STEP analysis 
Concerns about Dr H’s practice were raised from the first couple of weeks in his 
appointment. More specifically, other Mammography radiologists were concerned that Dr 
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H’s reports were too short, while he didn’t take into account previous radiology reports 
[Event 3.1: problem detection]. Concerns were higher with respect to cancer patients 
under surveillance. However, no errors had been identified until then. Radiologists 
formally reported their concerns about Dr H’s practices in November 2003 [Event 3.2: 
problem indication]. The subsequent investigation [Event 3.3: further investigation] 
did not find any significant problems with Dr H’s work [Event 3.4: failure of error 
recovery]. 
 
During November 2003, some errors in Dr H’s reports were noticed by other radiologists 
[Event 3.5: error detection]—we have no information regarding the nature of the errors. 
Trust management became aware of this [Event 3.6: error indication], but the errors 
were seen as isolated events, and not systematic [Event 3.7: failure of error recovery]. 
 
During November, clinical staff at Trafford were also becoming concerned that Dr H’s 
work was not reliable [Event 3.8: problem detection]. As a result, they were checking 
all critical tests with another radiologist [Event 3.9: further investigation]. However, 
they were not checking all results, but only the ones with diagnosed cancer (therefore 
only consider the risk of false positives). Since then, the inquiry reports do not mention 
any further activities with regards to Dr H’s work until April 2005. 
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Figure 5.15: Error recovery efforts 1, Greater Manchester. 
 
In April 2005, mammography radiographers at Trafford Hospitals Trust found a higher 
number of errors than expected in a single Breast Care Multi-Disciplinary Team (MDT) 
patient list [Event 3.10: error detection]. This, along with their general concerns 
regarding Dr H’s work was reported to the THT management [Event 3.11: problem 
indication], [Event 3.12: error indication]. On April 18th, the Trust management 
decided to suspend Dr H [Event 3.13: error control]. The following day, THT 
management reported Dr H’s errors as a ‘serious adverse event’ to the Greater 
Manchester Strategic Health Authority (GMSHA) [Event 3.14: error indication], who 
subsequently informed the Department of Health [Event 3.15: error indication]. An 
independent review was called, and the Nightingale centre was instructed to conduct it 
[Event 3.16: further investigation]. 
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Figure 5.16: Error recovery efforts 2, Greater Manchester. 
 
On April 26th, the Nightingale centre commenced a mammography review (consisting of 
478 reports) [Event 3.17: further investigation]. On the same day, an Expert Advisory 
Panel was established, in order to advise the Trusts on the management of the clinical 
incident [Event 3.18: further investigation]. The mammography review by the 
Nightingale centre was concluded on May 6th, finding a significant number of differing 
reports [Event 3.19: error explanation]. At that stage, the Bury Primary Care Trust 
(where Dr H was also working on a part-time basis) was advised to exclude Dr H [Event 
3.20: error indication]. The National Patient Safety Agency was informed of the 
incident on April 17th [Event 3.21: error indication].  
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Figure 5.17: Error recovery efforts 3, Greater Manchester. 
During August, the London Breast Screening Quality Assurance Team performed a 
review of the general radiology images and films [Event 3.22: further investigation], 
while the review of clinical notes, cytology reports and histopathology reports lasted 
three months (up to December 2005) [Event 3.23: further investigation], and the review 
of the ultrasound patients’ notes and images lasted four months (ending in January 2006) 
[Event 3.24: further investigation]. Finally, the review of the 28 patients with delayed 
diagnosis was performed over December 2005 [Event 3.25: further investigation]. 
5.3.3 Further analysis 
Figure 5.18 illustrated three distinct sequences of events that were motivated by detection 
in different locations. 
Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
116 
 
Figure 5.18: Error recovery focused view, Greater Manchester efforts 1. 
 
In the first case, colleagues of Dr H’s were concerned about the brevity and the brusque 
style of his reports. They officially reported their concerns to the Trust management who 
decided to look into Dr H’s past. They found nothing notable apart from a good resume 
with good references, and assumed that there were no problems with his practice. In the 
second incident, radiologists in one of the hospitals of the Trust found errors in his 
reports—this was reported also to the Trust management, but they thought these were 
isolated events. 
 
However in the third case, it was clinical staff that were concerned and not radiologists. 
They did not report their concerns—they double checked Dr H’s reports with other 
radiologists. This is common practice in radiology and should have been carried out any 
way, according to the inquiry report. 
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Figure 5.19: Error recovery focused view, Greater Manchester 2. 
 
The incident was directed towards resolution when colleagues of Dr H’s found a number 
of errors in one of his patient lists. Unlike the previous instances of detection, this time 
reporting of this event had immediate impact. Trust management suspended Dr H.  
 
Investigation activities, like in the previous Breast screening incident, involved multiple 
inquires—both internal and independent. In a similar manner to the Hammersmith 
incident, many indication events involved the notification of agencies and authorities in 
order to establish the inquiries that were necessary. 
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Event Analysis 
Problem detection Outcome based, inside the lab 
Concerns over the brevity and overall quality of Dr H’s reports by 
colleagues (event 3.1) 
Outcome based, outside the lab 
Clinical staff become concerned over the reliability of Dr H’s work (event 
3.8) 
Error detection Outcome based, outside the lab 
None 
Outcome based, inside the lab 
Radiologists notice errors in Dr H’s reports (event 3.5) 
Mammography radiologists find a high number of errors in a single patient 
list of Dr H’s (3.10) 
Problem indication Formal reporting of concerns to the Trust management (events 3.2 and 
3.12) [presumably in management meetings] 
Error indication Formal reporting of errors to the Trust management (events 3.6 and 3.11) 
Reporting of incident to the an external authority as a ‘serious incident’ 
(regional Health Authority and Department of Health) (events 3.14 and 
3.15) 
Inform other Trust that the liable person works in regarding his 
performance (event 3.20) 
Further 
investigation 
Inside the lab 
To investigate if there is an error (events 3.3 and 3.9) 
To determine the extent of the error (events 3.16, 3.17, 3.22, 3.23, 3.26 
and 3.27) 
Error explanation Identification of reports that contain errors (event 3.18) 
Compilation of report containing findings (event 3.25) 
Error control Suspend person responsible (event 3.13) 
Error correction n/a (there is no information available regarding subsequent activities to 
correct the problem) 
Failure of error 
recovery 
Investigation does not find any problems (event 3.4) 
Do not consider errors as systematic, but only as isolated events (event 
3.7) 
Table 5.9: Analysis of error recovery activities, Manchester 1, 2 and 3. 
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5.4 Case study 4: STI screening errors, Florida 
This last incident presents some similarities with the Sheffield incident due to the 
involvement of software. However, the bug was not part of the risk calculation but in the 
reporting scheme; the system which flagged positives and copied them to the test report 
to be distributed back to where the test was initially requested. In that sense, it also 
presents some similarities with the second incident, the errors that occurred in the London 
Breast Cancer Screening service where a confusing notation for denoting positives 
resulted in missing several positives. 
 
This incident occurred in the USA, where the delivery system is somewhat different from 
the UK NHS. In the USA there are more analytic laboratories per clinic or surgery, as the 
Primary/Secondary care distinction does not exist. This had some impact on the 
resolution of the incident as it was detected within the same hospital and the error had not 
propagated across various locations. 
 
There is no formal inquiry report for this case study; the analysis was based on an entry in 
the Risk Digest [Wears, 2004] and further data collected through interviews with 
involved personnel.  
5.4.1 Incident summary 
Due to a software bug compounded with interface deficiencies in the Microbiology 
Department of a hospital in Florida, 275 positive results for Sexually Transmitted 
Diseases (STDs) were missed over a period of four months in 2003. Consequently, 125 of 
these cases had not been treated presumptively with antibiotics. Prior to the incident there 
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was a change in equipment for analyzing DNA probes in the Biochemistry Department. 
Also, there was a change in the reporting format after a clinician’s request which 
contributed to missing critical test results. During the change of equipment, the ED nurse 
who was the designated recipient of all tests was away on vacation. 
 
A few years later, a similar error occurred, and the nurse responsible for collecting test 
results for the Emergency Department, recalled the previous incident and was alarmed 
very quickly. She contacted the lab shortly after the error (within a week) which found 
and dealt with without any patient complications. This second incident describes an 
effective error recovery and not a long- term diagnostic failure as the first one. However, 
the experience of the first incident contributed greatly to the resolution of the second. For 
this reason the ER-STEP analysis will cover both incidents. 
Incident  Errors in STI Screening   
Incident timeframe February 2003 – June 2003 
Primary cause Software bug 
Data source Interviews with involved personnel 
Table 5.10: Overview of incident 4. 
5.4.2 Background 
This incident involved errors in Sexually Transmitted Infections (STI) screening that 
occurred in a Biochemistry Department, affecting patients in the Emergency Department 
(ED) of the same hospital in Florida. Although this took place in the USA and not the 
UK, there are several similarities, as well as significant differences that are worth 
discussing in comparison to the NHS delivery model.  
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The software bug was in the system used for reporting results, and not in the actual 
diagnostic calculations. On a daily basis, the ED would request several different tests to 
be performed from the Biochemistry laboratory. Once these tests were performed, the 
reporting system in the Biochemistry Department would only select the positives and not 
the negatives—these positives are printed and sent to the ED; this was a new system. 
While the software bug in the reporting system resulted in missing positives, the fact that 
negative results were not printed as well did not allow for the error being detected. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, data regarding this incident was gathered with interviews 
with the ED nurse responsible for requesting and collecting reports from the ED, the 
Head of the Emergency Department and the supervisor of the Biochemistry 
Department14.  
5.4.3 ER-STEP analysis 
Towards the end of January 2003, there was a change in equipment for analyzing DNA 
probes in the Biochemistry Department. The system for ensuring that results were not 
missed was based on a custom report written locally. This report covered all bacteriology 
cultures, not just those for STDs, and looked at a binary field for a positive or negative 
value for Gonorrhea/Chlamydia (GC) reporting only the positives.  Under the new 
system, that field was empty, and so no GC cases positive were listed by the report 
[Event 4.1].   
                                                 
14
 This was possible through the ‘Ken Browning Traveling Scholarship in Computing and Medicine’ of the 
Department of Computing Science, University of Glasgow. 
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Because the other cultures were still being reported normally, the report looked normal 
(ie, it was not entirely empty). Some time after her return [Event 4.2: no classification], 
the nurse became concerned that there were no positives getting reported [Event 4.3: 
problem detection]. She discussed the matter with her supervisor [Event 4.4: further 
investigation], who advised her to report this to the Biochemistry Department [Event 
4.5: further investigation]; she shortly after visited the lab and informed staff [Event 
4.6: problem indication].  
 
Figure 5.20: Error recovery activities 1, Florida. 
Technicians looked at tests dating back to the time of the installation of new equipment 
[Event 4.7: further investigation], and found positives had been diagnosed, but were not 
printed in the report sent to the ED [Event 4.8: Error explanation]. They then checked 
the reporting system [Event 4.9: further investigation] and identified the bug [Event 
4.10: Error explanation]. The custom program was amended [Event 4.11: error 
correction, Event 4.12 error correction]. All involved patients were identified [Event 
4.13: further investigation] and patients were contacted [Event 4.14 error correction]. 
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In cases of STI screening errors, the patients had to be asked to inform their recent sexual 
partners to be screened as well. 
 
Figure 5.21: Error recovery activities 2, Florida. 
Two years later, the same ED nurse noticed after 2 weeks that no positives were coming 
back [Event 4.15: problem detection]. According to her experience, there were 2 or 3 
positives every week. As she recalled the previous incident [Event 4.16: No 
classification], she immediately visited the laboratory [Event 4.17: problem 
indication], and after checking the system [Event 4.18: further investigation] it was 
discovered that a ‘flag’ used to check whether a test result is positive had been mistakenly 
deactivated [Event 4.19: error explanation].    
 
Figure 5.22: Error recovery activities 3, Florida. 
The flag was reset [Event 4.20: error correction] and the system continued to be used 
without any further problems. All involved patients were identified [Event 4.21: further 
investigation] and patients were contacted [Event 4.22 error correction]. The incident 
did not last long enough to have any adverse impact on patients’ health. 
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5.4.4 Further analysis 
Figure 5.23 illustrates the error recovery focused view of the ER-STEP analysis presented 
in Figure 5.20. As we can see, there was only one instance of problem detection which 
was however enough for an effective recovery process to be carried out. This is perhaps 
due to the fact that problem detection occurred in the same hospital as the laboratory. 
There are also some significant differences in the model of diagnostic services delivery 
between the UK and US (as discussed in section 2.2) which perhaps play in role in the 
US incident response requiring less effort from the person who detected the 
problem/error. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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Figure 5.23: Error recovery focused view 1 and 2, Florida. 
In a similar manner to the previous incidents, the timeframe of the Florida incident is 
extended by the investigation required to identify and contact all involved patients for re-
screening. This problem is of particular significance when considering infectious diseases 
as more people may be affected over time. 
 
Figure 5.24 illustrates the error recovery focused view of the second incident that 
occurred in the same hospital, involving the same ED nurse as the previous occurrence.  
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Figure 5.24: Error recovery focused view 2, Florida. 
In this case, the experience of the previous incident helped in making a quicker and more 
efficient recovery. This incident only lasted two weeks and there were no affected 
patients from the error. 
Event Analysis 
Problem detection Outcome based, inside the lab 
none 
Outcome based, outside the lab 
ED charge nurse becomes concerned over the lack of positives reported 
from the lab (events 4.3 and 4.15) 
Error detection Outcome based, outside the lab 
None 
Outcome based, inside the lab 
none 
Problem indication Nurse reports concerns to the lab (face-to-face communication) (Events 
4.6 and 4.17) 
Error indication None 
Further 
investigation 
Outside the lab 
To decide what action to take (events 4.4 and 4.5) 
Inside the lab  
To investigate if there is an error (events 4.7 and 4.18) 
To determine the extent of the error (events 4.13 and 4.21) 
Error explanation Identification of erroneous reports(events 4.8)  
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Event Analysis 
Identification of technical problem (events 4.10 and 4.19) 
Error control None 
Error correction Fix technical problem (events 4.11, 4.12 and 4.20) 
Call involve patients and their partners back for screening (events 4.14 
and 4.22) 
Table 5.11: Analysis of error recovery activities, Florida. 
5.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the ER-STEP analysis of four screening incidents which were 
severely prolonged by a late detection and poor incident response. The analysis with ER-
STEP diagrams, the restructured view and a categorization and summary of all types of 
activities that took place according to the error recovery framework stages has been 
useful in understanding what happened in these incidents in terms of error handling. 
 
The purpose of the next chapter is to further analyze these incidents, by integrating and 
comparing them, in order to draw high level conclusions about the factors that inhibit 
effective detection and recovery in screening programmes.  
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Chapter 6: Overview of findings 
 
 
 
Having analyzed the four incidents with the same technique, we can now systematically 
compare and integrate the individual analyses’ findings and draw high level conclusions 
about key problem areas that may impede an effective error recovery in screening 
services (with perhaps implications for other laboratory services as well). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to attain a high-level perspective on screening 
error handling. The tables produced at the end of each of the four case studies will be 
used to aggregate and categorize the different kinds of activities that can be seen to fall 
under a specific stage of the error recovery framework—this will help in gaining an 
understanding about individual stages. However, it is also important to understand the 
relationship between the different stages, and the different activities. For instance, what 
are the different possible activities that may follow outcome based problem detection 
taking place outside the lab? What are the different kinds of further investigation, and 
what events may trigger these activities? This chapter will conclude with the ‘screening 
error recovery model’—this is based on the error recovery framework which has been 
enriched by the findings of the analysis of the four incidents. 
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6.1 Error recovery stages 
6.1.1 Problem detection 
Table 6.1 presents the different kinds of problem detection that occurred in the four case 
studies. As we can see, problem detection is most likely to occur outside the lab (i.e. 
where the test results are used). In two cases, problem detection outside the lab took the 
form of growing concerns regarding a change in the frequency of positives/high-risk 
patients. Also, in all cases of problem detection outside the lab, it was nurses (in one case 
presumably physicians as well) who started becoming concerned. In addition, the people 
who experienced problem detection also acted on upon their own initiative to report these 
concerns to the lab. This illustrates the importance of the nurses responsible for 
requesting and following up on test results, as they are the ones most likely to start 
becoming concerned. 
 
Incident 1: Sheffield Incident 2: 
London  
Incident 3: 
Manchester 
Incident 4: Florida 
Outcome-based 
problem 
detection 
outside the lab 
[Events 1.4 and 
1.23] 
Concern over low 
number of high- 
risk pregnancies 
— 
[Event 3.8] 
Clinical staff 
have concerns 
over the 
reliability of Dr 
H’s work 
[Events 4.3 and 
4.15] 
Concern over low 
number of positives 
Outcome-based 
problem 
detection inside 
the lab 
— — [Event 3.1] 
Radiologists 
have concerns 
over the brevity 
of Dr H’s 
reports 
— 
Table 6.1: Problem detection events 
Problem detection inside the lab occurred only in the Manchester incident. Colleagues of 
the person responsible were increasingly becoming concerned as the reports he was 
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compiling were too short and brusque, while they had realized he was not following all 
appropriate procedures.  
Findings regarding problem detection can therefore be summarized as follows: 
• Problem detection outside the lab (outcome-based): This kind of detection was 
performed primarily by the nurse responsible for requesting and collecting test 
results (events 1.4, 1.23, 4.13 and 4.23); the nurse will become increasingly 
concerned as his/her expectations of the frequency of positives/negatives reported 
back from the lab drops. Problem detection may take weeks to lead to some 
further action.  
• Problem detection inside the lab (outcome-based, could be action-based): 
This kind of detection only occurred once in the four incidents (event 3.1). This 
took place when colleagues of Dr H had concerns that his reports were short. No 
error had occurred though, so this event is labeled as problem detection. Problem 
detection arising from the evaluation of test results, as occurred outside the lab, 
did not take place. Therefore, problem detection inside the lab may rarely occur 
by expert clinicians who realize a procedure is not carried out as prescribed, either 
by examining a report, or by observing the conduct of the person responsible.  
6.1.2 Error detection 
Unlike problem detection, error detection does not build up over time or come with 
uncertainty; this is because there is evidence that an error has occurred. Several different 
kinds of error detection occurred in the four case studies; most of them involved a 
specific patient rather than a trend in the frequency of positives/negatives.  
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Apart from the action-based, outcome-based, through limiting functions and location 
based classification, there was another kind of error detection that was found in the case 
studies: detection through further investigation. Such an occurrence highlights the 
systemic nature of error recovery where problem detection in one organization may lead 
to error detection in another. Table 6.2 below presents these various events of error 
detection that occurred in the four case studies. 
Detection type and 
location 
Incident 1: Sheffield Incident 2: London  Incident 3: 
Manchester 
Incident 4: 
Florida 
Outcome-based 
error detection 
outside the lab 
[Event 1.6] 
Incident with one 
patient 
 
[Event 2.4] 
Revaluation of a 
patient’s screening 
result by new 
breast screening 
service found error 
— — 
Outcome- based 
detection inside 
the lab 
[Event 1.41] 
When trying to 
change DOB, risk 
calculation 
remained the same 
 
— 
[events 3.5 and 
3.10] 
Identification of 
errors in Dr H’s 
reports 
— 
Action- based 
detection in the lab 
— — — — 
Error detection 
through further 
investigation inside 
the lab 
[Event 1.62] 
Accumulation and 
investigation of 
audit data results in 
noticing a lack of 
high- risk results 
— — — 
Error detection 
through further 
investigation 
outside the lab 
— — — — 
Table 6.2: error detection events. 
Findings regarding error detection can be summarized as follows: 
• Outcome-based error detection outside the lab: Primarily incidents involving 
specific patients (events 1.6 and 2.4). This type of error detection will occur 
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when there are obvious errors with the test results, either because they do not 
make sense at all, or because clinicians have already established a set of potential 
diagnoses which is obviously contradicted in the test results. In addition, we 
should take into account accidental detection, as it occurred in the London 
Hammersmith incident. A cancer patient which had been sent the wrong 
mammogram been cleared of the diseases. When she moved to another Breast 
Screening Service, she was diagnosed again, unveiling the error of the previous 
diagnosis.  
• Outcome-based error detection inside the lab: Audits and many other quality 
assurance practices aim to detect such errors before test results leave the lab 
(events 1.41, 3.5 and 3.10). However, the incidents discussed here have occurred 
because errors were missed by the lab. Outcome based error detection in the lab 
considers all other possible ways through which the outcome of laboratory work 
is evaluated against errors. This kind of detection during an incident is rare, as, it 
has already been suggested that laboratories maintain little or no information 
about the subsequent patient outcomes of their work, which limits their evaluation 
of testing practices (Bonini et al., 2005). It is therefore very difficult for labs to 
evaluate the validity of test results; something which can take place in points of 
care where clinicians have physical contact with the patients when they integrate 
test results in the diagnostic process. Outcome based error detection inside the lab 
occurred only in the Manchester incident, where radiologists found errors in Dr 
H’s work (events 3.5 and 3.10).  
Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
133 
• Action-based error detection in the lab: Action-based detection can only occur 
in the lab, as it refers to error detection during the process of analyzing a 
specimen and performing the subsequent calculations to compile the patient’s test 
results. However such detection was not identified in the four case studies. This is 
a kind of detection that should be supported and will be discussed in the 
recommendations that are put forth in the next chapter. 
• Error detection through further investigation in the lab: This kind of error 
detection occurred in the Sheffield incident (event 1.62). Following reports from 
points of care, investigation in the lab was carried out to find out if and what is 
actually wrong. Error detection is considered to be the first stage in error recovery 
[Zapf and Reason, 1994]; however, as we have seen here, if problem detection 
occurs, error detection may come several stages later. This kind of detection is 
very much a system function, and involves further investigation and problem 
indication to take place first.  
• Error detection through further investigation outside the lab: There were no 
such instances in the four case studies. This makes sense as investigation activities 
in points of care were very limited; they could only monitor the trends of test 
results, consult with colleagues or make an enquiry to the lab; all activities which 
may lead to problem detection, but not error detection. 
6.1.3 Further investigation 
Further investigation includes a set of diverse activities, ranging from monitoring of 
results, review of audit results, communications to investigate aspects of the problem, 
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meetings, and internal and/or external inquiries. Furthermore, further investigation may 
take place both in and outside the lab.  
 
In order to proceed to a useful classification of all further investigation activities they 
were categorised not only according to location, but also according to purpose. The 
following purposes could be identified: 
• To determine if there is an error 
• To determine what the error is and its causes 
• To determine the extent of the failure 
Table 6.3 summarizes and categorizes all the further investigation events that were 
identified in the four case studies. 
Investigation 
type and location 
Incident 1: Sheffield Incident 2: 
London  
Incident 3: 
Manchester 
Incident 4: Florida 
To decide what 
action to take, 
outside the lab 
[Event 1.32] 
Enquiry to colleague 
— 
— [event 4.4] 
Enquiry to 
colleague 
To decide what 
action to take, in 
the lab 
[Events 1.19 and 
1.35] 
Enquiry to colleague 
[Event 2.18] 
Meeting to 
decide further 
action 
— 
— 
To find out if 
there is an error, 
outside the lab 
[Event 1.12] 
Monitoring of results 
— 
— 
— 
To find out if 
there is an error, 
in the lab 
[Events 1.38, 1.39, 
1.55, 1.61 and 1.63] 
Arrangement and 
conducting of audit 
 
 
[Events 2.22 
and 2.25] 
Arrangement 
and conducting 
of audit 
 
 
[Event 3.3] 
Investigate Dr’s 
past and 
background 
 
[Event 3.9] 
Double check 
Dr’s reports 
[events 4.7 and 
4.18] 
 
Investigation of 
system 
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Investigation 
type and location 
Incident 1: Sheffield Incident 2: 
London  
Incident 3: 
Manchester 
Incident 4: Florida 
Enquiry 
regarding past 
activities, outside 
the lab 
— — — — 
Enquiry 
regarding past 
activities, in the 
lab 
[Event 1.36, 1.54 
and 1.57] 
Discussing whether 
an audit has been 
carried out or not 
— — — 
To find out what 
the error is, 
outside the lab 
— — — — 
To find out what 
the error is, in the 
lab 
[Event 1.66] 
Investigation of 
system 
[Events 2.19, 
2.20, 2.28 and 
2.30 
Investigation of 
system 
— — 
To determine the 
extent of the 
error, outside the 
lab 
— — — — 
To determine the 
extent of the 
error, in the lab 
[event 1.70] 
 
Examination of all 
test results since 
Jan 1st 
[Events 2.22 
and 2.25] 
 
Audit 
[Events 3.16, 
3.17, 3.22, 3.23, 
3.26 and 3.27] 
Audit 
[events 4.13 and 
4.21] 
 
Checking of all 
test results 
Table 6.3: Further investigation events. 
Findings regarding further investigation are therefore as follows: 
• Further investigation outside the lab, to decide what action to take: This is 
most likely to occur following problem detection. The nurse who performed 
problem detection may seek advice as to what action to take. In the Sheffield 
incident, this took place after some attempts of problem indication had failed 
(event 1.32), while in the Florida incident this occurred straight after problem 
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detection (event 4.4). In addition, the colleague that gives the advice may be a 
supervisor or a physician.  
• Further investigation inside the lab, to decide what action to take: This kind 
of investigation will take place when people in the lab have acknowledged the 
possibility that something might be wrong. This may be informal (e.g., asking a 
colleague for advise) (events 1.19 and 1.35) or formal (Department, hospital or 
event Trust level meeting) (event 2.18). 
• Further investigation outside the lab, to find out if there is an error: In the 
four case studies, there was only one such occurrence: In Sheffield, a nurse that 
had performed problem detection was monitoring her own results (event 1.12). As 
there are very little means for staff outside the lab to investigate, this kind of 
further investigation is fairly limited as to what it may achieve. 
• Further investigation to find out if there is an error, inside the lab: This kind 
of investigation is the one most likely to have a major impact on the success of an 
error recovery process, as it may directly lead to error explanation. When it is in 
the form of an audit, it may take a significant amount of time, but this can also 
lead to—at least—an initial estimate of the number of patients misdiagnosed. 
Audits were requested and carried out in the Sheffield and London incidents 
(events 1.38, 1.39, 1.55, 1.61 and 1.63, and 2.2, 2.5). An investigation into the 
system, whether software or organizational process, will also fall under this 
category of further investigation.  
• Further investigation to find out what the error is, inside the lab: There may 
be an overlap between this kind of investigation and investigation to find out if 
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there is an error as an investigation to establish the presence of an error will be 
based on an informed hypothesis of the operator or other involved actor. 
However, in case where further investigation to find out if there is an error was in 
the form of an audit of test results, more investigation in the form of examination 
of the system (software/hardware, previous test results) will be required in order 
to establish what the error is. 
• Enquiry regarding past activities, inside the lab: It was found that in many 
cases, audits regularly requested had not been carried out. This emerged when in 
the inquiry report the person who had requested the audit asked weeks, or months 
later if that audit had been carried out or not. Although that audit may not form 
part of the error recovery if it was a routine activity, the enquiry regarding 
whether it has been carried out or not may well do, if it has been triggered by 
recovery related activities (e.g., by problem indication) (events 1.36, 1.54 and 
1.57). 
• To determine the extent of the error, inside the lab: This may take place either 
after or during the final stages towards the correction of the causal factors that led 
to the errors in the first place. In a screening incident, this is a very important part 
of error recovery as errors in screening will continue to have an impact as time 
passes on the people misdiagnosed. In the STI incident that took place in Florida, 
there were serious social implications as infected patients who were told they are 
free from disease could have possibly infected others which could remain 
unknown. Diagnostic services must therefore be prepared to contact involved 
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patients as soon as possible. Such kind of investigation may also involve 
independent auditors, which would severely prolong the incident timeframe.  
6.1.4 Problem indication  
Problem and error indication are very crucial—it was found that indication events were 
ones most likely to fail to achieve a progression to a later error recovery stage. Problem 
and error indication are most likely to be initiated outside the lab, following problem and 
error indication. It was observed that various means of communication were employed; 
these are used to classify the indication events that took place. 
 
Table 6.4 summarizes and categorizes the different kinds of problem and error indication 
events that took place in the four incidents, taking into account the various means of 
communication that were used. 
Problem 
Indication 
Incident 1: 
Sheffield  
Incident 2: 
London 
Incident 3: 
Manchester 
Incident 4: Florida 
Face-to- 
face  
— — — Events 4.6 and 4.17] 
ED charge nurse 
visits Microbiology 
lab and informs them 
of the absence of 
positives 
Over the 
phone 
 
[Event 1.3, 1.5, 1.7, 
1.24, 1.26 and 
1.34] 
Nurse that 
performed problem 
detection phones 
the lab 
— — — 
Written [Event 1.34] 
Nurse sends formal 
letter (fax)  
— — — 
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Problem 
Indication 
Incident 1: 
Sheffield  
Incident 2: 
London 
Incident 3: 
Manchester 
Incident 4: Florida 
Formal/ 
incident 
reporting 
— — [event 3.2 and 
3.12] 
To Trust 
management in 
management 
meetings 
— 
Table 6.4: Problem indication events. 
The following conclusions have been reached regarding problem indication events and 
means of communication used: 
• Problem Indication over the phone: As problem detection most commonly 
occurred in primary care institutions, it is understandable that the use of the phone 
for the purposes of problem indication was the most frequently used means of 
communication (6 occurrences in the Sheffield case). However, it was found to be 
greatly ineffective. Reasons for the failure of problem indication were two: the 
lack of evidence during the claim, and the breakdown of communication; two 
factors which are also intertwined and will be discussed later on in this thesis. 
• Written problem indication occurred only once in the four incidents (event 
1.34). A letter was directed from the hospital which detected the problem to the 
lab. It should be noted that no incident reports were written, even though incident 
reporting schemes where present in at least the three NHS incidents. 
6.1.5 Error indication 
Table 6.5 summarizes and categorizes all types of error indication events that took place 
in the four incidents in a similar manner with problem indication events discussed in the 
previous section. 
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Indication Incident 1: 
Sheffield  
Incident 2: 
London 
Incident 3: 
Manchester 
Incident 4: 
Florida 
Face-to- 
face  
— — — — 
Over the 
phone 
 
[event 1.45, 1.46 
and 1.48] 
[events 2.5, 2.9 
and 2.12] 
[event 3.20] 
Trust management 
inform other hospital 
of Dr’s errors 
— 
Voice 
message 
[event 1.65] 
Leaves voicemail 
after person is not 
available on phone  
— — — 
Written — [event 2.6 and 
2.10] 
— — 
Formal/ 
incident 
reporting 
— [events 2.14, 
2.15 and 2.16] 
Reporting to 
regional or 
national 
authorities 
[events 3.6 and 3.11]  
To Trust 
management 
 
[events 3.14 and 
3.15] 
Regional and national 
health authorities. 
 
Table 6.5: error indication events. 
The following conclusions can be drawn about error indication: 
• Face-to-face error indication did not occur in the four incidents. This kind of 
detection is limited due to the physical separation between points of care and 
laboratories in the NHS. As error detection is most likely to occur where test 
results are used, face-to-face error indication is going to take place in the cases 
where errors are detected within the same hospital. 
• Error indication over the phone: Like problem indication, error indication was 
mostly done over the phone, as the errors were detected outside the physical 
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premises of the lab and host hospital (event 1.45, 1.46, 1.48, 2.5, 2.9, 2.12 and 
3.20).  
• Written error indication: Letters were written to the lab and to national agencies 
when the error was deemed to be of great importance. However this was done as a 
last resort and only when it when initial reports to the potentially responsible 
organization were not addressed (event 2.6 and 2.10).  
• Formal/incident reporting: Incident reporting schemes that were in place within 
hospitals and diagnostic services were in fact not used. This involved cases where 
the management of a health organization decided to formally inform an authority 
of significant errors of other organizations. Informed agencies included regional 
Quality Assurance Centers, the National Patient Safety Agency and the 
Department of Health. Formal reporting to national agencies occurred in the 
London and Manchester incidents. 
 
Digital communication, such as email were not mentioned in the four case studies. There 
was one instance of voicemail, which was disregarded by the recipient; however the 
caller called again the next day, and the recipient was reached. 
 
Communication breakdowns will be discussed in a separate section in this chapter; this is 
because there are some common issues with other stages, and primarily further 
investigation. 
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6.1.6 Error explanation  
Error explanation is ultimately a result of a successful investigation into what the error is, 
and what the extent of the failure is. In most cases, reaching error explanation meant that 
error control and recovery are feasible at that stage. 
6.1.7 Error control and recovery 
Error control took the form of suspension of the person responsible in the Manchester 
incident (event 3.13) and suspension of breast screening until the investigation was 
completed in the London incident (event 2.29). Error control will establish certainty that 
no further errors will take place. Like error explanation, there is little to add to this error 
recovery stage, as the problematic areas are the ones earlier on in the recovery process. 
6.1.8 Failure of error recovery 
These are events where the progression from one error recovery stage to the next has 
been halted. These are primarily communication breakdowns (see Table 6.6 below).  
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Failure of error 
recovery 
Sheffield  London Manchester Florida 
Various 
activities 
[event 1.11] 
Incident not 
logged 
 
[event 1.10] 
Reassurances 
that ‘everything is 
OK’ 
 
[events 1.25, 
1.28 and .1.51] 
Previous events 
not considered as 
important 
[event 2.8] 
Previous 
events not 
considered as 
important 
[event 3.4] 
Investigation 
does not find any 
problems 
 
[event 3.7] 
Do not consider 
errors as 
systematic, but 
only as isolated 
events  
— 
Table 6.6: Failure of error recovery events. 
Failure of error recovery suggests the failure of the previous type of event. Primarily, 
these will either be problem/error indication or further investigation. Failure of error 
recovery will either result to the reiteration of previous activities, or to bringing the entire 
recovery process to a halt. 
 
It is notable that all of these failure of error recovery events have taken place after 
problem/error indication has occurred. In other words, the actual failure to progress 
towards error explanation and control/recovery involved people who were expected to 
take mitigative action. So, they either dismissed a report by the people who performed 
detection, or they conducted a poor investigation. 
 
Ignored indication events can be seen as communication breakdowns, as the people who 
are in communication fail to achieve shared understanding [Dix et al., 2004]. The 
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reasons for this are part of the discussion of further analysis of communication events of 
problem/error indication and further investigation (section 6.3).  
 
The next section will present an overview of the findings that have been discussed so far 
in this chapter. This is a particularly important part of this thesis, as it presents a model 
that considered all of the identified sets of activities that fall under each of the stages of 
error recovery, and their relationship towards the achievement (or failure of) error 
recovery.  
6.2 The screening error recovery 
model
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the screening error recovery model. This model is based on the 
error recovery framework, which has been enriched by the findings of the analyses 
conducted in the past two chapters.  
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Figure 6.1: The Screening error recovery model. 
The lighter shade of gray indicates the set of activities that are possible outside the lab 
(i.e. where test results are used), while the darker shade of grey illustrates the set of 
activities that may take place within the lab. 
The process can be seen in two parts:  
• Part 1: Until error is acknowledged in the laboratory. Part 1 includes the initial 
activities that will start where test results are requested and used. Most likely to be 
motivated by problem detection, the nurse responsible for request and collection 
of test results will either report his/her concerns to the lab, monitor his/her own 
results, or report his/her concerns directly to the lab.  
• Part 2: Identification and correction of errors. Having acknowledged the 
presence of an error, laboratory technicians will investigate to determine what the 
nature of the error is and what has caused it. This may take time as an audit might 
have to be called for.  Communication of the incident will either be internal 
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(within the Department, hospital or Trust) or it may involve NHS authorities such 
as regional quality assurance centers, the National Patient Safety Agency and the 
Department of Health. The recovery process may be prolonged even if an 
independent auditor is required to examine large volumes of test results in order to 
determine the extent of the failure (i.e. the number of patients that have been 
misdiagnosed). In the case studies analyzed here, the acknowledgement of an 
error within the lab was not always clearly noted, but occurred along with error 
explanation following an investigation into claims coming from outside the lab. 
 
An advantage of this model is that it illustrates at what stage different sub-types of error 
recovery stages may occur (e.g., further investigation to find out if there is an error etc). It 
can also be used to identify and relate activities that will take place in the different parts 
of the healthcare system. Eventually, the purpose of this model is to improve individual 
error recovery activities and consider the subsequent communication link between points 
of care and the laboratory. However, it is still abstract at this stage and should be enriched 
with particular information that pertain to a specific screening process, fitted within 
practices and regulation of a real diagnostic network. This model could be seen as a 
starting point for considering the design of error recovery strategies customized according 
to a particular setting. 
 
The following section will discuss the key conclusions that arise from this analysis. 
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6.3 Key problem areas 
It is important to stress that the failure of error recovery is not the only reason why the 
timeframe of an incident may be prolonged. Failure of failure recovery will interrupt the 
process, but other problems may slow it down. The recovery processes we have seen 
were mostly initiated by problem detection, and not error detection. Problem detection 
however may take a significant amount of time to occur. In addition, the lack of evidence 
that comes along with problem detection is very likely to compromise the effectiveness of 
problem indication. Limited detection, along with the fairly loosely defined process for 
reporting concerns over the phone and, on the other end, dealing with complaints lead to 
extended failures to detect and recover from errors (communication breakdowns).  
 
These two main factors (limited detection and communication breakdowns) will be 
briefly discussed here, and will be fully analyzed in the next chapter, which will also 
consider implications for design, and recommendations for the improvement of 
laboratory error handling. 
 
Limited detection 
Limited detection can be seen to be due to a lack of appropriate feedback [Norman, 
1983] from the system. The lack of appropriate feedback did not allow for error 
detection, and especially for action-based detection, which is an immediate way of 
identifying errors. Detection had to therefore take the form of problem detection, and was 
based on the experience of the nurse responsible for requesting and receiving test results. 
However, problem detection and the lack of appropriate feedback are not only 
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responsible for a late detection, but also a determinant factor of the failure of 
problem/error indication and further investigation.  
 
The lack of evidence often resulted to communication breakdowns, especially in inter-
organizational settings, which prolonged the incident adversely.  
 
Communication breakdowns  
Problem and error indication are the reporting of concerns of detected errors to the 
laboratory and other key parties, expecting them to act upon these reports. This should 
not be confused with communication during further investigation, where the person who 
initiates the communication is not reporting an error, but is trying to find out what caused 
it. However, common problems may affect both.  
 
Communication failures are an important contributor to adverse events in medicine. In a 
review of 14,000 in-hospital deaths, communication errors were found to be the lead 
cause [Wilson et al., 1995], while about 50% of adverse events detected in a study of 
primary care physicians were related to communication difficulties [Bhasale et al., 1998].  
 
Breakdowns during conversation are relatively frequent occurrences; however we tend to 
be able to repair them when we communicate [Winograd and Flores, 1986]. Breakdowns 
occur due to divergence in topic focus, due to ambiguity in a speaker’s expression, or 
merely because someone misheard a word. Most breakdowns are detected quickly, but in 
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many cases people might think they have achieved a shared understanding, while in fact, 
they have not (Dix et al., 2004).   
 
Many of these breakdowns occurred because reporting was informal. In the Sheffield 
incident, several reports over the phone were ignored, but a single letter stimulated some 
activity to investigate if there was actually a problem [see event 1.34, p. 89].  This 
highlights the danger associated with informal reporting; however, if formal reporting is 
introduced without appropriate consideration, there is a danger that it creates barriers to 
reporting; people may be more reluctant than mentioning something to a colleague. 
 
There is much work currently done in understanding communication breakdowns in 
healthcare. For instance, communication breakdowns in the operating room [e.g. Lingard 
et al., 2004 or Greenberg et al, 2007], or during patient hand-offs [e.g. Solet et al., 2005 
and Patterson et al, 2004]. Such work could be considered to further analyze these 
instances of communication breakdown that were found in this study.   
 
The purpose of the next chapter is to address the issues of limited feedback and 
communication breakdowns further, and to generate a set of useful recommendations that 
could be used to improve these two aspects of error handling. These recommendations 
are also based within the error recovery framework and the screening error recovery 
model, and will be related to the different stages of the recovery process. 
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6.4 Chapter summary and discussion 
This chapter presented the final stage of analysis of this thesis. The findings of the four 
individual incident analyses were aggregated, compared and integrated in order to 
understand how errors in screening programmes are detected and handled. This analysis 
resulted to the screening error recovery model, which summarizes the various activities 
that fall under each of the recovery stages, as well as their relationship. This model can be 
used to devise error recovery strategies for screening programmes. 
 
The chapter concluded with the identification of two general problem areas: the lack of 
appropriate feedback and communication breakdowns. These two problem areas affected 
various stages of error recovery in different ways. Having abstracted to a relatively high-
level, we can now relate these two problem areas to the various stages, and consider how 
to deal with the particular problems. The next chapter will discuss these two issues in 
more detail, and suggest a number of recommendations that may be applicable to 
screening services and diagnostic services in general for a more effective detection and 
recovery of errors.   
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Chapter 7: Recommendations 
 
 
 
The recommendations that will be discussed in this chapter address the challenges that 
have been discussed in the previous chapter. In order to produce recommendations on the 
improvement of screening error handling, the screening error recovery model is used in 
combination with systems design principles. In particular, they draw upon theory 
presented in Chapter 3: Theoretical context, theory in Human Computer Interaction 
(HCI), but also focus on the Quality Assurance practices and related artefacts that were 
discussed in Chapter 2: Field and focus and during the analysis of the case studies (such 
as auditing and incident reporting). These recommendations consider the improvement of 
individual stages of the screening error recovery model, but also take into account their 
impact on the subsequent stages, e.g. how a particular improvement in problem detection 
may facilitate better problem indication. 
 
There are two important limitations of the recommendations put forward in this chapter: 
first of all, they are high-level, as they have been abstracted from the laboratory context 
of the individual incidents that have been analyzed; this was necessary in order to reach a 
level of generalization that would cover the diverse set of screening services available. 
Therefore, their application will require further analysis and instantiation so that they can 
be focused on the particular processes, job roles, technology and regulation. 
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A second limitation is that these recommendations lack validation. Some of these have 
formed part of publications produced during this work [Chozos, 2008; Wears et al., 
2008], but this does not stand as sufficient validation for their application in an actual 
medical context at this stage. It is also likely that some of the suggested practices are also 
currently existing in NHS diagnostic services; this is because the recommendations are 
based on the findings of the analysis of the four incidents but a thorough review of actual 
systems has not been conducted. 
 
Nonetheless, these recommendations are important as they expand on the findings of the 
analysis of the four incidents and could suggest general principles for good practice and 
directions for further research. The discussion on the relationship between the different 
stages should be considered as the most significant contribution of this chapter. 
 
Table 7.1 illustrates the four different kinds of recommendations that are put forward in 
this chapter, and their area of relevance.  
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 Checking patterns Interface design Software app Communication 
Problem detection — — Section 7.1.3 — 
Error detection Section 7.1.1 Section 7.1.2 — — 
Action-based Section 7.1.1 — — — 
Outcome-based Section 7.1.1 Section 7.1.2 — — 
Limiting functions — Section 7.1.2 — — 
Problem indication — — Section 7.1.3 Section 7.2 
Error indication — — Section 7.1.3 Section 7.2 
Further 
investigation 
— — Section 7.1.3 Section 7.2 
Table 7.1: Recommendations and relevance to error recovery stages. 
7.1 Detection 
Recommendations for improving detection will consider:  
• Checking patterns 
• User interface issues 
• Software applications 
7.1.1 Checking patterns 
Action-based detection (discussed in Section 3.3) would occur during the analysis of a 
specimen or while entering data in a computer system. This primarily focuses on 
instances of human error, and not systematic errors that have been the focus of this thesis. 
Furthermore, action-based detection is very much dependent on the nature of the task 
which varies in relation to the diagnostic service—specific guidelines applicable here 
therefore should be driven by detailed insight from laboratory medicine.  
Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
154 
 
Human redundancy (discussed in Section 3.4.2) [Clarke, 2005] is applicable here as it can 
help to improve detection of errors in the lab during or shortly after the analysis; the 
concept is based on the presence of a colleague observing the person who is performing a 
specimen analysis. Human redundancy suggests the following: 
1. One person checks the outcome of their colleague’s work. In a laboratory 
setting, a test result is evaluated by another colleague. 
2. A check is carried out at the time a function is performed. A supervisor 
observes the laboratory technician while he or she carries out the test. 
 
There are two types of human redundancy that could be considered: 
• Active human redundancy can be identified in human systems through some 
analogy with redundancy in hardware systems. Active human redundancy occurs 
when the individual performing a redundant function is involved in the task at 
hand; for instance, when two laboratory technicians take part in the analysis of 
one specimen.  
• Duplication, Overlap and Substitution. Duplication exists when two different 
people perform the same function or if a reserve unit is present. Overlap exists 
when two people share some functional areas. For instance, when two people 
perform the same kind of laboratory testing, duplication takes place; however, 
when two people carry out different testing but they share the same equipment of 
parts of laboratory facilities refers to overlap. Substitution occurs when people 
rotate jobs.  
Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
155 
 
Outcome based detection will take place once a test has been completed and the test 
results are checked for errors. As we have seen in the Manchester incident, detection of 
the radiologist’s errors was done by colleagues of his who examined reports he had 
compiled. Double-checking is considered to be a standard practice in diagnostic services 
[Johnson and Patnick, 2000], although it was not mentioned in the other case studies.  
 
There is little room for making recommendations here; this is primarily because outcome-
based detection is most likely to occur outside the lab, since this is where test results are 
used—and thus evaluated. However, a number of options are applicable within a 
laboratory setting regarding detection through limiting functions—detection by 
constraints imposed on a diagnostic process. Some of these are discussed in the following 
section. 
 
7.1.2 User interface issues 
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) plays a very important role in error handling due to 
the increasing reliance on software-automated testing. The user interface can influence 
both detection and further investigation, with an immediate impact on any problem/error 
indication communication that may take place. 
 
 
 
Error detection 
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In the Sheffield and the Florida incident, user interface deficiencies resulted in a failure to 
detect software faults. Two conclusions can be drawn from these two incidents: 
 
• Critical calculations should be visible. In Sheffield, the screening calculation 
had been removed from the user interface following users’ request to reduce 
clutter. The result that was then indicated was a mere “high-risk” or “low-risk”. 
Had the calculation been visible, and users would be able to perform outcome-
based detection. This illustrates a trade-off that exists within usability. The key is 
that issues such as simplicity and readability had not adequately been considered 
in terms of the impact on safety – it is therefore necessary to take into account 
usability in hazard analysis and risk assessment. 
• Screening tests should be reported separately. In Florida, the reporting system 
would only print out the positive patients, and negatives would be disregarded.  
This was done in a custom report which was also included other tests. The 
software fault resulted in the positives not being reported, but the printout report 
appeared normal as there were other test results present. The conclusion to be 
drawn from this is that critical tests should be reported separately, and there 
should be no filter applied. All test results should be included, but presented in an 
organized manner, with more information regarding the particular test that has 
been carried out. 
The next section will consider how software applications could be used to improve 
screening error handling—primarily by facilitating further investigation. 
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7.1.3 Application-level issues 
As we have seen in the case studies, problem detection occurred over time due to a 
discrepancy in the frequency of positives/negatives, based on the expectations of the 
nurse responsible (and primarily in the Sheffield and Florida incidents). Nurses were 
however unable to investigate themselves, while problem indication was ineffective—
investigation activities to determine if there is an error were only possible within the lab. 
 
It has been suggested that allowing for comparisons is a practical way of evaluating 
outcomes [Reason 1997; Rizzo et al., 1996]. Staff at the points of care where test results 
are used should be able to monitor and investigate trends of test results at their location. 
A potential approach to this is by automatically logging all test results reported from the 
lab, and calculating a mean of the entire set of test results through a software application. 
A graphical distribution of test values or results across time can help to notice potential 
discrepancies and support further investigation by helping to identify a timeframe within 
which the behaviour of test results is different than the one expected. The results of such 
a comparison, with a date and a number in the drop or rise of reported positives/negatives 
can stand as evidence for laboratory technicians to carry out further investigation. 
 
Such an application would be particularly useful as it correlates historical data and 
represents it graphically. The nurses’ expectations and any potential deviations would 
both be captured and documented.  
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The next section will discuss how communication during error handling could be 
improved. This relates to problem/error indication and further investigation. 
7.2 Improving Communication 
Improvement of communication during problem/error indication and during further 
investigation can be improved in various ways15. This section will present various 
interventions that have been suggested in related literature.  
 
Non- technical interventions 
• Alter communication behaviours: Such interventions focus on encouraging 
communication behaviours as a professional skill rather than as a personal style, 
and they are a matter of education and training. 
• Alter communication policies: Mandatory policies should formalise certain 
aspects of communication, while there can be constraints on professional 
behaviour involving poor communication. This can be related to policies 
regarding incident reporting, and in the laboratory setting, reports made to the lab 
regarding possible errors detected in points of care. 
 
 
 
Technical interventions  
                                                 
15
 Material from this section resulted in the following paper: 
  
Chozos N, Wears RL and Perry S (2008). The role of communication in laboratory error handling. 
Healthcare Ergonomics and Patient Safety (HEPS) conference, Strasbourg, France 25-27 June. 
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With the merging of information and communication technologies, a number of different 
technical interventions have been suggested 
• Channels: One of the simplest interventions is to introduce new communication 
channels, such as pagers, mobile phones, Internet, email and other new options for 
interaction. Such interventions may be very helpful, especially in teams which are 
geographically dispersed.  
The following sections apply these recommendations to a diagnostic setting. 
7.2.1 Problem/error indication 
Non-technical interventions: Alter communication policies 
A dedicated phone line 
In many cases were the same nurse made several phone calls to a laboratory, different 
people picked up the phone. They were thus possibly not aware of previous reports, 
especially since log books for documenting abnormal test results were not used, or were 
not present at all. A dedicated phone line, and perhaps designated staff responsible for 
dealing with these phone calls, could greatly improve error handling for the following 
reasons: 
• Formalization of incident reporting over the phone 
• Presence of designated staff to deal with incident reporting 
• Ability to log messages for further investigation purposes 
This recommendation was also considered in a recent Scotland-wide study as a 
possibility to facilitate reporting by nurses [BBC news, 2009]. The study found that about 
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only about one third of reports resulted in some action taken, while the rest were largely 
ignored.  
Double checking of critical values 
Double checking of critical values can be seen as an intervention to support 
communication over the phone. This was recommended by a recent study which found 
that errors were significantly reduced [Barenfanger et al., 2004]. This requires that the 
person taking the result must read the result back to the lab as a check on correct 
communication and interpretation. Reduction of errors and better communication of 
important data can be achieved by asking all recipients (nurses, doctors, admin) to read 
back the message.  This is a simple yet effective measure for laboratories to improve 
safety by minimizing the number of critical values missed. This however deals primarily 
with errors such as wrong patient name or other patient information, and 
miscommunication of a test result if it is done over the phone.  
 
In this study, critical laboratory results were monitored. After receiving the message, the 
recipients of a telephoned message were asked to repeat the message. The recipients were 
asked to repeat the name of the patient, the test, and the result; the technologists noted 
this on the form. In addition, they noted the time necessary for the entire phone call and 
the extra time necessary to ask for the message to be repeated and for it to be repeated.   
 
Out of a total 822 telephone contacts made for critical results, 29 errors were made (error 
rate, 3.5%). The major categories of errors were incorrect name of the patient, incorrect 
test result, incorrect specimen or test repeated, and refusal of the recipient to repeat the 
Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
161 
message. The time required to deliver the message initially averaged 57.6 seconds per 
call. The time required to ask for the information to be repeated and for the recipient to 
repeat the message was a mean of 12.8 seconds per call. Times vary depending on the 
laboratory testing process. A call about a critical result from the microbiology laboratory 
inherently involves a more complex narrative than one would have in the chemistry 
laboratory. 
 
There is an abundance of work that could be also considered here. For instance, Leonard 
et al. [2004] examine the role of communication in the effectiveness of teamwork, while 
Haig et al. [2006] consider a shared mental model for improving communication between 
clinicians. Such work could be integrated with the findings of this study in order to 
generate more detailed recommendations. 
7.3 Risk calculation algorithmic issues 
Error trapping is a common practice in software development, which involves detecting 
an error and producing an error message, taking some action on the erroneous result and 
either proceeding with execution or aborting the execution. This can either occur for run-
time errors whose results are that are outside the defined range, or for infinity errors (e.g. 
division by zero).   
 
The first type occurred in the Sheffield incident, while the second in the Florida incident 
(the other two incidents did not involve software). However, code error handling is not 
within the scope of this thesis, as it could be argued that this is still within error 
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prevention. This thesis focuses on the handling of laboratory errors, which assumes that 
software cannot always be reliable.  
7.4 Job design and training 
Training can be a key factor towards effective error handling [Chmiel and Wall, 1994]. 
There are implications for training for nurses and for laboratory staff. As a starting point, 
training should consider raising the awareness of problems that may lie in screening 
services [Chant et al., 2002]. Discussion of incidents and accidents in relation to medical 
processes and involved equipment can facilitate the understanding of cause-and-effect; 
the role of staff in the detection and recovery of such problems should also be party of 
that training.  
 
A key aspect of training with regards to error handling would be to focus on the 
communication problems that have been found in this analysis. The expressions and 
terms used to transmit concerns over the phone to the laboratory technician can have a 
critical affect on a recovery process. This is an area that would require further research 
and is not considered in any depth here. 
 
Overall, if any of the error handling recommendations suggested in this chapter were to 
be implemented, training should also cover their implementation. For instance, reporting 
over the phone should be part of medical staff’s implicit training. This suggests that job 
design should primarily address error handling, with supportive training for a particular 
job specification.  
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Job design should encompass the appropriate portion of the responsibility for error 
recovery. One conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is what the capabilities of 
involved parties are in terms of detection and recovery. For instance, nurses that request, 
receive and use test results are limited to problem and error detection, with little ability to 
investigate the system. Therefore, their job specification should involve the monitoring of 
test results and the reporting of any concerns to their supervisor and/or the laboratory 
technician. In a similar way, the job specification of the laboratory technician should 
encompass following up reports and so on.  
 
On the other hand, it is important not to over-formalize some of these processes. Creating 
additional tasks can impose a work overload, leading staff to find workarounds. 
Therefore, the level to which some of these recommendations should be introduced as 
part of everyday work and policy requires further research. 
7.5 Chapter summary and discussion 
This chapter outlined a number of high-level recommendations that may be applicable to 
healthcare screening services. They have partly been derived from the findings of 
accident analysis, while some additional recommendations are based on literature in error 
detection and HCI. These recommendations considered checking mechanisms, interface 
design, improvement of communication and training, while the relevance of each of these 
to the various stages of error recovery was also discussed.  
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The recommendations discussed here can be seen as preliminary, as they are not focused 
on a particular system and maintain a high level of abstraction; also, they lack validation. 
Further research would be required to instantiate and validate such recommendations.   
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Chapter 8: ER-STEP Validation and evaluation 
 
 
 
A useful way for drawing conclusions regarding the applicability of an incident analysis 
approach is to distribute a scenario-based exercise to participants and compare their 
analysis and findings for consistency; such an activity was also done for ER-STEP.  The 
exercise and the participant’s findings can be found in Appendix B. The purpose of this 
section is to discuss some of the key issues that arose from the validation exercise. 
8.1 Validation method overview 
It should be mentioned that the aspect of ER-STEP that is subject to validation is the 
level to which analysts may consistently label events according to the error recovery 
framework stages. Otherwise, the set of activities that make up the method are identical 
to STEP, which has been widely accepted as a practical and straightforward technique.  
 
In order to evaluate the level to which analysts may label error recovery events with 
consistency, an exercise along with a brief introduction to ER-STEP and an example of 
how it should be applied was given to four participants. The exercise is based on Case 
Study 1: Down’s screening errors, Sheffield, so that the participants’ results could be 
compared to the author’s. This was done in two stages: 
• Stage 1: Initial evaluation by two experienced accident analysts. At an early stage 
of the development of the method, it was necessary to get an expert opinion on the 
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feasibility of such an analysis, and to identify problems of technical nature. 
Therefore, the first draft of the technique, along with guidelines as to how it 
should be applied was given to two accident analysts and a scenario for them to 
analyze. 
• Stage 2: Final evaluation by two healthcare professionals. Having revised the 
technique after its evaluation by the two experts, and having had further 
experience by analyzing the four incidents, the exercise was given to two 
healthcare professionals. It is important that people at the forefront are able to 
apply such a technique without necessarily having experience in accident analysis.  
Stage 1: accident analysis experts 
The initial analysis found there was not a sufficient distinction between communication 
events during further investigation and problem/error indication. During further 
investigation, a person will make an enquiry regarding a problem in order to take action 
themselves, or will instruct someone to carry out a specific activity. This is different to 
problem/error indication, where someone reports a problem/error, without having any 
control over the subsequent activities that are to take place. This was clarified in the 
section 3.5, where the error recovery framework is defined. 
 
At the time of this evaluation, the technique was still under development and changed 
significantly since their exercise. The actual exercise and the produced findings are 
therefore not presented here.  
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Stage 2: Healthcare professionals 
Table 8.1 illustrates the answers that the two healthcare professionals provided in the 
exercise. 
Event Participant 1 Participant 2 
E1: Problem detection √ √ 
E2: Problem indication √ √ 
E3:Problem indication √ √ 
E4:Further investigation √ √ 
E5:Failure of further 
investigation 
√ Failure of problem 
indication 
E6: Further investigation √ √ 
E7: Further investigation √ √ 
E8:Problem indication √ √ 
E9: Further investigation √ √ 
E10: Problem indication √ √ 
E11: Failure of further 
investigation 
√ Failure of problem 
indication 
Table 8.1: ER-STEP validation exercise findings. 
The two participants only disagreed in two events; however, they were of the same type 
which appeared twice. Disagreement can therefore be placed only on one event (Or at 
least in terms of this methodology this was the only disagreement that was apparent. It is 
possible that they might have classified events the same way but for different reasons).  
 
The disagreement was in the labelling of a ‘failure of further investigation’ event which 
was tagged as failure of ‘problem indication’ by the second participant. Following this, it 
was decided to brand all ‘failure of’ events in the same way: failure of error recovery, as 
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it may not always be clear where the failure was. As we can see in this case, the report of 
the nurse did not result in an effective investigation. It is therefore not straightforward to 
derive which of the two stages failed. 
 
Comments from the two participants can also be found at the end of each of the two 
forms. Some of them were based on the lack of information regarding the incident, and in 
particular timing, which was a problem for the main analysis of the case studies anyway. 
This limitation cannot be placed on the technique, as it is only a matter of what 
information is available from data gathering.  
 
Both participants commented on the possibility of further breaking down events, although 
the one acknowledged the fact that the analysis would become more “swamped”. Further 
breakdown has occurred as a result of the analysis of the case studies. In addition, the 
purpose of the exercise was to consider whether the basic identification of events would 
be possible; further analysis should be up to the analyst. 
 
An important comment was based on the fact that repetition of problem indication could 
be regarded as part of further investigation in order to confirm if that potential problem 
really exists. This is a rather challenging issue, as it is very difficult to understand the 
intentions the person who is initiating this communication. It could be assumed that this 
is subject to interpretation, especially as this analysis and the exercise are based on data 
gathering that others have performed. This could only be clarified if the interviews with 
involved actors targeted such issues. 
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8.2 Validation and evaluation findings 
In order to claim that the technique can be widely applied with ease, further evaluation is 
required. However, it should be stated that this technique was developed for the purposes 
of the specific investigation into laboratory error handling; the development of the 
technique itself may have formed a research objective, however its complete validation is 
not an objective within the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, the activities discussed in 
this section were very useful in making some considerable improvements and 
clarifications in the definitions of error recovery stages which may be subject to 
misinterpretation by the analyst.  
 
Following the analysis of the exercises and the experience of applying the technique, 
some further conclusions can be drawn. 
Benefits: 
• The technique can be very useful in identifying, representing and communicating 
the activities that took place during error recovery during an incident. 
• The reconstructed view can assist in identifying key problem areas of an error 
recovery process 
• The focus on problem detection is particularly useful as it can help to reason 
about the role of “concerns” in error recovery. These can be the only error 
recovery initiating events in the absence of system feedback that can guide the 
investigator to identify errors. 
Limitations: 
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• Still not always straightforward—but it has been found that different accident 
analysts may still conclude to different findings. 
• Tool support—it has been very difficult to maintain the indexing and traceability 
between events in text, figures and STEP cards, while the drawing of figures had 
to be done with Microsoft Word, creating the possibility for inconsistencies in the 
use of colours, size of boxes etc. 
8.3 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the approach that was undertaken towards validation of ER-STEP. 
The findings of the evaluation were also presented, while this section concluded with an 
evaluation of the technique as a result of the validation exercise and the experience 
accumulated with the application of ER-STEP with these four case studies. 
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Chapter 9: Evaluation and implications 
 
 
 
This final chapter will present a summary and an evaluation of the research undertaken, 
before discussing the implications for practice and research this thesis has. The discussion 
about implications for practice will briefly state the relevance of the various findings that 
have emerged for different stakeholders, while directions for further research will 
concern patient safety, error detection and recovery, and accident analysis. This chapter 
will conclude with some final remarks. 
9.1 Summary of research 
The research presented here is an investigation into the factors that may impede detection 
and recovery of errors in screening tests. In order to identify and understand these factors 
and how they may inhibit an effective recovery, four incidents (three from the UK and 
one for the USA) were analysed with an analytical method that focuses on error handling 
activities that will take place. This method (ER-STEP) is an adaptation of STEP which 
has been integrated with a theoretical framework that illustrates the stages that make up 
an error recovery process from problem detection (initial concerns that something might 
be wrong) to error correction (chapters 3 and 4). 
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The findings of the four case studies (chapter 5) were integrated and compared to draw 
high-level conclusions about common problems in screening services in general. These 
conclusions (chapter 6) concerned both error recovery stages individually, and their 
relationship (e.g. how a specific kind of detection will result to a specific kind of further 
investigation). It was found that there are two key problem areas (which are anyway 
interrelated):  
• Problem detection is most likely to occur than error detection. When there is a 
problem with a screening service, the first instance of detection is going to take 
place where test results are used. In almost all instances in the four case studies, 
this was done by the nurse responsible for requesting and received them. This 
detection is based on a discrepancy between the expected number of 
positives/negatives (probably per week or month). 
• Severe communication breakdowns throughout the recovery process: 
Communication breakdowns will primarily occur because the reporting nurse will 
call the laboratory to report concerns, without convincing evidence that will 
motivate the laboratory technician to investigate further. However, these 
communication breakdowns are not only attributed to limited detection, but also 
to problematic—or a lack of—procedures for recording and handling complaints. 
The means of communication also play a role in the effectiveness of reporting of 
concerns. The informal reporting over the phone did not succeed in convincing 
laboratory technicians to investigate the system in order to find out if there is an 
error or not, whereas in the cases where face-to-face communication was possible, 
it was effective. 
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The sum of these findings resulted in the “laboratory error recovery” model, which 
classifies and correlates the various activities that may take place for the purpose of error 
handling outside and inside the laboratory.  
 
These findings are used to generate recommendations for the improvement of detection 
and recovery (chapter 7). Additional literature was used from the areas of Human-
Computer Interaction and systems engineering in order to provide some more detailed 
insight for technical and organizational interventions that aim at improving the 
preparedness of healthcare systems to detect and recover lab errors more efficiently. 
However these recommendations serve as a secondary aim of this thesis and would 
require more research in order to be further developed and validated. 
 
Finally, Chapter 8 presents the validation and evaluation of ER-STEP. The exercise and 
the participants’ responses can be found in Appendix B.  
9.2 Evaluation of research 
This section will discuss the contributions that this thesis has perhaps made to patient 
safety, accident analysis and error recovery, as well as the limitations and major problems 
that were faced during this work. 
9.2.1 Contribution to practice 
Screening programmes need to have adequate systems in place in order to “to be able to 
respond to errors quickly” [Screening Programme Director’s report, 2005]. The several 
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screening failures that have been discussed throughout this thesis illustrate what can 
happen if screening programmes are not prepared to detect and recover from errors when 
they occur. While there are several studies in the area of laboratory error, they mainly 
focus on error types and frequencies. It has been argued that we have very limited 
understanding of the impact of laboratory errors and laboratory work in general on patient 
outcomes [Plebani and Carraro, 1997; Bonini et al., 2002]. These issues motivate this 
study. The findings and the approach employed can help to understand how healthcare 
systems could be better prepared to detect and deal with errors when they occur within 
screening services.  
 
This study has identified a set of high-level conclusions—this level of abstraction was 
required in order to understand what the common key problem areas require that attention 
is placed in screening services in general (limited detection and communication barriers) 
and their impact on various stages of a recovery process. However, the application of 
these recommendations to a ‘real world’ environment would require a substantial amount 
of further technical analysis.  
9.2.2 Contribution to accident and incident analysis 
Although error handling is identified as a distinct area in the study of error, it is not 
considered as a separate issue in accident analysis. Up to this time, there is no technique 
available that focuses intrinsically on error detection and recovery. The adaptation of 
STEP to ER-STEP is a proposed approach to analyze the organizational response during 
a crisis. The validation and evaluation of the technique where already discussed in 
Chapter 8: in detail. 
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9.2.3 Cognitive science and systems engineering 
The use of the error recovery framework as a means to analyze error handling activities 
has resulted in a better understanding of the relationship between such activities, and the 
variety of actions that may fall under a specific error recovery stage. For instance, we can 
better understand how different kinds of communication may be stimulated following the 
various kinds of detection, or what purposes further investigation has.  
 
In addition, the inclusion of problem detection in the error recovery process has not—to 
this time—been done; problem detection, as a subject matter has been considered as an 
action of its own. In a similar manner, most recovery models and frameworks do not take 
into account the different mechanisms of detection (e.g. action-based, outcome-based, 
through limiting functions). 
 
Finally, this study indicated an additional detection mechanism which had not been 
considered by Sellen [1994]: detection through investigation. This kind of detection 
suggests that not only the process of recovery, but also error detection may be 
organizational processes; especially in this context, where error detection through further 
investigation was inter-organizational.  
9.2.4 Study limitations 
Given the high-level view that is taken in this thesis, the recommendations require further 
input in order to be practically useful within a specific context. In such a case, it is 
possible some of the recommendations might not be applicable. In addition to this point, 
it is very difficult to validate the correctness and significance of the findings and 
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recommendations. This has perhaps been achieved to a certain extent by peer review 
publications, and especially the two in the Patient Safety and Ergonomics conference, as 
it has a clear focus on patient safety.  
 
Another limitation is the hindsight bias [Johnson, 2003] with which the analyst views an 
accident. Although the focus on problem detection has been an important part of this 
thesis, it is unknown how many of reports based on concerns, without concrete evidence, 
are actually correct and not “noise”. Nonetheless, this thesis has argued that events of 
“problem indication” should be at least recorded, as they can be of great importance 
during an incident investigation. 
 
The final limitation here was the lack of data for the analysis of the Florida incident. The 
laboratory was unwilling to discuss the incident in detail, while the distance and the time-
difference made follow-up discussions problematic from the UK. For these reasons, the 
analysis of the Florida incident were significantly more superficial in comparison to the 
UK incidents. 
9.3 Implications for research 
Research in error handling has been fairly limited, at least in comparison to error 
prevention. This section will discuss some potential directions for further research which 
consider error handling in healthcare, the application of ER-STEP in other domains, and 
the consideration of error handling within safety argumentation (safety cases). 
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9.3.1 Error handling in healthcare 
Understanding the boundaries of plausibility 
A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods should be employed to understand 
the thresholds (problem detection) that when passed would drive a nurse to report a 
potential problem (problem indication). This is based on the notion that false-yet-
plausible test results are only plausible in isolation. The qualitative aspect would focus on 
examining a particular screening process, and, with a laboratory medicine-driven 
analysis, construct scenarios which describe potential instances of false-yet-plausible test 
results.  
 
Focus groups consisting of nurses would then discuss these scenarios in order to explore 
the different levels of plausibility. Ideally, such a study should be run within a network of 
hospitals and GP practices that are all dependent on the same laboratory or radiology 
department, with the scenarios being based on that specific department. The findings of 
such a study could then be used to direct questionnaires that could be deployed on a 
larger scale, again focusing on how nurses would react to different levels of plausibility. 
 
Hazard analysis 
The focus of hazard analysis should aim to identify the causes of false test results, 
focusing on their potential plausibility. In order to do this, a multidisciplinary perspective 
on hazard analysis would be required, which would involve clinicians at points of care, 
nurses, laboratory technicians, quality and safety managers, and system and software 
engineers.  
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9.3.2 Application of ER-STEP in other domains 
The error under investigation here can be seen to be information-based as it impacts 
medical test results; thus, safety implications arise after a considerable amount of time. It 
would be interesting to consider different kinds of errors and technical faults, as well as 
in other domains such as aviation and energy, where the timeframe within which 
recovery will have to occur is much shorter.  
9.3.3 ER-STEP tool 
Following the discussion regarding limitations of the technique, it would be very useful if 
there was tool support for ER-STEP. Tool support could also facilitate the restructuring 
of events to the error recovery focused view.  
9.4 Final remarks 
Error handling in screening programmes can be a complex, multi-departmental and inter-
organizational process; while detection is most likely to occur where test results are used 
(and originally requested), rectification of the technical problem can only take place 
within the laboratory. In addition, the incident response can only be considered as 
complete once affected patients are all identified and contacted, as a misdiagnosis will 
continue to affect a patient as time passes. This part of error recovery may involve several 
other organizations, such as national and regulatory authorities, or independent auditors.  
 
Problem detection was the initial recovery related activity in all of the incidents that were 
discussed here. Yet problem detection has neither been given enough attention in 
practice, nor in research. To an extent, this is understandable as problem detection often 
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occurs without the presence of an error, and the turbulence of medical environments 
along with limited time and resources do not allow for the investigation into any concern 
reported to the laboratory. Nonetheless, problem detection is critical as the plausibility of 
test results does not allow for error detection. The consideration of problem detection in 
the analysis of these four incidents has therefore been an important aspect of this thesis. 
 
The technique proposed perhaps requires some further application in order to calibrate 
and better define the boundaries between activities that seem to overlap. In any case, this 
is the first proposition of an error recovery focused technique; the findings of the multiple 
analyses resulted in the screening error recovery model which could be used to design 
error recovery processes in a laboratory setting. 
 
The involvement of physicians has been very important for the purposes of this work. A 
laboratory supervisor (Dr Frank Finley), a GP surgeon (Dr James Barnes) and an 
Emergency Medicine physician (Dr Robert Wears) have provided with very important 
insight, and with some evaluation and validation of the findings that resulted from this 
work.  
 
To conclude, this thesis aimed at increasing our understanding of an important problem 
that medical practice currently faces. The primary contribution of this thesis is therefore 
seen to be the set of conclusions that were derived in Chapter 6, which can be used to 
design error recovery processes in NHS screening services. The author hopes that such 
work will be continued, and, in the long run, will contribute to the improvement of the 
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ability of the NHS to detect laboratory screening errors and better handle them, 
eventually offering safer and of higher quality services to individuals.  
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Appendix A: STEP cards 
 
A.1 Incident 1: Down’s screening errors, Sheffield 
The data source for this incident is the formal Sheffield Inquiry report (Ferres et al., 
2001). The ‘data source’ cell in each of the following STEP cards will refer to the 
specific paragraph number (description of events can be found in section 10, pp. 63-74 of 
the Report). In addition, the actors’ names have been disclosed; in the Report they have 
been given aliases which will also be used here. Finally, there are several occasions 
where some information (in most cases the time/data event began and duration) has not 
been explicitly mentioned in the Report; therefore assumptions had to be made. Where 
necessary, these are highlighted by italic fonts in the STEP cards. 
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Event card id: Event 1.1 
Actor: Dr T 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
7th December, 1999 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.2 
Description: Issues a draft of a 
document describing a 
new incident reporting 
scheme 
 
Event card id: Event 1.2 
Actor:  Dr B 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
1st January, 2000 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.2 
Description: Introduces the new 
incident reporting 
scheme 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.3 
Actor: Mr R  
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
4th January 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.3 
Description: Undertakes Y2K 
testing on PathLan. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.4 
Actor: MGL sister 
Action: Problem detection 
Event 
location: 
Hospital B 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid January 
Event 
duration: 
Approx. 2 weeks 
Data source: 10.3 
Description: Becomes concerned 
as the number of 
positives she had 
received was lower 
than expected 
 
Event card id: Event 1.5 
Actor: MGL sister 
Action: Problem indication 
Event 
location: 
Hospital B 
Time/date 
event began: 
End of January 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.3 
Description: Reports concerns to 
immun. Dept. over the 
phone. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.6 
Actor: MGL sister 
Action: Error detection 
Event 
location: 
Hospital B 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid January 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.3 
Description: Notices the results for 
an older woman are 
“unrealistically low” 
 
Event card id: Event 1.7 
Actor: MGL sister 
Action: Problem indication 
Event 
location: 
Hospital B 
Time/date 
event began: 
End of January 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.3 
Description: Reports concerns 
[Event 1.4] to 
immunology 
department over the 
phone. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.8 
Actor: MGL sister 
Action: Error indication 
Event 
location: 
Hospital B 
Time/date 
event began: 
End of January 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.3 
Description: Reports [Event 1.6] to 
Immun. Dept. over the 
phone. 
 
Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
 200 
 
Event card id: Event 1.9 
Actor: Ms S 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
End of January 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.3 
Description: Asks Mr R “colleague 
who had undertaken 
Y2K testing [Event 1.3] 
about event 1.8. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.10 
Actor: Mr R 
Action: Failure of Further 
investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immun. Dept. 
Time/date 
event began: 
End of January 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.3 
Description: Reassures Ms S that 
there is no Y2K 
problem with PathLan. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.11 
Actor: Ms S 
Action: Failure of Further 
investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immun. Dept. 
Time/date 
event began: 
End of January 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.3 
Description: Does not log incident 
[Events 1.7 and 1.8] 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.12 
Actor: MGL sister 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Hospital B 
Time/date 
event began: 
End of January 
Event 
duration: 
2 months 
Data source: 10.4 
Description: Monitors her own 
screen positive results  
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.13 
Actor: MGL sister 
Action: Problem indication 
Event 
location: 
Hospital B 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.5 
Description: Reports concerns over 
the phone 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.14 
Actor: <unknown> someone 
in immunology 
department 
Action: Failure of Problem 
indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.5 
Description: Reassures that there is 
no problem with Down’ 
screening. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.15 
Actor: Mr K  
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 2000 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.6 
Description: Requests from Dr A for 
a routine audit to be 
carried out for CPA 
visit due April 18th. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.16 
Actor: Dr A 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 2000 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.6 
Description: In response to [Event 
1.16], Dr A suggests 
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the data would not be 
available but he would 
be able to respond to 
any queries made 
during CPA visit, 
 
Event card id: Event 1.17 
Actor: Mr K 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th April 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.7 
Description: Performs random 
check of the ‘High 
book’. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.18 
Actor: Mr K 
Action: Problem detection 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th April 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.9 
Description: Notices there are too 
many positives 
reported in High book. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.19 
Actor: Mr K 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 17th 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.10 
Description: Instructs Mr M to audit 
the screen positive rate 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.20 
Actor: Mr M 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 17th 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.10 
Description: Assumes ‘human error’ 
has been made during 
maintenance of the 
High book. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.21 
Actor: Mr M 
Action: Failure of further 
investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 17th 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.10 
Description: Does not consider this 
[Event 1.19] as urgent 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.22 
Actor: Mr K  
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 19th 
Event 
duration: 
18 days 
Data source: 10.11 
Description: Goes on leave until 8th 
of May 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.23 
Actor: Midwife coordinator 
Action: Problem detection 
Event 
location: 
Hospital C 
Time/date 
event began: 
13th April 
Event 
duration: 
2 weeks 
Data source: 10.13 
Description: Becomes concerned as 
no high-risk test results 
have been received 
 
Event card id: Event 1.24 
Actor: Midwife coordinator 
Action: Problem indication 
Event 
location: 
Hospital C 
Time/date 
event began: 
2nd May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.13 
Description: Reports concerns 
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[Event 1.23] to Mr M 
over the phone. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.25 
Actor: Mr M 
Action: Failure of problem 
indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
2nd May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.13 
Description: Does not consider 
Event 1.24 serious 
enough to notify Dr B. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.26 
Actor: Midwife coordinator 
Action: Problem indication 
Event 
location: 
Hospital C 
Time/date 
event began: 
Week commencing 2nd 
May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.14 
Description: Reports concerns 
again [Event 1.23], this 
time to Ms S (over the 
phone). 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.27 
Actor: Ms S 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Same day as Event 
1.26 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.14 
Description: Replies she will notify 
Mr M regarding [Event 
1.26] 
 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.28 
Actor: Ms S 
Action: Failure of Problem 
indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date Same day as Event 
event began: 1.26 
Event 
duration: 
Until 17th May 
Data source: 10.15 
Description: Does not inform Mr M 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.29 
Actor: Ms S 
Action: Failure of Problem 
indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Same day as Event 
1.26 
Event 
duration: 
Until 17th May 
Data source: 10.15 
Description: Does not respond to 
[Event 1.26] 
 
Event card id: Event 1.30 
Actor: Midwife coordinator 
Action: Problem indication 
Event 
location: 
Hospital C 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.15 
Description: Reports to Dr B that 
she hasn’t received a 
high-risk pregnancy 
report for 5 weeks, 
although she would 
expect 5-10 per week. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.31 
Actor: Dr B 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.15 
Description: Responds she will get 
back to her (midwife 
coordinator) regarding 
Event 1.30. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.32 
Actor: Midwife coordinator 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Hospital C 
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Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.15 
Description: Consults with the Head 
of Midwifery regarding 
what actions to take in 
order to pursue a 
resolution of her 
concerns. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.33 
Actor: Midwife coordinator 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Hospital C 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.16 
Description: Writes a letter to the 
immunology 
department addressed 
to Mr K 
 
Event card id: Event 1.34 
Actor: Midwife coordinator 
Action: Problem indication 
Event 
location: 
Hospital C 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.16 
Description: Writes a letter to the 
immunology 
department addressed 
to Mr K 
 
Event card id: Event 1.35 
Actor: Midwife coordinator 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Hospital C 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.17 
Description: Writes a letter to the 
immunology 
department addressed 
to Mr K 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.36 
Actor: Dr B 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.17 
Description: Has a discussion with 
Ms P regarding Event 
1.34. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.37 
Actor: Ms P 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.17 
Description: Informs Dr B Mr K had 
asked Mr M to 
undertake an audit 
earlier that month 
(May). 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.38 
Actor: Mr M  
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Beginning of May 
Event 
duration: 
Until 17th May 
Data source: 10.17 
Description: Mr M does not perform 
audit. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.39 
Actor: Dr B 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.17 
Description: Requests audit to be 
performed immediately, 
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and have the results on 
his desk. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.40 
Actor: Mr M 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
2 days 
Data source: 10.17 
Description: Performs audit 
 
Event card id: Event 1.41 
Actor: Antenatal staff 
Action: Error detection (2) [(2) 
is required as this is a-
what seemed to be-
different error] 
Event 
location: 
Antenatal care 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.20 
Description: Notice DoB in two 
Down’s screening 
reports are wrong. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.42 
Actor: Antenatal staff 
Action: Error indication (2) 
Event 
location: 
Antenatal care 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.20 
Description: Report event 1.41 to 
Ms S, immunology 
department. 
Event card id: Event 1.43 
Actor: Ms S 
Action: No classification (2) 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.21 
Description: Attempts to change 
DoBs for the two 
reports in event 1.42. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.44 
Actor: Ms S 
Action: Error detection 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.21 
Description: Notices risk calculation 
remains unaltered 
following event 1.43. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.45 
Actor: MS S 
Action: Error indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.23 
Description: Reports event 1.44 to 
Mr L. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.46 
Actor: Mr L 
Action: Error indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.23 
Description: Phones Mr W at 
Hartlepool. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.47 
Actor: Mr W 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Hartlepool hospital 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.23 
Description: Mr W is absent 
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Event card id: Event 1.48 
Actor: Mr L 
Action: Error indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.23 
Description: Leaves a voice-mail for 
Mr W. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.49 
Actor: Mr M 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
18th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.20 
Description: Places a note on Dr B’s 
desk writing “1.7%” 
following event 1.40. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.50 
Actor: Dr B 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
7.00pm ,18th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.17 
Description: Sees note (event 1.41) 
on his desk 
 
 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.51 
Actor: Dr B 
Action: Failure of further 
investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
7.00pm ,18th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.17 
Description: Does not pay attention 
to that note (based on 
assumption that he did 
not understand what 
that note meant). 
 
Event card id: Event 1.52 
Actor: Mr K 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Friday, 19th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.18 
Description: Returns to work 
 
Event card id: Event 1.53 
Actor: Dr B 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Friday, 19th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.18 
Description: Is absent as his wife 
goes into labour.  
 
Event card id: Event 1.54 
Actor: Dr B 
Action: Problem indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
19th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.18 
Description: Speaks on the phone 
with Mr K to confirm 
that the results are 
locked in his office. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.55 
Actor: Mr K 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
19th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.18 
Description: Agrees to look into the 
matter. 
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Event card id: Event 1.56 
Actor: Midwife coordinator 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Evening, 19th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.19 
Description: Phones Mr K regarding 
the letter she sent 
(event 1.33) 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.57 
Actor: Mr K 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
22nd May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.26 
Description: Receives letter through 
fax (event 1.33). 
 
Event card id: Event 1.58 
Actor: Dr B 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
22nd May 
Event 
duration: 
1 day 
Data source: 10.26 
Description: Away on paternity 
leave 
 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.59 
Actor: Dr B 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
11:30am, 23rd May 
Event 
duration: 
7 hours 
Data source: 10.27 
Description: Is present at hospital 
(but not in immunology 
department). 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.60 
Actor: Mr K 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
23rd May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.28 
Description: Asks Mr M to provide 
him with the results of 
the audit. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.61 
Actor: Mr K 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
23rd May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.28 
Description: Examines audit results 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.62 
Actor: Mr K 
Action: Error detection 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
23rd May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.28 
Description: Notices only 2% 
positives had been 
reported since January.  
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.63 
Actor: Mr K 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
23rd May 
Event 
duration: 
“some time”  
Data source: 10.28 
Description: Examines analytical 
values 
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Event card id: Event 1.64 
Actor: Mr K 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
23rd May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.28 
Description: Urges Mr L to contact 
Mr W. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.65 
Actor: Mr L 
Action: Error indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Morning, 24th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.28 
Description: Contacts Mr W, 
Hartepool  over the 
phone. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.66 
Actor: Mr W 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Hartlepool 
Time/date 
event began: 
9:30am, 24th May 
Event 
duration: 
Approx. 30’ 
Data source: 10.29 
Description: Examines PathLan 
 
Event card id: Event 1.67 
Actor: Mr W 
Action: Error explanation 
Event 
location: 
Hartlepool 
Time/date 
event began: 
24th May 
Event 
duration: 
A few minutes  
Data source: 10.29 
Description: Identifies bug 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.68 
Actor: Mr W 
Action: Error correction 
Event 
location: 
Hartlepool 
Time/date 
event began: 
24th May 
Event 
duration: 
A few minutes  
Data source: 10.29 
Description: Removes bug 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.69 
Actor: Mr K 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
24th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.30 
Description: Informs Dr A that he 
will find all high-risk 
cases that have been 
wrongly reported (face-
to-face) 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.70 
Actor: Mr K 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Morning, 24th May 
Event 
duration: 
Approx. 12 hours (until 
11.30pm). 
Data source: 10.34 
Description: Trawls through system 
to identify “the potential 
size of the problem”. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.71 
Actor: Mr K 
Action: Error explanation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
24th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.34 
Description: Finds approx. 150 
high-risk pregnancies 
which had been 
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reported as low-risk. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.72 
Actor: Mr K 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
11.30pm, 24th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.34 
Description: Emails findings [event 
1.71] to Dr B. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.73 
Actor: Dr B 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
11.30pm, 25th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.35 
Description: Sees email [event 1.72] 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.74 
Actor: Mr J 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
11.30pm, 24th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 10.34 
Description: Informs Chief 
Executive 
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A.2  Incident 2: Breast Cancer Screening errors, London 
 
The data source for this incident is the formal Commission for Health 
Improvement report (CHI, 2002). The corresponding paragraph number will be 
entered in the source cell. 
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Event card id: Event 2.1 
Actor: Patient 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
January 1999 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.1 
Description: Receives letter from 
WoLBSS indicating 
that her mammogram 
was normal. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.2 
Actor: Patient 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
2000 (before October) 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.1 
Description: Moves to area X 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.3 
Actor: BSS X 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
Breast  Screening 
Service X 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid-October 2000 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.1 
Description: Receives patient’s file 
forwarded by WoLBSS 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.4 
Actor: BSS X 
Action: Error detection 
Event 
location: 
BSS X 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid-October 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.1 
Description: Realize patient has 
been screened 
incorrectly by WoLBSS 
by comparing their 
mammogram with the 
previous. 
 
Event card id: Event 2.5 
Actor: BSS X 
Action: Error indication 
Event 
location: 
BSS X 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid-October 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.1 
Description: Contact senior 
manager at WoLBSS 
by phone regarding 
event 2.4. 
 
Event card id: Event 2.6 
Actor: BSS X 
Action: Error indication 
Event 
location: 
BSS X 
Time/date 
event began: 
31st October 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.2 
Description: Send written 
confirmation of the 
incident to WoLBSS. 
 
Event card id: Event 2.7 
Actor: Senior management 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
WoLBSS 
Time/date 
event began: 
1st November 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.2 
Description: The matter of event 2.4 
is discussed in 
management meeting. 
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Event card id: Event 2.8 
Actor: Senior management 
Action: Failure of Further 
investigation 
 
Event 
location: 
WoLBSS 
Time/date 
event began: 
1st November 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.2 
Description: The matter of event 2.4 
is not considered as 
important. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.9 
Actor: Quality assurance 
reference centre 
relating to BSS X 
Action: Error indication 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
1st or 2nd of November  
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.3 
Description: Informs the London 
quality reference centre 
about event 2.4 
(“verbally”—it is 
assumed this was done 
over the phone). 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.10 
Actor: Quality assurance 
reference centre 
relating to BSS X 
Action: Error indication 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
Same day as event 2.9 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.3 
Description: Forward the letter that 
was sent to WoLBSS 
[event 2.4] to the 
London quality 
reference centre. 
Event card id: Event 2.11 
Actor: London quality 
reference centre 
Action: No classification 
Event 
location: 
London 
Time/date 
event began: 
10th November 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.3 
Description: Receive letter [event 
2.10] 
 
Event card id: Event 2.12 
Actor: London quality 
reference centre 
Action: Error indication 
Event 
location: 
London 
Time/date 
event began: 
13th November 
Event 
duration: 
5 days 
Data source: 1.4 
Description: Contacted senior 
management 
(WoLBSS) on “several 
occasions”, insisting 
that the matter [event 
2.4] be reported to the 
general manager of the 
imaging directorate of 
Hammersmith 
Hospitals NHS Trust) 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.13 
Actor: WoLBSS 
Action: Error indication 
 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th November 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.5 
Description: Report the incident as 
critical incident to the 
general manager of the 
imaging directorate of 
Hammersmith 
Hospitals NHS Trust. 
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Event card id: Event 2.14 
Actor: Trust chief operating 
officer/director of 
services  
Action: Error indication 
 
Event 
location: 
Hammersmith 
Hospitals Trust 
Time/date 
event began: 
17th November 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.6 
Description: Briefs the trust chief 
executive and medical 
director. 
 
Event card id: Event 2.15 
Actor: London quality 
reference centre 
Action: Error indication 
 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
22nd November 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.6 
Description: Informs the national 
coordinator of the NHS 
Breast Screening 
Programme and the 
chair of its 
administrative group. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.16 
Actor: London quality 
reference centre 
Action: Error indication 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
23rd November 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.6 
Description: Informs the officer with 
lead responsibility for 
cancer services at the 
NHS London regional 
office 
 
Event card id: Event 2.17 
Actor: London quality 
reference centre 
Action: Error indication 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
24th November 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.6 
Description: Confirms the incident in 
writing to the NHS 
London region director 
of public health. 
 
Event card id: Event 2.18 
Actor: London quality 
reference centre 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
4th December 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.7 
Description: Call a meeting to 
discuss the incident.  
 
Event card id: Event 2.19 
Actor: Meeting panel 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Hammersmith 
Hospitals Trust 
Time/date 
event began: 
4th December 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.7 
Description: An internal inquiry 
panel is established.  
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.20 
Actor: Inquiry panel 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
WoLBSS 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early December 
Event 
duration: 
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Data source: 1.7 
Description: Review documents and 
conduct interviews. 
 
Event card id: Event 2.21 
Actor: Inquiry panel 
Action: Error explanation 
Event 
location: 
WoLBSS 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early December 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.7 
Description: Conclude that 
WoLBSS did not have 
a robust right results 
protocol. 
 
Event card id: Event 2.22 
Actor: Inquiry panel 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
WoLBSS 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early December 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.7 
Description: Suggest that an 
external audit company 
reviews the 
mammogram files of all 
women who had 
attended for screening 
since 1993 (nearly 
104,000 women and 
over 174,000 episodes) 
 
Event card id: Event 2.23 
Actor: Inquiry panel 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Hammersmith 
Hospitals Trust 
Time/date 
event began: 
21st December 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.8 
Description: Report their findings to 
a meeting. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.24 
Actor: Inquiry panel 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Hammersmith 
Hospitals Trust 
Time/date 
event began: 
22nd December 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.8 
Description: Report their findings to 
the trust chief 
executive. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.25 
Actor: PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
WoLBSS 
Time/date 
event 
began: 
27th February, 2001 
Event 
duration: 
Approx. 3 months 
Data source: 1.9 
Description: Go through the files of all 
women screened since 
1993. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.26 
Actor: Inquiry panel 
Action: Error Explanation 
Event 
location: 
BSS X 
Time/date 
event began: 
July 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.10 
Description: Compile a report with 
their findings. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.27 
Actor: chief executive 
Action: Error indication 
Event 
location: 
Hammersmith 
Hospitals Trust’s 
Time/date 
event began: 
9th March 
Event 
duration: 
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Data source: 1.11 
Description: Request CHI’s 
assistance 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.28 
Actor: CHI 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
10th April 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.11 
Description: Agree to conduct an 
investigation 
 
Event card id: Event 2.29 
Actor: WoLBSS 
Action: Error control 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
11th June 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.12 
Description: Suspend breast 
screening 
 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.30 
Actor: CHI 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
WoLBSS 
Time/date 
event began: 
11th June 
Event 
duration: 
Approx. 3 months 
Data source: 1.11 
Description: Conduct investigation 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.32 
Actor: WoLBSS 
Action: Error correction 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
10th December 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: 1.12 
Description: Begin phased 
reintroduction of 
services. 
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 A.3  Incident 3: Breast Cancer Screening errors, Manchester 
 
Following this incident, two inquiries were conducted; the one by the Expert 
Advisory Panel [2006], and the other by Professor Mark Baker [2006]. The two 
reports have been used to produce the STEP cards for this incident. The EAP 
report has paragraph number, but not the Baker report. For the later, the page 
number will therefore be entered in the STEP card source cell.  
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Event card id: Event  3.1 
Actor: Mammography 
radiographers 
Action: Problem detection 
 
Event location: Breast service, Trafford 
Hospitals Trust 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
8 months 
Data source: Baker report, p6 
Description: Become concerned over 
Dr H’s brusque style 
and high speed and 
brevity of reporting, the 
non-use of previous 
screening programme 
films in reporting 
mammograms and 
other practices, 
although no errors had 
been made. 
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.2 
Actor: Mammography 
radiographers 
Action: Problem indication 
Event location: Breast service, Trafford 
Hospitals Trust 
Time/date 
event began: 
November, 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: Baker report, p6 
Description: Formally report their 
concerns [Event 3.1] to 
the Trust management. 
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.3 
Actor: THT management 
Action: Further investigation 
Event location: Breast service, Trafford 
Hospitals Trust 
Time/date 
event began: 
November, 2003 
Event 
duration: 
<,unknown>, 
presumably less than a 
week 
Data source: Baker report, p6 
Description: Investigate Dr H’s 
practice. 
 
Event card id: Event  3.4 
Actor: THT management 
Action: Failure of Further 
investigation 
Event location: Breast service, Trafford 
Hospitals Trust 
Time/date 
event began: 
November, 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: Baker report, p6 
Description: Do not find any errors or 
unacceptable behavior 
apart from the non-use 
of previous screening 
programme films. 
 
Event card id: Event  3.5 
Actor: Radiologists 
Action: error detection 
Event location: Trafford Hospital 
Time/date 
event began: 
November, 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: Baker report, p6 
Description: Notice errors in Dr H’s 
reports 
 
Event card id: Event  3.6 
Actor: Radiologists 
Action: error indication 
Event location: Trafford Hospital 
Time/date 
event began: 
November, 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: Baker report, p6 
Description: Inform Trust 
management about 
Event 3.5 
 
Event card id: Event  3.7 
Actor: Trust management 
Action: Failure of error 
recovery 
Event location: Trafford Hospital 
Time/date 
event began: 
November, 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: Baker report, p6 
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Description: Consider errors as 
isolated events 
 
Event card id: Event  3.8 
Actor: Clinical staff  
Action: problem detection 
Event location: Trafford Hospital 
Time/date 
event began: 
November, 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: Baker report, p6 
Description: Started becoming 
concerned that Dr H’s 
work was not reliable. 
 
Event card id: Event  3.9 
Actor: Clinical staff 
Action: Further investigation 
Event location: Trafford Hospital 
Time/date 
event began: 
November, 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: Baker report, p6 
Description: Would double-check Dr 
H’s reports with other 
radiographers before 
communicating bad 
news to patients. 
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.10 
Actor: Mammography 
radiographers 
Action: Error detection 
Event location: THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
April, 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: Baker report, p7 
Description: Find a high number of 
errors in a single MDT 
patient list.  
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.11 
Actor: Mammography 
radiographers 
Action: Problem indication 
Event location: THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
13th April, 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: Baker report, p7,  
EAP report, 4.1 
Description: Report their concerns 
again to Trust senior 
management. 
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.12 
Actor: Mammography 
radiographers 
Action: Error indication 
Event location: THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
13th April, 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: Baker report, p6, EAP 
report 4.1 
Description: Report event 3.7 to 
Trust senior 
management. 
 
Event card id: Event  3.13 
Actor: THT management 
Action: Error control 
Event location: Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
18th April, 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: EAP report 4.1 
Description: Suspend Dr H 
 
Event card id: Event  3.14 
Actor: THT management 
Action: Error indication 
Event location: Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
19th April 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: EAP report 4.1 
Description: report the issue as a 
Serious Adverse Event 
to the Greater 
Manchester Strategic 
Health Authority 
(GMSHA) 
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Event card id: Event  3.15 
Actor: GMSHA 
Action: Error indication 
Event location: GMSHA 
Time/date 
event began: 
19th April 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: EAP report 4.1 
Description: Inform the Department 
of Health.  
 
Event card id: Event  3.16 
Actor: Nightingale Centre 
Action: Further investigation 
Event location: Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
20 April 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: EAP report 4.1 
Description: Are instructed to 
conduct an audit of Dr 
H’s work 
 
Event card id: Event  3.17 
Actor: Nightingale Centre 
Action: Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
26th April 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: EAP report 4.1 
Description: Commencement of the 
review of the 457 
Mammograms. 
 
Event card id: Event  3.18 
Actor: Expert Advisory Panel  
Action: Further investigation 
Event location: Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
26th April 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: Baker report, p6 
Description: The panel is established 
 
Event card id: Event  3.19 
Actor: Nightingale Centre 
Action: Error explanation 
Event location: Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
6th May 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: EAP report 4.1 
Description: Findings of initial 
mammography review 
(457 mammograms) 
highlighted a significant 
number of differing 
reports. 
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.20 
Actor: THT management 
Action: Error indication 
Event location: Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
27th May 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: EAP report 4.1 
Description: Bury PCT became 
aware of the Serious 
Adverse Event due to a 
general alert regarding 
the excluded Consultant 
Radiologist being 
distributed to PCTs,  
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.21 
Actor: THT management 
Action: Error indication 
Event location:  
Time/date 
event began: 
17th June 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: EAP report 4.1 
Description: NPSA notified of 
incident 
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.22 
Actor: Breast Screening 
Quality Assurance 
Team 
Action: Further investigation 
Event location: Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
1st August 2005 
Event Approx. one month 
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duration: 
Data source: EAP report 4.1 
Description: External review of 
general radiology 
images/films 
 
Event card id: Event  3.23 
Actor: Breast Screening 
Quality Assurance 
Team 
Action: Further investigation 
Event location: Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
1st September 2005 
Event 
duration: 
Apprx. 3 months 
Data source: EAP report 4.1 
Description: External review of 
clinical notes, cytology 
reports and 
histopathology reports 
 
Event card id: Event  3.24 
Actor: Breast Screening 
Quality Assurance 
Team 
Action: Further investigation 
Event location: Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
1st September 2005 
Event 
duration: 
Apprx. 4 months 
Data source: EAP report 4.1 
Description: External review of 
ultrasound patients 
notes/images 
 
Event card id: Event  3.25 
Actor: Breast Screening 
Quality Assurance 
Team 
Action: Error explanation 
Event location: Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
21st November 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source: EAP report 4.1 
Description: Findings reported 
 
 
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.26 
Actor: Breast Screening 
Quality Assurance 
Team 
Action: Further investigation 
Event location: Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
1st December 2005 
Event 
duration: 
One month 
Data source: EAP report 4.1 
Description: External review of the 
28 patients with delayed 
diagnosis completed  
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A.4 Incident 4: STI screening errors, Florida 
As already mentioned, data for this analysis has been gathered with interviews. 
Therefore, the source cell will be left blank. 
 
 
Event card id: Event  4.1 
Actor: Biochemistry department 
Action: No classification 
Event location: Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
January 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: New reporting system is 
introduced 
 
Event card id: Event  4.2 
Actor: Charge nurse 
Action: No classification 
Event location: Emergency Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early April 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: Returns from maternity 
leave 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event card id: Event  4.3 
Actor: Charge nurse 
Action: Problem detection 
Event location: Emergency Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early April 
Event 
duration: 
2 weeks 
Data source:  
Description: Notices there are no 
positives reported from 
Biochemistry department 
 
Event card id: Event  4.4 
Actor: Charge nurse 
Action: Further investigation 
Event location: Emergency Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: Discusses matter (event 
4.3) with a physician  
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Event card id: Event  4.5 
Actor: Physician 
Action: Further investigation 
Event location: Emergency Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: Advises nurse to contact 
the lab 
 
Event card id: Event  4.6 
Actor: Charge nurse 
Action: Problem indication 
Event location: Emergency Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: Informs lab that there 
are no positives being 
reported back to ED 
 
Event card id: Event  4.7 
Actor: Biochemistry department 
Action: Further investigation 
Event location: Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: Check tests carried out 
since change of 
equipment 
 
Event card id: Event  4.8 
Actor: Biochemistry department 
Action: Error explanation 
Event location: Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: Find positive tests in the 
system which have not 
been reported by 
reporting system 
 
Event card id: Event  4.9 
Actor: Biochemistry department 
Action: Further investigation 
Event location: Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: Check result reporting 
system 
 
Event card id: Event  4.10 
Actor: Biochemistry department 
Action: Error explanation 
Event location: Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: Identify/locate software 
bug 
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Event card id: Event  4.11 
Actor: Biochemistry department 
Action: Error correction 
Event location: Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: Remove software bug 
 
Event card id: Event  4.12 
Actor: Biochemistry department 
Action: Error correction 
Event location: Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: Change printout settings 
so that all results are 
reported 
 
Event card id: Event  4.13 
Actor: Biochemistry department 
Action: Further investigation 
Event location: Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: Search for all involved 
patients’ details 
 
Event card id: Event  4.14 
Actor: Biochemistry department 
Action: Error correction 
Event location: Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
End of April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: Call patients back for 
screening 
 
Event card id: Event  4.15 
Actor: Charge nurse 
Action: Problem detection 
Event location: Emergency department 
Time/date 
event began: 
n/a, sometime in 2005 
Event 
duration: 
2 weeks 
Data source:  
Description: Notices there are no 
positives being reported 
back from the lab 
 
Event card id: Event  4.16 
Actor: Charge nurse 
Action: No classification 
Event location: Emergency Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early week 3 
Event  
duration: 
Data source:  
Description: Recalls previous incident 
 
Event card id: Event  4.17 
Actor: Charge nurse 
Action: Problem indication 
Error handling in NHS screening programmes | 223 
 223 
Event location: Emergency Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early week 3 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: Informs lab no positives 
are being reported back 
to ED (face-to-face) 
 
Event card id: Event  4.18 
Actor: Biochemistry department 
Action: Further investigation 
Event location: Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early week 3 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: Do not find any errors or 
unacceptable behavior 
apart from the non-use 
of previous screening 
programme films. 
 
Event card id: Event  4.19 
Actor: Biochemistry department 
Action: Error explanation 
Event location: Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early week 3 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: Realize a flat used to 
check whether a test 
result is positive has 
been mistakenly 
deactivated 
 
 
Event card id: Event  4.20 
Actor: Biochemistry 
department 
Action: Error correction 
Event location: Biochemistry 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early week 3 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: Reset flag 
 
Event card id: Event  4.21 
Actor: Biochemistry department 
Action: Further investigation 
Event location: Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid week 3, 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  
Description: Do not find any errors or 
unacceptable behavior 
apart from the non-use 
of previous screening 
programme films. 
 
Event card id: Event  4.22 
Actor: Biochemistry department 
Action: Error correction 
Event location: Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid week 3, 2005 
Event  
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duration: 
Data source:  
Description: All involved patients are 
contacted for re-
screening 
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Appendix B: ER-STEP exercise 
This appendix will present the exercise that was used for the validation of the proposed 
technique, and the solutions provided by the two participants. The discussion regarding 
the results of validation activities can be found in Chapter 8:. 
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Focusing Accident and Incident Analysis on Error Handling:  
Error Recovery focused Sequentially Timed Events Plotting (ER- 
STEP). 
 
Nick Chozos 
PhD Student 
Department of Computing Science 
University of Glasgow 
17, Lilybank Gardens 
mailto:Nick@dcs.gla.ac.uk 
07909793228 
 
 
Accident and incident analysis techniques aim at identifying and understanding the factors that 
resulted to a disaster or a ‘near- miss’. Such analyses are important, not only for the 
understanding of what caused an accident, but also for the understanding of how it could have 
been avoided, prevented, or better handled once the failure started to take place.  
 
In the following pages, you will find a brief description of an incident analysis technique, and an 
exercise for its evaluation. The technique (ER- STEP) focuses on the analysis of error handling 
activities following the detection of a problem/ error/ technical fault. A brief incident scenario 
will be introduced, and participants will be asked to analyse the error handling efforts with the 
proposed analytical technique. 
 
I would like to thank you for taking the time to conduct this exercise. Your findings will be 
compared to others’ who have performed the same analysis, in order to evaluate how consistent 
and applicable the technique can be. If you have any queries please contact me at the email 
address above, or my PhD supervisor (Professor Chris Johnson, mailto:Johnson@dcs.gla.ac.uk). 
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ER- STEP: Focusing accident analysis on error handling activities 
 
The technique presented here is an integration of an existing technique called Sequentially Timed 
Events Plotting (STEP), and the Error Recovery Framework, a theoretical framework that 
described the sequence of events that take place during error handling, from detection to 
recovery. STEP and the Error Recovery Framework will be introduced, before presenting Error 
Recovery focused- STEP, the integrated technique. An example will also be presented, in order to 
suggest how the technique should be applied during an incident analysis. 
 
1. Sequentially Timed Events Plotting 
STEP was developed by the USA Department of Energy. STEP is a reconstruction technique 
which presents the sequence of events as they evolved from left to right, denoting the actors’ 
involvement. Figure 1 illustrates how STEP is applied in incident and accident analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Example of incident analysis with STEP 
 
In order to focus the analysis on error handling activities, STEP has been integrated with the Error 
Recovery Framework, which will be presented in the next section. 
 
2. The Error Recovery Framework 
The framework presented here is an adaptation of existing frameworks, while taking into account 
error detection theory from psychology and cognitive science. Figure 1 presents the sequence of 
the different stages that an error recovery process will go through. Each stage will be described in 
this section. 
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Figure 2: The Error Recovery Framework 
 
Problem Detection: Initial concerns that something may be wrong. During problem detection the 
operator is not certain that there is an error or fault in the system. At this initial stage, the operator 
would have a ‘feeling’ based on experience and expertise, rather than any evidence suggesting 
concerns are valid. It is possible the operator might not act upon those concerns, but if they build 
up through time, the operator will either proceed with problem indication, or further 
investigation.  
 
Error Detection: A near miss, incident, or a system indication that something is wrong. Unlike 
problem detection, error detection is a strong and clear indication of a system failure. However, 
error detection does not suggest the causes of the error have been identified. Further investigation 
might still be necessary in order to find the exact nature of the failure, and what caused it. 
 
 
Further Investigation: Actions to find out if there is an error, what the error is, what the extent 
of the failure is. Activities range from seeking advice for further action to investigation into 
system elements that might be problematic, carrying out audits etc. Following problem detection, 
the operator might consult with a colleague, monitor system behaviour, or conduct other activities 
in order to determine if there is an error. Further investigation varies depending on the previous 
error recovery stage that took place. If it follows error detection, where more evidence is 
available, further investigation may include a range of different activities, all of which aim at 
finding out more about what caused the error. 
 
Problem Indication: Reporting of concerns (problem detection). Reporting of concerns takes 
place when the operator that has detected a problem informs someone who can act upon these 
Problem 
Detection 
Error 
Detection 
Error 
Indication 
Error 
Explanation 
Error Control and/ or 
Correction 
Further Investigation 
Incident Timeframe 
Problem 
Indication 
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concerns. It is important to distinguish problem indication from communication that takes place 
during further investigation. During further investigation, the person that detected a problem/ 
error, will communicate in order to find out more about the potentially problematic system 
element, while during problem indication, the operator will report his/ her concerns to someone 
who can do something about it. 
 
Error Indication: Reporting of error detection. Error indication may take place in different 
forms: Incident report, communication over the phone, email etc.  
 
Error Explanation: The causes of the error are identified. Error explanation usually follows 
further investigation. Once the causes of the failure have been identified and explained, error 
correction can be completed. 
 
Error Correction: Actions are taken to eliminate the error or fault that took place. 
Modifications or interventions are introduced in order to assure the same error does not take place 
again.    
 
The process of error recovery does not necessarily have to go through all stages. Also, some 
stages might be repeated, while the failure of a stage will either stop error recovery, or take it 
back to a previous stage. 
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3. Error Recovery- focused –STEP (ER STEP) 
 
Figure 3 presents the application of ER STEP to the same sequence of events illustrated in figure 
2. The classification of events has been done according to the different stages of the Error 
Recovery Framework. 
 
Figure 3: Analysis of error handling efforts with ER- STEP 
 
Note event E3 which is labelled as ‘No Classification’. This is done when an event cannot be 
categorised under any of the stages of the error recovery process. 
 
When the event following further investigation and/ or problem/ error indication results in 
slowing down or stopping the process, the event is labelled as ‘Failure of- label of previous 
stage’.  In the example, a Lab technician that was going to investigate the ED nurse’s reports 
failed to do so. Event E5 is then labelled as ‘Failure of Further Investigation’. 
 
The proposed technique aims at analysing error handling activities that took place during an 
incident. The labelling of events with the appropriate error recovery stage name, and the timely 
sequence can assist analysts to ‘filter’ activities, and to consider where error recovery was 
problematic. 
 
However, in order for the technique to be applicable, it is important to have solid definitions of 
the error recovery stages, so that analyses are consistent and coherent. The purpose of this 
exercise is to evaluate this technique with its application to the same incident scenario by multiple 
participants. In the next section, the incident scenario will be presented.
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4. Incident scenario 
 
This scenario describes part of the events that took place during an incident in the Immunology 
Department of Sheffield Northern General Hospital. A software system used to calculate the 
likelihood of pregnant women giving birth to children with Downs Syndrome was not compliant 
with the millennium bug. As a result, calculations came back as negative, and pregnant women 
were screened as ‘low- risk’, even if they should be in the ‘high- risk’ area. The error resulted in 
the misdiagnosis of 235 women over a period of 5 months (January 1st to May 23rd 2000).  From 
early on, several attempts were made by nurses that had concerns to contact the lab and resolve 
the matter. However, due to a number of reasons, error recovery efforts failed.  
 
Following you will find 11 events that describe activities following January 1st 2000, during the 
response to the first indications of the software error. 
 
4.1 Event Classification 
 
Participants are asked to label the 11 events according to the stages of the Error Recovery 
Process, and then the sequence of events will be drawn in a STEP diagram as illustrated in figure 
3. Events can be labeled as [No Classification, Problem Detection, Error Detection, Further 
Investigation, Problem Indication, Error Indication, Error Explanation, Error Correction, 
Failure of Further Investigation, Failure of Problem Indication, Failure of Error Indication] 
 
Events following January 1st, 2000. 
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B.1 First participant’s solution 
 
E1: By the first two weeks of January, A Maternity and Gynaecology Liaison Sister at one of the 
hospitals (Hospital A) had become concerned as the number of screen positives she had received 
was lower than expected. _ Problem Detection __________________________ 
 
E2: Following her concerns, she made the Immunology Department aware of this at the end of 
January with a phone call, during which she spoke with Ms S, the acting MLSO. 
______________________Problem Indication ____ 
 
E3: At the end of January, the Liaison Sister also queried a result for an older woman which she 
believed to be unrealistically low. She also spoke to Ms S about this matter. 
______________________Problem Indication _____ 
 
E4: Ms S had mentioned it to a colleague, Ms J in Hartlepool Hospital who had undertaken the 
Y2K test on January 4th.  __ Further Investigation _________________________ 
 
E5: Ms J reassured her that everything was fine. __ Failure of Further Investigation__________ 
 
E6: Ms S did not log this incident because she did not regard it as very significant. 
____________________ Failure of Further Investigation _ 
 
E7: The Liaison Sister decided to monitor her own screen positive results. 
____________________ Further Investigation ______ 
 
E8: She phoned the Immunology Department again in April to express her concerns. She spoke 
to Mr M. ____________Problem Indication ______________ 
 
E9: Following her reports in April, she was told that it would be looked into by Mr M.  
____________________Further Investigation ______ 
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E10: During March and April, whenever results seemed unusual, the Liaison Sister would ring up 
and query the results for individual patients when they seemed unusual. ____________________ 
___________________ Problem Indication ________ 
 
E11: On all occasions she received assurances that there was no problem. 
___________________Failure of Further Investigation _______ 
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4.2 ER STEP diagram 
 
Now that events have been labeled, the ER STEP diagram can be drawn up. On the left of the 
vertical axis please place the title of each actor and the department/ organization they belong to. 
As events are drawn up from left to right, the corresponding date/ time of the event should be 
written below the horizontal axis, as in the example presented in Figure 3. Since events have been 
labeled in the previous part of the exercise, box diagrams do not need to contain the description of 
the event. It is advised that each box contains the event number and the error recovery stage name 
(e.g. E20: Error Detection) 
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Actors 
Time 
Actor A 
M&G 
Liaison 
Sister 
Actor B 
MLSO 
Ms S 
Actor C 
MLSO 
Ms J 
Actor D 
MLSO 
Mr M 
E2 
Problem 
Indicatn 
 
E1 
Problem 
Detectn 
E3 
Problem 
Indicatn 
 
E4 
Further 
Investigation 
 
E5 
Failure 
Further 
Investgn 
E6 
Failure 
Further 
Investgn 
E7 
Further 
Investgn 
 
E8 
Problem 
Indicatn 
 
E9 
Further 
Investgn 
 
E10 
Problem 
Indicatn 
 
E11 
Failure 
Further 
Investgn 
Early Jan Late January 
E4 
Further 
Investigation 
 
March April 
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Please feel free to leave any comments in this page 
 
Uncertain as to number of actual events – should they be broken down further?   
Also uncertain as to time plotting - should timing of events be more detailed? 
E.G. Problems are notified twice in separate events to Actor B Ms S, but event numbers do not 
detail this unless event label (E2) is repeated twice. 
Same applies to E4..both Actor B Ms S and Actor C Ms J are engaged in ‘further 
investigation’..separate events? 
Events in March / April overlap…is loss of information on ER-STEP important? 
Unclear whether or not Actor A’s efforts end in failure. 
Insufficient detail to report multiple ‘problem indication’ events from Actor A to unspecified 
persons, presumably in the lab who provided assurances. 
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B.2 Second participant’s solution 
E1: By the first two weeks of January, A Maternity and Gynaecology Liaison Sister at one of 
the hospitals (Hospital A) had become concerned as the number of screen positives she had 
received was lower than expected. __Problem Detection_________________________ 
 
E2: Following her concerns, she made the Immunology Department aware of this at the end of 
January with a phone call, during which she spoke with Ms S, the acting MLSO.  
_______Problem Indication___________________________ 
 
E3: At the end of January, the Liaison Sister also queried a result for an older woman which she 
believed to be unrealistically low. She also spoke to Ms S about this matter. 
_Problem Indication__________________________ 
 
E4: Ms S had mentioned it to a colleague, Ms J in Hartlepool Hospital who had undertaken the 
Y2K test on January 4th.  __Further Investigation_________________________ 
 
E5: Ms J reassured her that everything was fine. ___Failure of Further Investigation ___ 
 
E6: Ms S did not log this incident because she did not regard it as very significant. _Failure of 
Problem Indication____________________ 
 
E7: The Liaison Sister decided to monitor her own screen positive results. ____Further 
Investigation_______________________ 
 
E8: She phoned the Immunology Department again in April to express her concerns. She spoke 
to Mr M. ___Problem Indication____(? No definite proof  of error)____________________ 
 
E9: Following her reports in April, she was told that it would be looked into by Mr M.  
___Further Investigation________________________ 
 
E10: During March and April, whenever results seemed unusual, the Liaison Sister would ring 
up and query the results for individual patients when they seemed unusual. ___Problem 
Indication________________________ 
 
E11: On all occasions she received assurances that there was no problem. ___Failure of 
Problem Indication________________________ 
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4.3 ER STEP diagram 
 
Now that events have been labeled, the ER STEP diagram can be drawn up. On the left of the 
vertical axis please place the title of each actor and the department/ organization they belong to. 
As events are drawn up from left to right, the corresponding date/ time of the event should be 
written below the horizontal axis, as in the example presented in Figure 3. Since events have 
been labeled in the previous part of the exercise, box diagrams do not need to contain the 
description of the event. It is advised that each box contains the event number and the error 
recovery stage name (e.g. E20: Error Detection) 
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Actors 
Time 
E1 
Problem 
Detection 
E1 
Problem 
E7 
Further 
Investigation 
E2 
Problem 
Indication 
E4 
Further 
Investigation 
E1 
Problem 
E6 Failure 
of  Problem 
Indication 
E unclassified 
Further 
Investigation 
E5 Failure 
of  further 
Investigation 
E10 
Problem 
Indication 
E8 
Problem 
Indication 
E11 Failure 
of Problem 
Indication 
E9 
Further 
Investigation 
Actor A 
Liaison  
Sister 
Actor B 
Ms S 
MLSO 
Actor C 
Ms J 
MLSO 
Actor D 
Mr M 
 
Wk 1, 2 Wk 5 
 
Wk 5 
 
End of 
 
Jan - March April 2000 April 2000 April 2000 
E3 
Problem 
Indication 
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Please feel free to leave any comments in this page 
 
 
Found timing of events slightly difficult as not always discrete events, may cover a time period 
so become difficult to order and display  
 
Could argue need to break down into more events but appreciate do not want to become 
swamped with detail. It may be better to have description of event in box. 
 
Are repeated Problem Indications simply that or do they become a part of the Further 
Investigation process as they help to build a picture of the potential problem and start to confirm 
that it really exists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
